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This report was commissioned by the US-Canada Automotive Select Panel, which 
was established under Article 1004 of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA) implemented in January, 1989. The federal governments of Canada and the 
United States agreed that certain automotive issues which arose during the trade talks 
warranted further joint investigation by a binational panel representing the full spectrum 
of industry activities. The governments stated that the mandate of the Panel would be to 
research the issues and to make recommendations for private initiatives and public 
policies to improve the global competitiveness of the automotive industry in North 
America. 
The Automotive Select Panel appointed the Office for the Study of Automotive 
Transportation (OSAT) to conduct an assessment of the industry in order to understand 
the industry's current status and to identify those private initiatives and public policies 
that will enhance the industry's global competitiveness. This report summarizes the 
major findings and key recommendations of that work. 
The report addresses a number of public policy issues only in passing, and focuses 
on those issues that have the most direct impact on automotive competition. The 
extensive attention already focused on some policy issues in Canada and the United 
States by other reviews and studies renders any detailed efforts by OSAT superfluous. 
Such issues are raised only in contexts that are specific to, or especially important in, 
automotive competition. Thus, for example, we recognize the critical importance to the 
industry of ensuring an adequate supply of appropriately skilled human resources, but 
provide relatively little discussion and examination of this issue. 
Where appropriate, the report describes and discusses the differing situations of 
the industry's Canadian and US components. However, since the purpose of this report is 
to contribute to the improved competitiveness of the combined North American industry, 
such discussions are meant to reveal the interdependent nature of the industry and the 
potential for mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries. They are 
certainly not intended to suggest that either national industry can or should attempt to 
gain significant advantage at the expense of the other. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Traditional North American Automotive Industry --consisting of the Big 
Three manufacturers and their suppliers-is at a critical cross-roads. By most measures, 
the industry has experienced an extended period of serious decline and faces a real 
possibility that it is verging on a performance free-fall resulting in irreversible damage to 
the industry's viability. The purpose of this report is to assess the current status of the 
industry, to identify causes of its current difficulties, and to propose actions by the US 
and Canadian governments as well as by private industry that will help the automotive 
industry regain healthy competitive performance. 
Why the Traditional North American Automotive Industry Is Important 
Why should North American citizens and government officials be concerned with 
the fate of the Traditional North American Automotive Industry ? Why does it matter 
whether the vehicles sold in North America are produced by the Traditional 
manufacturers, by foreign producers, or by New Entrants (i.e. new assembly and 
manufacturing facilities in North America that are owned by offshore auto companies) ? 
There are several reasons why the existence of a viable North American-owned 
automotive industry is critical to the well-being of the North American economy. First, 
the Traditional Automotive Industry is the largest manufacturing industry in North 
America, accounting for about 4% of Gross National Product. Second, the industry 
generates approximately 1.2 million jobs (most of which are high wage) and provides 
health and pension benefits to employees, retirees, and their families-thereby 
contributing significantly to the North American standard of living. The auto industry 
directly supports one million additional jobs in related industries. Many of these spinoff 
jobs are also high paying and high value added. Finally, the industry supports jobs in 
non-manufacturing sectors of the economy through its induced level of economic 
activity . 
The automotive industry is linked to and is a major customer of other important 
industries, accounting for over 25% of sales of iron, stampings, machine tools, and 
semiconductors, and over 50% of sales of rubber, lead, and textiles. By employing 
approximately 6% of all scientists and engineers, and by accounting for approximately 
11% of North American corporate R&D in 1991 (though it was down from 14% in 1980), 
the automotive industry is a major source of advanced technologies with a ripple effect to 
other industries. While New Entrant automotive facilities in North America are 
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producing an increasing number of vehicles, their contribution to the North American 
economy is much more restricted than is that of the Traditional industry. The operations 
of the New Entrants are closely linked to their home countries (particularly in the case of 
Japan), from which they procure most of their high value-added components and where 
they locate most of their engineering activity. 
The North American Automotive industry generated approximately $1 1.3 billion 
in tax revenues in 1990-$7.05 billion in production-related taxes to US federal, state, 
and local governments, and approximately $4.25 billion to the Canadian federal and 
provincial governments~onsisting of $1.35 billion in production related taxes and an 
additional $2.9 billion in vehicle sales taxes. Nevertheless, tax payments from the 
Traditional North American automobile manufacturing industry have fallen sharply since 
the mid-1970s, in parallel to declining market share and profit. If the Traditional 
industry's sales and profitability in 1990 were equivalent to those implied by its 1978 
market share, the auto industry's total US tax liabilities in 1990 would have risen from 
$7.05 billion to $13.35 billion, for an increase of $6.30 billion, or approximately 89%. 
This number is almost 3% of the US federal budget deficit in 1990. Taxes paid by New 
Entrants are much lower because they have reported less profit than Traditional North 
American f m s  from comparable assets and sales. 
In sum, the Traditional Automotive Industry makes a significant contribution to 
the North American economy and standard of living. Should this industry continue to 
deteriorate, the negative implications for the North American economy will be severe. 
The full range of jobs that the industry currently provides will shrink as the Traditional 
industry contracts. Many technical and managerial jobs will be unavailable to North 
American citizens, but will remain largely concentrated in Japan and other nations, at 
least for some time. Similarly, tax revenues will continue to contract, and will not be 
nearly compensated for by the New Entrants. 
Current Status of the North American Automotive Industry 
The Traditional domestic share of North American automotive sales has markedly 
declined during the past fifteen years-down from 85% of the passenger car market in 
1974 to 56% in 1991. The share of nonfleet North American sales declined to as low as 
48% in 1991, as the Big Three lost a total of $6.7 billion-a post-World War 11 record. 
Employment in the automotive industry has fallen sharply since 1978, and real 
wages have declined. The North American decline in employment, to about 88% of 1978 
levels during 1990, involved the loss of over 200,000 jobs. 
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The Traditional supplier industry has suffered along with the domestic 
assemblers, as North American suppliers have been relatively unsuccessful in accessing 
New Entrant operations in North America and Japanese assemblers in Japan. Indeed, the 
North American auto parts trade deficit with Japan is projected to climb from $13 billion 
in 1991 to over $20 billion in 1994. Furthennore, New Entrant assembly and parts 
supplier capacity has created a situation of major overcapacity in the industry, further 
exacerbating the industry's difficulties. The competitive pressures on the Traditional 
industry to close capacity create a wide range of social and economic dislocations in 
North America. 
The North American automotive industry has undergone a series of shocks that 
have fundamentally altered its structure and shape. The basic driver of the industry's 
competitive challenges is the internationalization of the production sources supplying the 
North American market. The major international competitor to the North American 
automotive industry has been and will continue to be-at least for the next fifteen 
years-the Japanese industry. As has been the case in a number of manufacturing areas, 
such as consumer electronics and machine tools, the Japanese have proven themselves to 
be formidable competitors, and have been able to gain substantial market share and even 
a dominant position in some vehicle segments. 
The Global Context of the Automotive Industry 
The global automotive market continues to expand, growing from 42.3 million 
units in 1978 to just over 48 million in 1991. North America, Western Europe, and Japan 
account for over 90% of the world's vehicle production. North America was the world's 
leading vehicle producer until 1979, but since that year, production leadership has 
alternated between Japan and North America. Since 1978, North America lost over 10.5 
share points, or 5.1 million vehicles at 1991 worldwide production volume. While the 
North American share of world vehicle production has declined from 32% in 1975 to 
24% in 1991, North American-owned companies still account for 33% of world vehicle 
production. 
While the global auto market grows, the North American market has reached 
saturation, and annual growth levels are expected to reach only 1% or 2% in the coming 
years. Meanwhile, opportunities for exports of North American-produced vehicles are 
limited, as most countries require substantial domestic content or enforce various tariff 
and nontariff barriers to vehicle imports. Moreover, the presence of North American- 
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owned production facilities in Europe and Latin America further limits exports to those 
markets of North Arnerican-produced vehicles. 
Many industrialized countries have adopted an explicit industrial policy aimed at 
preserving a viable auto industry for their own domestic producers. Most European 
nations, for example, have instituted import quotas or 'targets' for vehicle imports to their 
markets. Other nations, such as Japan, enforce a variety of informal barriers which 
greatly limit foreign auto sales in their domestic markets. The North American market, 
on the other hand, remains largely open to vehicle imports. Consequently, while imports 
accounted for approximately 35% of the North American automotive market in 1991, 
imports from North America and Europe accounted for less than 3% of vehicle sales in 
Japan that same year. 
Furthermore, the recent automotive agreement limiting imports of Japanese-made 
vehicles into the European Community may indirectly impact the North American 
market. Japanese manufacturers may well increase their exports to North America to 
utilize production capacity originally intended for the European market. 
Causes of the North American Automotive Industry's Decline 
North American automotive manufacturers maintained virtually exclusive control 
of the North American market from the early 1900s through the late 1950s. hported 
vehicles filled niches, competing for the relatively small sales volumes available in the 
sports, extreme luxury, or budget small-car markets. 
North American automotive management bears a large measure of responsibility 
for the competitive situation the industry faces today. Detroit was not sufficiently 
concerned about the small import market share in relatively low volume niches. 
Management was slow in responding to the import threat, resisted recognizing the 
Japanese as serious and consequential competitors, sought easy and quick fixes to the 
problems posed by the Japanese competitive challenges, and saw the silver lining in 
every cloud on the horizon. At the same time, it must be recognized that the industry 
was, in some sense, a victim of its own success in earlier times. It is no easy task to 
change the strategies and tactics that made one remarkably successful over a long period 
of time, nor is it easy to recognize the environmental signals indicating that fundamental 
change has occurred. 
In addition to management's role, it is important to recognize that systemic public 
policy differences between Japan and North America have had a significant competitive 
impact. Public policies in Japan have historically been supportive of a manufacturing 
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base, thereby providing certain competitive advantages to that nation's automakers. By 
contrast, public policies in North America have often been adversarial or at best neutral 
toward the automotive industry. For example, Japanese import barriers-both formal and 
informal-ontinue to provide that nation's producers a highly profitable sanctuary 
market, enabling them to offset losses in North America and Europe. The North 
American market, on the other hand remains the world's most accessible, drawing a large 
number of global competitors. 
Health care policy is another case in point. Japan's national health care system 
and the absence of a comparable system in the US means that the average health care 
expense associated with each vehicle produced in Japan is only some $550 compared 
with nearly $1,100 in the United States. And while Canada does offer a national health 
care program, its potential cost savings are diluted due to the high content of US- 
produced components in Canadian assembled vehicles. 
Furthermore, increasing regulatory focus on fuel economy, occupant safety and 
environmental issues in North America is straining the limited resources of the North 
American industry, which might more effectively utilize its financial and human 
resources to further close the competitive gap rather than to comply with new regulations. 
Performance Improvements by the North American Automotive Industry 
The past five years have witnessed significant improvement in the performance of 
the North American automotive industry. As a result of new management approaches, 
improved manufacturer-supplier relations, and huge capital investments exceeding $40 
billion, the auto industry has made noteworthy gains along several dimensions. 
Manufacturing prcductivity in the auto industry has improved at a 2.9% average annual 
rate during the latter half of the decade. Quality gains have nearly eliminated the gap 
between the North American and Japanese manufacturers, and North American vehicles 
currently have a price advantage in almost all segments. Time to market has been 
shortened, as exemplified by Chrysler's 39-month LH development program. 
While there is still much room for improvement, it is important to acknowledge 
that the industry has made significant strides in closing the gap with the competition by 
improving the quality and appeal of its products. It is also important to credit the industry 
with developing and adopting new innovations-including air bags, anti-lock brakes, and 
the now ubiquitous minivan. 
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The Imperative of Global Free Trade 
The North American automotive industry is committed to free and fair trade. 
However, to achieve the benefits of free and fair trade, all participants in the global 
trading system must believe that trade relations and investment flows are mutually 
beneficial Perceptions of imbalance and lack of mutual benefit make free trade 
unsustainable. All participants in the global market must adhere to principles and 
systems of trade and competition that are relatively uniform and provide equivalent 
access to each other's markets. 
The North American trade imbalance with Japan is large and continues to grow. 
Of the $43 billion trade deficit the US incurred with Japan in 1991, $32.4 billion-or 
75%-was accounted for by autos and automotive components. Canada's deficit with 
Japan in autos and components amounted to approximately $4.6 billion in 1991. This 
imbalance has resulted in the perception that there is a lack of mutual benefit. These 
trends may eventually undermine free trade between North America and Japan, and it 
may be necessary to create short term corrective measures to achieve a realignment that is 
more consistent with the concept of free and fair trade. While these short term actions 
will be viewed by some as managed trade orprotectionist, the intent of the 
recommendations made by this report is to preserve and protect free trade. 
What Lies Ahead for the Traditional North American Automotive Industry 
While the North American automotive industry has taken corrective actions, much 
remains to be done, and the industry's future prosperity is by no means assured. At least 
two scenarios of the industry's future are possible. 
Under the first scenario, the current situation remains largely unchanged, and the 
Traditional industry continues to lose share of the North American market. As sales and 
profits erode, the Traditional industry loses its viability, going the way of the consumer 
electronics and machine tool industries and becoming dominated by foreign competitors, 
Much of the value-added employment shifts from North America to Japan, and North 
American operations in effect truly become "Japan's subcontractors." 
Under a second, more optimistic scenario, the Traditional North American auto 
industry meets transportation needs of customers worldwide with manufacturing bases in 
all major regions. The Traditional industry gradually regains North American market 
share, capturing 75% of North American vehicle sales by the year 2000. The rise in 
domestic sales translates directly to increased business for Traditional automotive 
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suppliers. Employment opportunities rebound and capital investments in North American 
infrastructure expand. In addition to regaining market share in North America, this 
scenario envisions that the Traditional North American industry will capture 15% of the 
Japanese market and substantially increase its R&D investment. Under this scenario, 
total sales in North America would rise 5.6%, while Japanese market share would fall by 
just about that amount. The employment gains from capturing market share in Japan 
more than offset the losses associated with increased R&D investments, as Canada and 
the United States each gain abut four percent in automotive emp1oyment.l 
In order to realize this second, preferable scenario, the industry must take the lead 
in regaining its competitiveness. Productivity must be further improved, quality and 
product value gains must continue, and design cycles compressed. Most importantly, the 
industry must convince reluctant consumers that North American vehicles are world class 
in quality, reliability, and value. Even if the private sector accomplishes all this, the 
automotive industry will not necessarily succeed. In order to increase the likelihood of 
success, the private and public sectors must forge a cooperative partnership. 
Recommended Actions for Improving the Industry's Competitiveness 
Numerous reviews and analyses over the past few years have evaluated the 
competitiveness of the North American economies and specific industries within those 
economies.2 This report is the first to consider the competitiveness of a specific industry 
within the bilateral context of the United States and Canada, recognizing that the 
competitiveness of the industry is intertwined with the competitiveness of the two 
economies rather than simply one or the other. Therefore this report focuses its policy 
recommendations at once more narrowly than is typically the case-in terms of the 
actions we recommend-and more broadly-in terms of the binational focus of those 
recommendations. 
We strongly support many of the general recommendations offered by these 
numerous other reports, including many of those that target improved education and 
training, enhanced savings-to-debt ratios, and more assertive governmental negotiating 
postures in international trade. The automotive industry is a key element of both the 
Canadian and US economies, and undoubtedly will benefit from the increasing general 
competitiveness of those economies, along with other industries. However, we elect not 
to repeat and specifically endorse these myriad recommendations. We prefer to present a 
l ~ o r  a fuller discussion of various scenarios which the automotive industry may face, see pp. 161-168. 
2~ee Appendix A for a list of some of these reports and their recommendations. 
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shorter, more focused list of recommendations that, in our judgment, will be most 
effective in ensuring the survival and competitiveness of the North American automotive 
industry, including its New Entrant component. We adopt this approach to highlight 
these most critical steps for automotive survival, and because the industry may not 
survive until such time that many of these more fundamental, longer-term efforts bear 
h i t .  
A number of guidelines have shaped our selection of these recommendations, and 
it is useful to review them here. First, the recommendations bear on the particular 
situation of the North American automotive industry, however much they may or may not 
benefit other manufacturing industries or even other sectors of the two economies. In our 
view, none of our recommendations involve harm to other constituent elements of the 
economies. However, they have direct and traceable benefits for the automotive sector. 
Second, while the survival of the Traditional North American industry is the specific 
focus of this report, we recognize the important and promising role of the New Entrants 
in the North American industry, and thus avoid recommendations that unfairly penalize 
or hamper the competitive development of this emerging industry sector. Rather, we 
focus on recommendations that strengthen both Traditional and New Entrant components 
of the North American industry in competition with offshore producers-to the extent 
they improve the real incomes of North American citizens. 
Third, the policies and practices of all world industries are changing and evolving 
over time, and many, although certainly not all, past policies and practices that distorted 
international competition were temporary and have been corrected. Nevertheless, the 
automotive industry is truly strategic, both in the sense of its importance to the North 
American economies and its relatively long time horizons. We therefore recognize that 
the competitive damage inflicted by time-bound, specific policies and practices often 
endures long after those policies and practices are corrected, and assert the 
appropriateness of steps to remedy such damage. Two noteworthy examples of this 
emerge in the report. Japan's policies against direct foreign investment in the automotive 
industry have shifted from an "infant industry" prohibition to a less formal practice of 
resisting control appropriate to levels of direct investment by foreigners, and an effective 
insistence on joint ventures for automotive companies wishing to establish a production 
presence in Japan. The formal policy prohibition may have been eliminated, but it 
effectively barred the North American industry from pursuing its standard method of 
participating in foreign markets, and has only eased as the competitive pressure on the 
North American companies has prevented them from implementing this strategy. 
Similarly, though the Japanese cost of capital advantage of the mid-1980s may be 
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virtually eliminated for the present, it afforded the Japanese manufacturers an 
immeasurable competitive advantage in product development and investment, which are 
tremendous competitive advantages today. 
Finally, we believe that these recommendations must be implemented in a 
systems fashion, because the underlying competitive problems of the North American 
industry are themselves systemic in nature. They are certainly neither temporary nor self- 
correcting. Thus the implementation of one or two of these recommendations may itself 
do little to improve the industry's competitiveness if the others are ignored. In particular, 
it is critical that both private and public initiatives be implemented. Thus, our first 
recommendation to the industry-increased investment-is impossible unless public 
policy changes support the enormous capital requirements of such efforts, while our 
second recommendation to the industry-increasing penetration of the Japanese market- 
is illusory if public policy fails to ensure the fair market opportunity of those efforts to 
succeed. We have reached a condition such that the industry may not survive- 
regardless of however successfully it pursues appropriate private initiatives-if the public 
policy environment does not become more supportive of its efforts. Also, the industry 
will not survive if it fails to implement effective private efforts, no matter how supportive 
the public policy environment becomes, short of outright and permanent protection, 
which this study opposes. 
Private Initiatives 
The evidence presented in this report clearly establishes the improved 
competitiveness of the Traditional North American Automotive Industry, both absolutely 
and relatively, along a number of important operating and product dimensions. 
Productivity has substantially improved, narrowing the gap with the Japanese industry 
and increasing the lead over European manufacturers. Product quality has improved 
enormously, and the Traditional domestic industry now closely trails the Japanese and 
leads the Europeans. The Traditional industry now has a price advantage over both 
Japanese and European imports. Nevertheless, this improvement has perhaps come at the 
expense of company profits and investments, where performance has been poor in the 
current economy. Moreover, the Traditional industry continues to lose market share to 
New Entrants, even as Japanese import share somewhat declines, reflecting to varying 
degrees the Traditional industry's fewer and older model offerings and consumer 
reluctance to purchase its products. 
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The Traditional North American Automotive Industry must continue to accelerate its 
efSorts at improving its operating Mciency and results. In particular, it must accelerate 
capital spending for new product development and achieving production mciencies, in 
spite of the difficulties this entails. 
The Japanese automotive industry has enjoyed remarkable worldwide success 
over the past two decades, anchored in a series of competitive advantages. Some of these 
advantages reflect factors internal to the industry, such as excellent products, superb 
strategic management, a relentless focus on continuous improvement, and a well-trained 
labor force. Some advantages reflect accidents of history, such as the initial opportunities 
in the North American market presented by the two oil shocks of the 1970s. Other 
advantages reflect the supportive economic and public policy environment in the home 
market, such as the continuing growth of the Japanese market and the difficulty foreign 
automotive industries have faced in securing access to that market-the world's second 
largest national vehicle market and largest auto parts consumption market. The near-total 
dominance of its home market has afforded the Japanese industry numerous strategic 
advantages in its competition in offshore markets such as North America, providing a 
volume production base and options in pricing and profit strategies across international 
markets. We recognize the numerous and significant bamers to accessing the Japanese 
markets for vehicles and parts. These include keiretsu arrangements and inspection 
practices, as well as the substantial costs of doing business in Japan, especially in 
establishing a distribution network. Nevertheless, it is critical that the North American 
industry visibly expand its efforts to penetrate that market, both for the potential business 
it promises and to disrupt the secure home base4.e. the sanctuary market--of its major 
international competition. It is imperative that these efforts include specific responses to 
popular explanations for the industry's failure to date, including an increased market 
development effort in Japan and the export of vehicles particularly suited to the total 
Japanese market. 
It  is a fundamental strategic imperative that the North American industry continue to 
expand its eforts to penetrate the Japanese automotive markets for both vehicles and 
parts. 
The North American industry has made great strides in the capability of its 
constituent parts to work together, recognizing that changes in the competitive 
environment have altered the fundamental dynamics of industry competition. In 
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particular, the often adversarial relationships among the segments of the industry 
appropriate to earlier times have changed and the basis of coordinated actions widened. 
Thus the typically adversarial relationships between manufacturers and suppliers and 
management and labor have changed. While some aspects of these relationships remain 
appropriately adversarial, the competitive, win-lose approach that often colored the entire 
relationship has given way to a recognition of the necessity of coordinated, win-win 
approaches in many circumstances. 
International competition no longer permits the inefficiency fostered by the 
extreme competitive orientation of old, nor does it permit any company to compete 
without regard to its suppliers or customers, nor management and labor to compete on 
every issue. Even the Big Three manufacturers can no longer afford to compete in all 
their activities. In particular, automotive manufacturers and suppliers can no longer 
afford to pursue a complete research and development program that will meet all their 
needs for material, product, and process development, while ensuring their ability to meet 
the increasing regulatory demands of society for environmental improvements ranging 
from clean air to improved fuel economy. The industry has recognized this, and a 
number of consortia for pre-competitive research have been established in the United 
States. 
These cooperative efforts should be expanded to include other institutions and 
sectors of our economies, perhaps especially in the pursuit of research and development. 
Many Canadian and US universities offer unusual strengths in particular aspects of 
automotive research and development, and the US national labs offer many such 
resources that may become available now that the Cold War has ended. 
The North American industry must expand its developing nonadversarial orientations, 
especially in research and development, and begin to draw on the nonindustry resources 
available in both economies. 
There is ample reason to be concerned that the Japanese-owned New Entrants 
represent more of a parallel industry than an addition to the Traditional industry. This 
report documents a number of these concerns. These include the preference of New 
Entrants to source from New Entrant suppliers; their reliance on high levels of imported 
automotive parts, components, and production equipment from Japan; their selection of 
greenfield production locations often far from the Traditional North American supply 
base, and hiring policies that select new workers rather than displaced auto workers; and 
continued reliance on Japan for high-value components, research and development, and 
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engineering. If New Entrants wish to become full participants in the North American 
automotive industry, these practices will have to alter, and more of their activity become 
integrated into the North American industry. This is not to say that competition between 
companies should be muted, nor that New Entrants are obliged to pattern their activities 
and operations after the current Traditional industry. However, they should strive to 
increase their North American activity levels, including engineering, vehicle and part 
sourcing, and reliance on the North American automotive workforce, and become more 
participating competing companies rather than a rival industry. 
New Entrant automotive companies should continue to expand their eflorts to integrate 
themselves into the Traditional North American automotive economy as competitor 
companies, rather than constitute a competitor industry. 
Public Initiatives 
The North American automotive industry has experienced a challenging two 
decades, as new competitors have successfully entered the Canadian and US markets, 
changed the bases of competition in the industry, and made large investments in New 
Entrant facilities in North America, often subsidized by various governmental agencies. 
In addition to this competitive turmoil, the industry has faced increased regulatory actions 
covering safety, vehicle and plant emissions, and fuel economy. These regulatory 
initiatives often originate in different agencies, with little coordinated consideration of 
their effects on the industry. There is much debate as to the wisdom of some of these 
specific regulatory efforts, and even fundamental questions as to the wisdom of using 
regulatory tools to achieve social goods. However, there is little debate that the net effect 
of these efforts channeled industry capital into areas of minor and/or temporary relevance 
to consumer decisions at a time when all available capital could well have been targeted 
to meeting the challenges of offshore competitors. 
Moreover, the fact that these requirements apply to all vehicles sold in each 
market does not mean that offshore and North American industries face the same 
requirements and costs of compliance. Thus, plant emission regulations apply only to 
North American production facilities, and the Japanese and European industries enjoy a 
substantial lead in fuel economy as a result of the differential vehicle mix sparked by the 
fuel-taxing policies of the two North American governments compared with Europe and 
Japan. Reasonable people will certainly disagree as to the costs and benefits of these 
regulatory efforts, and the appropriateness of shielding an industry from policy 
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differentials across nations. However, the critical point is that these regulatory burdens 
were imposed with little concern for the effect they would have on the industry's 
competitiveness against imports, While such concerns should perhaps not be the only 
factors governing national policy decisions, they certainly should be major ones if the 
industry's core role in the two econornies-as documented in this report-is recognized. 
Both the Canadian and US governments should affirm the strategic importance of 
the automotive industry to the two economies. Our evidence suggests this fundamental 
orientation may already be stronger in Ottawa than in Washington. Such recognition 
requires developing policies and mechanisms to foster the industry's international 
competitiveness, and developing a repertoire of policy tools that can be deployed rapidly 
and flexibly to adjust the international bases of competition in response to 
governmentally imposed advantages and disadvantages, These tools should be available 
to address three situations: first, in response to policy actions of competitor nations and 
industries that have adverse consequences for the competitiveness of the North American 
industry, whether in North American or foreign markets, such as cost subsidies and 
market closure; second, to adjust policy actions of the North American governments 
themselves that impose disadvantages on our own industry compared to offshore 
producers, such as differential regulatory impact; and third, to remedy past policy actions 
of both North American and foreign governments that impose policy-linked 
disadvantages that linger even after the damaging policies or circumstance have been 
eliminated, such as barriers to entry and capital costs, when time itself is a critical factor. 
The North American governments should efSectively recognize the strategic importance of 
the automotive industry developing and coordinating the application of policy tools to 
avoid damaging and to promote the industry's internutional competitiveness. 
The two North American governments are f d y  committed to free trade, and this 
commitment has been frequently demonstrated. An example is the bilateral Free Trade 
Agreement that gave birth to the Automotive Select Panel. OSAT finnly endorses these 
principles and af fms the necessity of expanding rather than contracting free trade on a 
global basis. However, the evidence of this report documents the continuing barriers to 
free automotive trade, particularly with regard to Japan. We understand the importance 
of leading by example, and we share concerns that retaliatory market closure actions 
simply hurt consumers and do little to expand trade. 
Nevertheless, the North American automotive industry has paid a great price 
because of the relatively open North American markets and relatively closed Japanese 
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market, both in lost sales in North America and lost sales in Japan. Our evidence 
suggests that capturing even a modest 15% of the Japanese market-well below North 
American market share in Europe-would have a major beneficial impact on North 
American sales and employment. Moreover, any consumer surplus North America has 
enjoyed because of vehicle imports is reduced by consumer loss due to parts imports and 
may, in any case, be purchased at the eventual cost of a continuing, viable, full-range 
North American automotive industry. 
Few experienced observers deny that there are continuing entry barriers to the 
Japanese vehicle and parts markets, as there are to markets of other manufactured 
products. Debate today centers on whether the mechanisms in place to dismantle these 
barriers are sufficient and whether the rate of dismantling these barriers is acceptable. 
We support the long-term efforts of the Canadian and US governments to reduce these 
automotive trade barriers, but we also feel that such efforts will likely succeed too late to 
preserve the vital North American automotive industry in any semblance of its current 
activity. We note that the major shift in currency values in the mid-1980s has yet had 
virtually no effect on automotive trade, although it effectively reduced Japanese 
investment costs in North America by over 40%, and raised North American investment 
costs in Japan by over 80%. 
Both governments must take more affirmative steps to open both the Japanese 
automotive vehicle and parts markets to free competition from the North American 
industry. Ideally, coordinated efforts of the two governments would be preferred because 
of the integrated nature of the two motor vehicle industries, Evidence in this report 
suggests that quotas on Japanese exports may protect the industry at consumer expense 
and provide high profit levels for Japanese producers. However, there are many other 
policy tools available to accelerate the dismantling of Japan's remaining baniers, and it is 
important that the North American governments consider and select those that are most 
appropriate and effective. 
The North American governments, either jointly or severally, should pursuefree and fair 
trade by effectively assuring reciprocal access to world automotive markets, especially 
Japan's, both because of its size and relative closure. 
This report documents that the North American industry faces enormous demands 
for capital over the next five to ten years, both to invest in products and to refurbish 
facility investments. However, because of the nature of our market economies and the 
competing demands of industry stockholders, these longer-term investments are difficult 
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to justify. Tax policies are effective policy tools to influence management behavior, and, 
unfortunately, some tax provisions in the United States and Canada hinder rather than 
facilitate investments necessary to industry competitiveness. 
A particular problem for the automotive industry is that so much of its research 
and development activities are focused on product development that does not, or may not, 
qualify for tax incentives in either country. We believe that the definitions of industry 
research and development should be modified to recognize the huge cost of automotive 
product development and the large proportions of those costs that truly represent applied 
research. We further believe that research and development tax credits should be made 
permanent, as they encourage critical economic investments across many industries. 
Such credits will encourage the expansion, rather than contraction, of such investments. 
We also believe that both governments should establish a permanent investment 
tax credit for facility and equipment modernization, subject to investments' qualification 
as North American under the FTA rule of origin, or 50% value-added, or some other 
appropriate rule. Finally, there are other tax policies, such as the US Alternative 
Minimum Tax, that penalize capital intense, cyclical industries like automotive. 
Both governments should review their tax codes for adverse impact on automotive versus 
other sectors, and consider tax policies that compensate the industry for handicaps 
imposed by the structure of the two economies. 
Two components of the social wage constitute significant portions of the North 
American industry's employee costs. These are health care expenditures and pension 
costs. Both of these cost components disadvantage the Traditional manufacturers 
compared with New Entrants, and the health care component represents a significant 
disadvantage compared to importers' health care costs. 
Our report documents that the Traditional manufacturers and their suppliers 
incurred nearly $1 100 per vehicle in health care payments for North American production 
in 1990. While Canada and the United States differ in both their systems and costs of 
health care, Canadian vehicles carry a large health care cost due to their high levels of US 
supplier content. Our report estimates that 1990 health care costs per vehicle in Japan 
were about $550, an advantage of over $525 per vehicle, just about the ratio of total 
medical expenditures for the two societies. New Entrants' US health care costs were even 
lower, at about $475 per unit, or an advantage of over $600 per unit. 
Pension costs in the Traditional industry are a substantial pomon of benefit costs, 
reflecting the age of the workforce and the high ratio of retirees to active employees, 
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exacerbated by the shrinkage of the industry employment base over the past decade. 
These costs are particularly high in relationship to New Entrants, whose recency and 
young workforces keep these costs low. 
The pension and health care cost advantages enjoyed by New Entrants are 
diminishing advantages: at some point in the future they will be roughly equivalent to the 
Traditional manufacturers' cost, as their workforce ages and stable capacity yields an age 
distribution similar to the Traditional industry's. However, the pressures on the 
Traditional industry are so severe that it is unlikely they can survive until that time. The 
fundamental challenge of different policies in health care between the United States and 
the bulk of the automotive-producing world is complex, and the nation will simply have 
to face the choice of altering its present medical cost funding system, face continued 
erosion of its manufacturing base as its products carry this cost into global competition, 
or develop a method of insulating its manufacturers from such social choices. 
There are three basic ways to reduce the automotive industry's direct per-vehicle 
health care and pension costs. First, since these costs per worker are relatively fixed, per- 
vehicle costs can be reduced through increased volumes. Indeed, 1990 health care costs 
at 1985 production levels would be some $250 lower. Second, Big Three direct health 
care expenditures in the United States would be reduced by nearly 50% if the United 
States adopted a Canadian-style system, Third, the automotive industry could decrease 
its health care and pension coverage for employees. This third method is inconsistent 
with improving competitiveness without lowering living standards, while the second 
method is at best a long-term potential solution. The first solution is only a partial 
solution, as significant differences in the contained health care costs of Traditional, 
Import, and New Entrant vehicles will remain. 
A fourth pcssibility is to levy some form of health care and/or pension tax on each 
vehicle sold in the North American markets, utilizing this fund to compensate 
manufacturers and suppliers whose costs are excessive due to their long-time 
contributions to the economy. This strategy would involve some minimal loss of 
consumer welfare, compensated by the avoidance of such losses should the Traditional 
Automotive Industry collapse. However, it would involve a shift in consumer welfare 
between purchasers of Traditional and ImportNew Entrant vehicles. 
The North American governments must develop policies that prevent components of the 
social wage from becoming competitive disadvantages for the North American 
automotive industry or for long-established participants within the industry; this is 
pam'cularly critical for the United States in the area of health care costs. 
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The costs of industrial adjustment necessary for the enhanced competitiveness of 
the North American automotive industry are high. These include such costs as economic 
dislocation experienced by individuals who lose their jobs or must retire early, 
communities and provinces/states that lose important parts of their economic and tax base 
as the Traditional industry closes facilities, and the social costs associated with worker 
displacement. New Entrant expansion will not compensate for these total losses, and 
effectively redistributes the automotive manufacturing economy away from its historical 
base and into new areas. These broader social and economic costs of automotive 
adjustment are well understood. 
The Traditional industry bears heavy and direct costs in this restructuring, and 
there is a danger that these costs will serve only to hasten the demise of many participants 
in the Traditional industry. Thus, when companies shed workers as they become more 
productive and reduce capacity, the costs associated with such terminations and closures 
must be borne by a smaller remaining base, and pension costs and health care costs for 
retirees must be supported by a smaller workforce. These costs are currently paid by the 
company, and the imposition of such costs on specific companies may even differentially 
handicap those that are most effectively pursuing competitiveness. 
These costs are aggravated by New Entrant decisions to locate in greenfield sites 
and to hire fresh workforces, thus failing to provide new opportunities to individuals and 
communities damaged by the retrenchment of the Traditional industry. These decisions 
permit the New Entrants to avoid many of the social components of these costs as well, 
since their new locations do not share in all the costs associated with layoffs and closings. 
The Traditional industry continues to bear both direct and indirect costs of these kinds. 
The automotive industry historically presented major barriers to entry, primarily 
reflecting the huge capital investments it entails, the importance of economies of scale for 
efficient production, and the significant learning curve that characterizes it. Temporary 
advantages, such as lower social wage costs, public subsidies for investment and training, 
new facilities, or even the competitively forced closing of some established capacity were 
offset by these significant entry baniers. However, these traditional entry barriers have 
little meaning when entry is effected by successful and well-funded offshore industries, 
such as is the case in North American automotive production today. These temporary 
advantages may in fact overwhelm the established participants. 
It makes no sense for the North American economies to allow temporary 
company advantages and disadvantages to become the basis of selection for company 
survival. Thus the New Entrants enjoy a cost of health care advantage that will gradually 
disappear, but over a sufficiently long time that it may ultimately be the deciding factor in 
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their survival and the death of Traditional companies. These social and economic costs 
of job loss due to enhanced productivity and necessary capacity reductions should be 
distributed throughout the industry and the economy. 
The North American governments must adjust the balance of advantages and 
disadvantages to New Entrants to reflect the international reality that capital barriers 
are now far lower than in the past, and that the costs of enhanced competitiveness and 
inevitable employment reductions may destroy the Traditional Automotive Industry . 
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L INTRODUCTION 
The Traditional North American Automotive Industry faces a crisis and may be 
on the verge of economic free fall. The industry cannot long sustain the pattern of the 
past few years: eroding market share, disastrous profit performance, and continual 
shrinkage in the face of well-supported competition. The choice is clear: the industry can 
recover and continue to provide North America with the wealth and economic activity it 
creates, or it can even more precipitously decline. This industry--consisting of the Big 
Three motor vehicle assemblers and thousands of component suppliers-is one of the 
most important to the two North American economies, and its loss could well do massive 
damage to our economies and standard of living. North Americans should understand 
that they cannot afford to lose this industry, and work to identify ways to solve this 
problem without a last-minute fall back to ineffective and ultimately damaging rescue 
attempts. 
It is not too late. In the past few years competitive pressures have transformed the 
industry, resulting in leaner operations, shortened product development times, closer 
manufacturer-supplier relations, competitive product offerings, and additional 
productivity advances. Today's North American vehicles have made excellent progress 
in terms of quality, fuel efficiency, safety, and value. Much has been accomplished, 
although much remains to be done. 
However, the public policy structure of North America places the automotive 
industry-and other manufacturing industries-at a permanent disadvantage relative to 
foreign competitors. This structural disadvantage cannot be overcome-regardless of the 
industry's advances-unless the governments of North America accept the following 
realities: 
The public policy environment in North American is generally more supportive 
of New Entrant manufacturers than of the indigenous, Traditional industry. 
The economic benefits contributed to the North American economy by 
Traditional manufacturers, whether in automotive, machine tools, or other industries, are 
not equaled by New Entrant manufacturers, since the New Entrants perform much of their 
value-added activity in their home countries. 
Much of this report discusses the damage that the Traditional Automotive 
Industry has experienced as a consequence of inroads made by the Japanese competitors 
into the North American market. This is not meant as an attack on Japan, or to imply that 
Japanese policy has any intention of destroying the North American economy. Rather it 
is meant to stress that much of Japan's industrial success is due to comprehensive and 
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systematic public policies that emphasize global manufacturing competitiveness over 
consumer welfare. 
Furthermore, it is of critical importance to understand that while this report 
focuses on the automotive industry, the arguments made herein are germane to the entire 
spectrum of manufacturing industry in North America. As the automotive industry 
deteriorates, so too will North American manufacturing, and along with it North 
American living standards. 
This report assesses the current status of the industry, identifies causes of its 
current difficulties, identifies areas where progress has been made, and proposes actions 
by the US and Canadian governments as well as by private industry that will help the 
automotive industry regain healthy competitive performance. 
Definition of Terms 
North America 
Throughout the report, the term North America is used to refer to the Canadian 
and US industries. This usage reflects communication convenience, and in no way 
should be interpreted as excluding Mexico from either the continent or from the 
continental industry. 
North American Automotive Industry 
The term North American automotive industry includes both the Traditional 
industry and the New Entrants. The New Entrants are the North American production 
facilities of non-North American automotive manufacturers and suppliers. 
Traditional North American Automotive Industry 
The Traditional North American Automotive Industry consists of three vehicle 
manufacturers-GM, Ford, and Chrysler-as well as thousands of independent 
companies that supply materials, parts, and components for incorporation into vehicles. 
These automotive supplier companies, virtually all of which are North American owned, 
range from small local operations supplying products such as stampings or fasteners, to 
very large international companies with global operations, supplying more complex parts 
and components. 
These independent suppliers participate in almost all manufacturing industries and 
include significant portions of the materials, electronics, metal stamping, and plastics 
processing industries. In a very real sense, automotive suppliers form a microcosm of 
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North American manufacturing. They also evidence a wide range of dependence upon 
the automotive industry, as many rely on the industry for over 85% of their sales, while 
some of the larger, more diversified companies have much lower, although still 
substantial shares of their business in the automotive sector. These suppliers contribute 
well over half the industry's total value-added, and are themselves important sources of 
technical innovation, jobs, and profits. 
In order to better understand the integrated nature of the North American 
automotive industry, it is useful to compare the relative economic distribution of 
automotive industry activities in Canada and the US. As table 1.1 portrays, Canada 
accounts for 9.5% of vehicle sales in North America, while its related activities- 
including automotive employment and payroll-are substantially greater than this level 
of automotive consumption. Therefore, the Canadian economy benefits proportionally 
more from the North American automotive industry than does the US economy. The 
table also illustrates the integrated nature of the North American automotive economy. 
Table 1.1. Comparison of US and Canada Automotive Activity, 1989. 
t I 
I Total Lieht Vehicle Sales I 91.5% I 9.5% 
I Direct Automotive Employment (assembly I 85.5% I 14.5% 
Vehicles Assembled 




Automotive Parts Employment 
Automotive Assembly Payroll* 
Automotive Parts Payroll* 
Automotive Payroll (assembly & parts)* 
Competitiveness 
17.5% 










meets the test of domestic and international markets. From a societal point of view, we 
assume that national or bilateral competitiveness includes the notion that the auto 
industry contributes to improving the real standard of living and quality of life of North 
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American citizens. This definition is quite close to the definition adopted in a recent 
report by the US Office of Technology Assessment.3 
Vehicle Production Source 
Traditional North American vehicles are manufactured and marketed in North 
America by the Big Three. Import vehicles are manufactured abroad by foreign 
companies and sold here. Vehicles manufactured abroad but marketed here by the Big 
Three are captive imports. The Pontiac LeMans, made by Korea's Daewoo and sold in 
North America by GM, is a captive import. Captive imports represent a distinct type of 
vehicle because their sales levels reflect the strategic decisions of the Big Three as well as 
their manufacturers. Finally, New Entrant vehicles are manufactured and sold in North 
America by foreign companies. Hondas from Marysville, Ohio, and Toyotas from 
Cambridge, Ontario, for example, are New Entrants. 
Industry in Turmoil 
The Traditional North American Automotive Industry faces an imminent crisis. It 
has experienced an extended period of serious competitive decline along many 
performance measures, and faces the real possibility that it is verging on a free fall that 
will result in further erosion of North American automotive activity-up to and including 
the industry's elimination. Most North American citizens are aware of the competitive 
problems facing the Traditional domestics: anyone driving the North American roads 
recognizes the substantial portion of the vehicle fleet that now comes from nontraditional 
manufacturers-primarily of Japanese origin. However, the full extent and complex, 
multidimensional nature of the damage to the Tmditional industry is less well recognized 
and understood. 
Market Share Erosion 
The Traditional North American Automotive Industry has experienced 
substantial loss of market share in North America between 1978-1991, as portrayed in 
figure 1.1.4 The slippage in market share has been dramatic. In 1978 the Traditional 
3 ~ . ~ .  Congress Office of Technology Assessment. Competing Economies: America, Europe, and the 
Pacific Rim. 
4 ~ o r  almost all figures, we start with 1978 as a base year, the last record North American production year. 
While that choice somewhat obscures the dramatic effects on the traditional industry of the oil shock in the 
early 1970s, it keeps comparison within the recent past for most readers. These sales shares are computed 
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North American manufacturers accounted for over 85% of North American car and light 
truck sales. By 1991 this figure had declined to about 64%.5 
The Traditional manufacturers have lost about 21 points of market share in 
thirteen years, a rate of just over 1.6 points--or nearly 200,000 vehicles-per year. The 
rapid loss of market share seriously raises the issue of whether the Traditional companies 
might not be nearing a level that will necessitate a significant shift in their North 
American strategies and activities. Some analysts feel that there is already a fundamental 
question as to whether the Traditional manufacturers can any longer afford to produce 
models spanning the full range of vehicles in the marketplace. 
Other analysts argue that significant shares of their production activity must leave 
North America if they are to remain competitive.6 Both these possibilities may be 
foreshadowed by the Traditional manufacturers' reliance on captives vehicles. Adopting 
strategic options such as reduced market coverage or sourcing from new locations may be 
acceptable for regaining competitiveness, but the selection of either strategy involves 
potentially serious losses to the Canadian and US economies. 
Figure 1.1. Market Share of Traditional North American Industry, 1978- 199 1 
to reflect the manufacturers' own production activities, excluding their sales of captive vehicles. We 
exclude captives because of their relatively minor and indirect role in the North American economy. 
5 ~ o t o r  Vehicle Manufacturers Association (MVMA), World Vehicle Data, 1991. 
6~ames P.Womack, Daniel T. Jones, and Daniel Rms. The Machine That Changed The World. Rawson 
Associates, New York. 1990. 
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Production Levels 
Market share loss by the Traditional North American automotive manufacturers 
has been somewhat offset by market growth since 1978. Consequently, absolute 
production levels have not fallen as much as they might. Nevertheless, as figure 1.2 
reveals, unit North American production by the Traditional manufacturers reached a 
record level in 1978, and has not reached that level since. In fact, the 1986 record sales 
year-at approximately 17.8 million units-was the first North American record sales 
year that did not also yield a new North American production record. 
The 1979 and 1990 markets in North America were almost identical in size--at 
approximately 15.5 million units-yet Traditional North American production in 1990 
was only 77% of 1979 levels. Indeed, had 1978 market shares prevailed in 1990, total 
Traditional production in 1990 would have been some 30% higher than its actual level. 
Much of the economic activity associated with automotive production occurs at supplier 
companies, and the manufacturers' sales and production levels largely determine the size 
of the market available to these suppliers. These vehicle sales and production numbers 
for the Traditional manufacturers, then, represent the traditional market for North 
American automotive supplier companies. As the Traditional manufacturers' production 
levels have declined, the business levels, opportunities, and potential economic activities 
of suppliers have also receded. In 1991, production levels of the Traditional industry 
continued to decline, as shown in figure 1.2. 
Cars and Trucks 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Figure 1.2. Cars and Trucks Produced by Traditional - 
North American Assemblers, 1978- 199 1 
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Profits 
The profits of the Traditional industry have sharply declined, as shown in figure 
1.3.7 This has damaged shareholders, as the decade of the 1970s produced six years that 
were more profitable (in pretax, constant dollars) than was 1984--the most profitable 
year in the 1980s. The steady decline in profits since 1984 is alarming, especially in view 
of the relatively strong rates of capacity utilization. 
Figure 1.3. US Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Capacity 
Utilization Versus Pre-Tax Profits, 1970- 199 1 
Automotive production involves huge fixed costs and relatively high break-even 
points. That means that manufacturers must sell large numbers of vehicles before they 
become profitable, and additional sales beyond the break-even points have major impact 
7~ureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), US Department of Commerce (DOC), Federal Reserve Board. The 
North American automotive industry is broadly defined to encompass fifteen separate industtial activities 
or sectors, including two core industries: motor vehicle manufacturers and motor vehicle parts and 
accessories. This definition includes the North American production activities of manufacturers owned 
outside North America These figures include estimates for automotive suppliers categorized as such by 
the two governments. Many companies that consider themselves automotive suppliers are not so 
categorized in industrial classification codes. For example, a supplier of mirrors or window glass would 
typically be included in the glass industry, even though some companies only manufacture glass for 
automotive use. While it is difficult to estimate precisely how much of an underestimate of automotive 
industry activity this introduces, it probably has little effect on comparisons across time. 
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upon their profit levels. It is particularly womsome that the automotive companies may 
no longer be profitable at 80% capacity utilization, an historic standard that permitted 
them to facilitize for the wide market swings associated with the economic cycle. 
If this is the case, then the pattern of weak profits or small losses in bad years, 
offset by robust profits in good years, may change. That pattern may be replaced by one 
of small or large losses in bad years, which cannot be offset by weak profits or even small 
losses in good years. The structural remedy for this is further reductions in capacity, but 
that involves large losses and transition costs for the North American economy. 
Investment 
Increased inroads by the foreign competitors have pressured management to 
reduce investment levels to offset declining profitability. To be sure, absolute investment 
levels remained high, averaging over $10 billion a year for the decade of the 1980s. 
However, total automotive investment in plant and equipment, as a percentage of all 
manufacturing investment, fell in the 1980s compared with the 1970s. This occurred in 
spite of the large investments made in North America by the Japanese industry during 
that former period.8 
Profit pressure has also resulted in the delay and even cancellation of vehicle 
programs, model freshenings, and powertrain programs-and that places the Traditionals 
at a marked disadvantage in the marketplace. Traditional North American manufacturers 
already offer fewer passenger car models and platforms (basic structure supporting 
multiple models) than imports and New Entrants. While they will invest an estimated 
$139 billion in product development between now and 1996, they will rely more heavily 
on minor rather than major facelifts and introduce fewer new models. 
By 1996, the Japanese manufacturers will introduce over three times as many new 
models as the Traditionals. While some may see this as a failure of competitive will on 
the part of the Traditional manufacturers, it is more a question of capital availability and 
allocation. To be sure, the Japanese industry consists of nine manufacturers, so it might 
be expected to support larger capital investment and a broader range of product offerings. 
Whether it is one company or nine, it represents the same competitive dilemma for the 
Traditional North American manufacturers, and raises the same concerns as to its effect 
on the North American automotive economy. 
8 ~ o t o r  Vehicle Manufacturers Association (MVMA), Facts and Figures '91, p. 63. Steven Hemenberg, 
The Internationalization of the Auto Parts Industry: 1958-1987 and Beyond. Table 19 estimates Japanese 
investment for assemblers alone in the United States at $6.4 billion, and in Canada, at $1.5 billion. 
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Research & Development 
Declining profits also encourage companies to restrict research and development 
(R&D) expenditures. The Traditional North American automotive industry invests 
heavily in R&D activities. While absolute R&D spending levels increased throughout the 
1980+74% in the US and 107% in Canada-the industry's share of total industrial R&D 
fell. In 1980, the US automotive industry accounted for 14% of such spending, but only 
11% in 1989; the Canadian industry's share fell from 3% to 2%.9 
Employment 
Employment in the automotive industry has also fallen since 1978, as have real 
wages.1° The US decline in employment involved the loss of over 240,000 jobs between 
1978 and 1990, as shown in figure 1.4. The US decline has been somewhat offset by an 
increase in Canada, where 1990 levels are at 139% of 1978 levels, and more than 44,000 
jobs have been gained. This reflects the shift in assembly activity from the United States 
to Canada during the 1980s. Some of this shift reflects the market success of particular 
vehicles, but some is driven by a substantial increase in Canada's share of Traditional 
assembly capacity. 
While US assembly workers have seen an hourly increase of $0.15 in 1990 dollars 
since 1978, workers in the parts industry have seen their hourly wage decrease $2.34. 
Over the same period, Canadian production workers have gained $0.23 in 1990 Canadian 
dollars. Employment and wage shrinkage damages the many individuals who depend, or 
depended, on the industry for their livelihood. It also severely damages some local 
communities, by virtue of the industry's historic concentration in the US upper Midwest 
and the Province of Ontario. 
It is important to note that the employment decline of 12% shown in figure 1.4, 
has occurred in spite of the expanded direct investment of the Japanese automotive 
industry in Canada and the United States. If Traditional market share in 1989 were the 
same as it had been in 1978, we would expect to see some 22% higher Traditional 
employment in Canada and the United States." 
9~ichael S Flynn, Automotive Research and Development in Canada. A Report Prepared for The Science 
Council of Canada. January 199 1, p. 47. 
~ O U S  Employment levels based on OSAT calculations; Canada employment and wage data from 
Hertzenberg, op.cit, tables 20,23B and 25. 
lThese projected increases cannot be applied directly to the employment levels of figure 1.4 because those 
estimates include employment created by the New Entrants. 
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Figure 1.4. North American Automotive Employment, 1978- 1990 
A Competitive Crisis 
By any of these four measures-sales share, production, profits, or employment- 
the Traditional North American Automotive Industry has endured a dreadful dozen years. 
Nontraditional manufacturers have captured share, in turn restricting Traditional 
production, slashing profits, and lowering industry employment-resulting in declining 
real wages. It is no exaggeration to describe the industry's current situation as a 
competitive crisis. The direct source of this competitive crisis is well known: the 
industry has been buffeted by severe competition from imports over the past two decades, 
and has lost the confidence of many consumers. The most significant offshore 
competitor has been the Japanese industry, and its success in North America has come 
largely at the expense of the Traditional North American industry. 
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Some might raise the question of whether recent developments in the North 
American industry are not simply another example of the working of fundamental 
economic laws. After all, new products, new producers, and new national sources are 
constantly emerging, and industries and nations must sometimes reallocate their 
investments wisely, minimize the transition costs, and seek new areas of comparative 
advantage. 
Does concern for the Traditional industry simply reflect an unwillingness to 
recognize the benefits of economic revitalization through the successful entry of new 
competitors-namely the Japanese manufacturers? To be sure, levels of North American 
assembly activity have declined less since 1978 if we include the production and sales of 
the Japanese New Entrants, as shown in figure 1.5. However, the decline in passenger 
car production is still substantial. 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Figure 1.5. Total North American Production (Including New Entrants), 1978- 199 1 
Furthermore, Japanese direct investment in North America certainly has its 
parallels in the strategies and business decisions of the Traditional North American 
industry at both the manufacturer and supplier level. After all, both General Motors and 
Ford maintain significant broad-based participation in other counmes' automotive 
economies, most notably in Europe. Moreover, they are ultimately US corporations, and 
some see little difference between their activities in Canada and Japanese direct 
investment in Canada. Many North American suppliers are themselves large 
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multinational corporations with production and sales activity dispersed throughout the 
world rather than concentrated exclusively in North America. 
However, the expansion into Europe by the North American automotive industry 
came at a time when the overall European market was growing, between 1910-1930. In 
contrast, today's stagnant market in North America renders the Traditional North 
American industry much more sensitive to the timing, levels, and focus of Japanese direct 
investment. The transition occurring as a result of Japanese direct investment creates 
opportunities and threats in the possible future direction of the North American industry. 
Possible Future of the North American Industry 
Should North America abandon automotive production by the Traditional industry 
and simply put its resources to more effective economic use in other sectors? That 
argument is appealing to many, but faces an important empirical barrier in the case of the 
auto industry. Figure 1.6 displays the relative labor efficiency of a range of US 
manufacturing industries. Note that most manufacturing industries are more efficient 
than the economy as a whole, and that the automotive industry is the fourth most efficient 
manufacturing industry, generating about $100,000 value-added per employee. The 
strategic reasons (i.e. sustained domestic growth, high value-added employment, etc.) that 
have motivated Japan and other countries to target the auto industry are the same 
motivations for their announced targeting of other high value-added industries. 
The problem with the argument that the economy simply shift resources to other 
sectors is that only the chemical industry, of the more efficient manufacturing industries, 
is of comparable size to automotive: tobacco products and petroleum combined support 
only 160,000 workers. There really is no reasonable manufacturing target for resources 
shifted out of the automotive industry. North America should perhaps view the situation 
as so many other economies do-automotive as a target to shift to, not away from! 
There is a risk that North American automotive activity may well change in 
important ways if the new Japanese entrants increasingly replace the activity of the 
Traditional industry. These changes will include a decline in the level of North American 
supplier activity that local motor vehicle assembly supports. Japanese manufacturers, 
across all manufactured goods, accounted for about half of all imports by foreign direct 
investors in the United States for 1988, even though they accounted for only a quarter of 
all direct investment sales. Furthermore, 93 % of Japanese direct investors' imports came 
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from Japan, while European investors sourced only 70% from all of Europe.12 It may 
well take longer to substitute North American sourcing when the importer is also an 
established supplier in Japan. In fact, many North American suppliers are told by New 
Entrants that business really is not available because of the close cooperative relationship 









Figure 1.6. Average Value Added Per Employee in Various Industrial Sectors 
There is also concern that the full range of jobs the industry currently provides 
will shrink as the Traditional industry contracts. Certainly many technical and 
managerial jobs will be less open to North American citizens because the headquarters 
l k o n g r s s  of the United States. Office of Technology Assessment. Making Things B e t t e r ~ m p r r i n g  in 
Manufactun'ng. Summary, 1990, p. 25. 
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and R&D functions will remain largely concentrated in Japan. Just as the Traditional 
North American industry has provided those jobs in North America, sometimes to the 
resentment of foreign nationals, the Japanese industry will undoubtedly keep most of 
those jobs in Japan. Finally, the benefits the industry confers as both a source of and a 
spur to technical innovation here in North America will surely diminish. If technical 
R&D is largely performed in Japan, and key suppliers are also located in Japan, then it is 
Japan, and not North America, that will be the initial and primary beneficiary of the 
automotive industry's technological push and pull. While some Canadians may feel that 
there is little to chose between a US-owned or Japanese-owned industry in Canada, in 
fact it is highly doubtful that the Japanese and Canadian industries will ever become as 
fully integrated under Japanese ownership as they have become under US ownership. In 
sum, we believe that North American ownership of this critical industry is crucial because 
we cannot afford to lose control of it. 
These questions are important ones that, unfortunately, admit of few clear and 
certain answers. However, the context for asking them is crystal clear, as the motor 
vehicle industry remains the single largest manufacturing industry in North America, as it 
is in both Canada and the United States. The importance of the context requires that we 
attempt to answer these broad questions, and develop information that contributes to the 
preservation of automotive manufacturing in North America to the extent possible under 
free marketplace competition. The purpose of this report is to contribute to that effort. 
Structure of Report 
What might the future hold? Will the automotive economy in North America 
maintain its recect course, characterized by reduced activity levels in the Traditional 
industry, enhanced activity by the New Entrants, and perhaps higher ratios of imports in 
the market? Or might the Traditional North American manufacturers and suppliers regain 
market share and activity, as they become more successful in meeting the competitive 
challenges from abroad and from New Entrants into North America? If there is a 
continued shift of North American production to New Entrants, how do the two 
governments ensure that North America does not face eventual competitive decline in 
automotive activity, and increase the likelihood that national ownership and control has 
little effect on the types and levels of that activity, and the benefits it confers? 
These and other significant issues are addressed in the report. Chapter II 
describes the economic significance of the North American auto industry, including its 
impact on other industries, its contribution to North American tax revenues, and other 
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related measures. The chapter also presents a model of the impact on the US and 
Canadian economies of increasing domestic motor vehicle production by 500,000 units. 
Chapter III opens with a brief overview of the global auto industry, comparing the 
three major vehicle producing regions and vehicle markets-namely Europe, Japan, and 
North America. Also included is a discussion of two emerging automotive participants- 
South Korea and Mexico. The chapter concludes with a discussion of emerging 
automotive markets. 
Chapter IV presents a competitive assessment of the North American industxy vis- 
a-vis the Japanese industry along several dimensions, discussing several related 
competitive issues, including product development cycles, capital investment levels, 
market size, consumer demographics, quality, manufacturer/supplier relations, and 
human-resource factors. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the future structure 
and likely trends of the North American industry. 
Chapter V discusses the impact that differing public policies have on industry 
performance in several nations, with a particular emphasis on trade, cost of capital, and 
health care. The chapter includes an assessment of the perception that policy officials in 
North America have about the automotive industry. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the proposed North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
Chapter VI presents a general summary of the competitive status of the 
Traditional North American Automotive Industry . A conceptual framework utilizing a 
break-even model is employed to compare fixed and variable costs of the North 
American and Japanese industries. Sources of these costs are allocated to either public 
sector policies or to the private arena. The chapter closes with several conclusions about 
the contribution of these costs to the higher break-even point of the Traditional North 
American industry. 
Finally, Appendix A presents a compendium of policy recommendations related 
to industrial competitiveness proposed by a variety of studies and reports published by 
various organizations and agencies during the past several years. 
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IL ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 
Why does is it matter whether or not the Traditional North American Automotive 
Industry remains viable? What difference does it make if automotive production 
facilities in North America are owned by the Traditional North American 
manufacturers-i.e., the Big Three and their suppliers-or by Japanese vehicle 
producers? Is it not the case that Honda's operations in Ohio are as beneficial to the US 
economy as are GM's operations in Detroit? Similarly, are Toyota's operations in Canada 
not as beneficial to the Canadian economy as are Ford's operations in that country? After 
all, GM and Ford claim that their operations in Germany are just as beneficial to the 
German economy as are those of Volkswagen. 
Before answering these questions, it is important to understand the magnitude of 
the contribution by the Traditional Automotive Industry to the North American 
economy, and to recognize that this beneficial contribution has diminished in the past 
decades as a result of declines in vehicle production and sales by the Big Three. It is 
equally important to note that the New Entrant manufacturers currently make a 
significantly smaller contribution to the North American economy than their proportion 
of production in North America might suggest. 
Differences Between the Traditional Industry and the New Entrants 
To fully appreciate the importance of the Traditional North American Automotive 
Industry , it is necessary to understand the considerable differences between that industry 
and the New Entrants, as well as the differences between the European operations of Ford 
and GM compared with the North American operations of the New Entrants, 
Vehicles produced in North America by the Traditional manufacturers reflect 
overwhelmingly North American economic activity. In spite of increased offshore 
sourcing by the Big Three, the traditional vehicle is assembled in North America, using 
parts and components that are themselves manufactured and assembled here, with 
materials that are processed and fabricated here. This North American chain of value- 
added represents jobs and profits at each stage of production and sale. 
While New Entrants provide local assembly jobs, their vehicles have lower levels 
of North American-sourced materials, parts, and components than traditional vehicles. 
The domestic content of Big Three and New Entrant vehicles is not the same, so their 
respective effect on the domestic economy is quite different. We estimate that New 
Entrants sourced over $3,200 in Japanese parts for each vehicle they built in North 
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America, thereby accounting for nearly 32% of the automotive parts deficit with Japan. 
The Big Three, by comparison, sourced only $150 in Japanese parts for each vehicle 
built, so that even with their high volumes, the Big Three accounted for only about 12.4% 
of the parts deficit.13 Moreover, the comparative tendency of Japanese direct investment 
to rely on imports from the home country suggests that this pattern will not shift 
dramatically over time.14 
Imports-whether true imports or captives-represent value-added chains of 
production abroad, with a serious loss of jobs and profit to the economies of Canada and 
the United States. The pattern of Japan's automotive foreign investment parallels the 
pattern of Japanese foreign investment in electronics and other industries. American 
affiliates of Japanese electronics companies mostly employ Japanese managers, while 
American electronics affiliates in Japan mostly employ Japanese managers. 
To be sure, imports provide jobs and profits in the retailing and servicing sectors 
of the industry, but the manufacturing share is eliminated. Further, the aftermarket 
opportunities of Traditional parts manufacturers shrink as the relative ratio of the foreign 
operating fleet increases. Captive imports, of course, provide somewhat greater shares of 
final sale profit, and often some participation in manufacturing profit when the source of 
such vehicles is offshore operations of the Big Three, or a foreign nameplate partially 
owned by one of the Big Three. Such is the case with General Motors in its sales of 
Suzuki and Isuzu vehicles. Some of the multinational suppliers, such as Allied-Signal and 
Kelsey-Hayes, also participate to a limited degree in profits from the sale of some captive 
and true imports. 
Finally, it is noteworthy to compare the different characteristics of Ford and GM 
operations in Europe with the practices of the New Entrants in North America. Ford and 
GM operations in Europe are generally indistinguishable from those of the indigenous 
European automotive manufacturers in terms of their contribution to and integration in 
the European economies. In contrast, the New Entrant operations in North America have 
generally chosen to import virtually all major components from Japan or to bring their 
own affiliated suppliers from Japan, rather than to source from the Traditional North 
American parts industry. 
13sean McAlinden, David Andrea, Michael Flynn, and Brett Smith. U.S.-Japan Automotive Bilateral 1994 
Trade Deficit, OSAT, University of Michigan, Report for The Automotive Parts Advisory Committee. 
May, 1991. 
14congress of the United States. Office of Technology Assessment. Making Things Betterxompeting in 
Manufacturing. Summary, 1990. 
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Employment and GNP 
The Traditional Automotive Industry is the largest manufacturing industry in 
North America, accounting for nearly 4% of Gross National Product. The industry 
generates approximately 1.2 million high wage jobs and provides health and pension 
benefits to employees, retirees, and their families. Furthermore, the auto industry directly 
supports an additional one million jobs in related industries. Thereby, the North 
American automotive industry directly accounts for approximately 2.2 million high 
paying and high value added jobs--contributing significantly to the North American 
standard of living. It is especially important to note that automotive jobs are relatively 
high value added-approximately $98,000 per employee as compared with an economy- 
wide average of $46,000. Only three other manufacturing sectors have higher value 
added per employee performance than does automotive. 
The number of jobs created by the New Entrants in North America does not offset 
those automotive jobs lost by the Traditional industry-either in assembly or 
components.15 As a result of extensive use of parts imported from Japan, cars made and 
sold in North America by the New Entrants support many fewer jobs than do cars made 
by the Traditional industry. Even after the North American industry's current downsizing 
is completed, the Traditional North American produced car will support considerably 
more jobs than will current New Entrant production. 
Finally, the scope of job opportunities provided by the New Entrants is more 
limited, characterized primarily by production jobs. The full range of jobs that the 
Traditional industry currently provides will shrink as the Traditional industry contracts, 
and many technical and managerial jobs will be unavailable to US citizens, but will 
instead be largely concentrated in Japan. 
It is possible that over time the New Entrants will become more closely integrated 
into the Traditional North American economy, as GM and Ford have done in Europe. 
However, it is unlikely that this process will occur without strong pressure from the North 
American governments, as well as from the Traditional industry itself. While the New 
Entrants often state that they intend to become truly North American companies, and 
while they have made some progress in this direction, that progress has been quite limited 
given the length of time that some New Entrant operations have been in North America. 
15~estimony of Professor Candace Howes before the Joint Economic Committee hearing on "The Future of 
US Manufacturing: Auto Assemblers and Suppliers," December 10, 1991. Professor Howes estimates a net 
loss of 150,000 jobs in the US indusay due to the transfer of sales from the Traditional industry to New 
Entrants between 1982 and 1993. 
COMPETITIVE SURVIVAL: Private Initiatives, Public Policy, and the North American Automotive Industry Page 39 
Linkage to Other Industries-the Multiplier Effect 
The automotive industry is linked to and is a major customer of other important 
industries, accounting for over 25% of the sales of starnpings, glass, machine tools, and 
semiconductors, and over 50% of the sales of rubber, lead, and iron. By employing 
approximately 6% of all scientists and engineers, and by accounting for approximately 
11% of North American corporate R&D in 1991 (though it was down from 14% in 1980), 
the automotive industry is a major source of advanced technologies and has a ripple effect 
to other industries. While New Entrant automotive facilities in North America are 
producing an increasing number of vehicles, their contribution to the North American 
economy is much more restricted than is that of the Traditional industry. The operations 
of the New Entrants are closely linked to their home countries (particularly in the case of 
Japan), from which they procure most of their value-added components and where they 
locate most of their engineering activity. 
The Traditional industry's contribution to the North American economy in terms of 
GNP, employment, and other variables has diminished in parallel to its reduced North 
American market share and declining profits. 
Minority Opportunity16 
The Traditional Automotive Industry has an impressive record in providing 
employment and business opportunities to minority citizens. The Big Three and their 
suppliers are a major source of jobs and income for minority Americans. A recent study 
reports that black Americans represent a larger proportion of the workforces at the Big 
Three than in othzr sectors, reaching some 17% in 1984, compared with 11% of the 
national workforce. Moreover, because of the high wages these jobs pay, General Motors 
alone accounted for 1.7% of all wages and salaries paid t~ black Americans in 1987, 
almost three times the proportion of jobs it provided. Further, many minority-owned 
businesses depend on the automotive industry. In both 1989 and 1990, General Motors 
alone purchased over $1 billion dollars in goods and services from minority suppliers, 
and all vehicles built by the Traditional industry contain components from minority 
l 6 ~ 0 s t  of the data in this section are drawn from "Minority Businesses: The Opportunity Structure of the 
Domestic Automotive Industry," Testimony by Michael S. Flynn before the Commission on Minority 
Business Development's Hearings on International Competitiveness in Detroit, MI, May 30,1991. 
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suppliers. Black-owned automotive suppliers account for nine of the largest 100 black- 
owned industry and service companies.17 
Minority dealerships account for over 5% (295) of Ford's 5,500 outlets, and 
Chrysler has committed to increasing its Hispanic dealerships by 10% a year. Big Three 
programs to expand minority dealerships have benefited from a serious commitment of 
funds, personnel, training, and business assistance. Nevertheless, the failure rate of 
black-owned dealerships over the past 20 years has exceeded 55%, while the rate for all 
other dealerships has been about 20%.18 Black dealerships are a central business activity 
for the black community: four of the eight black-owned businesses with sales in 1990 
exceeding $100 million were dealerships, and the 100th largest black dealership would 
rank 79th in sales among all black-owned industrial and service companies.19 
If the Traditional Automotive Industry has been a major avenue of opportunity 
for minority Americans, in both the employment and business arenas, New Entrants and 
imports have not. The siting and employee selection policies of New Entrant plants make 
them less likely employers of minority Americans than the Traditional Big Three plants 
they are displacing. Minority suppliers' location, recency, and, in some cases capital 
weakness all make them less likely to secure business at New Entrants than with the Big 
Three. 
The proportion of Import/New Entrant dealers who are minority Americans is 
extraordinarily small, representing well under 1% of all Import/New Entrant outlets. 
Only 10 of the 100 largest black dealerships carry Japanese-badged vehicles, and only 
five carry Nissan, Toyota, or Honda products. None of these dealerships is an 
ImpodNew Entrant exclusive, and all carry at least one of the Big Three lines.20 
So while the decline of the Traditional North American industry in the face of 
Import and New Entrant competition raises economic concerns for all North American 
citizens, minority citizens are likely to suffer disproportionately from this decline, and 
that should be a serious concern for all citizens. 
17Black ~n te r~r i se ,  vol. 21, no. 11, June, 1991, pp. 107-114. This estimate may be low: some companies 
may have significant automotive business in addition to the reported lines. 
8 " ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  to probe black dealer's loss of Chrysler point," Automotive News, 1 2 m  1, p. 8. 
l9~1ack Enterprise, op. cit., pp. 107-114 and 117-124; and OSAT calculations. 
2 0 ~ ~ a c k  Enterprise, op. cit., pp. 117-124. 
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Contribution to Government Revenues 
The North American automotive industry generated approximately $1 1.3 billion 
in tax revenues in 1990-$7.05 billion in production-related taxes to US federal, state, 
and local governments, and approximately $4.25 billion to the Canadian federal and 
provincial governments-consisting of $1.35 billion in production related taxes and an 
additional $2.9 billion in vehicle sales taxes. The automotive industry's annual level of 
tax payments closely reflects the size of the market in a given year, and the Traditional 
industry's market share. Tax payments from the Traditional North American automobile 
industry have fallen sharply since the mid-1970s, in parallel to declining market share 
and profit.21 
Tax payments for four years are compared below-1978, 1979, 1986, and 1990. 
North America saw a record production year in 1978, reaching approximately 14.4 
million units. In that year, the Traditional industry accounted for 85% of the North 
American market. In 1979 the production figure dipped slightly to 14.1 million units, and 
continued to drop through the early 1980s, but climbed back to slightly over 13 million 
units in 1986-a new record sales year. Production by the Traditional North American 
industry dropped to around 12 million units by 1990, capturing a 65% market share in a 
market with the same size as in 1979. 
US Tax Payments 
Total tax payments to US governments, including income, payroll, sales, and 
excises, are estimated to have been $9.21 billion in 1978 and $7.05 billion in 1990, a 
decline of 23%, as shown in table 2.2. (Federal liability is negative in 1986 because of an 
unusually large net operating loss reported by one company in that year which dominated 
the positive liability of the rest of the industry.) 
Total tax payments by the Traditional North American automobile industry to US 
state and local governments declined from $2.1 billion in 1978 to $1.7 billion in 1990, a 
17% reduction. Income taxes comprised the largest share of that decline, followed by 
property taxes. From 1978 through 1986, state and local income taxes fell 73%, but they 
recouped nearly half that loss by 1990, registering an overall decline of 43%. Real estate 
and property taxes declined by 12%. Sales and excise taxes rose sharply, but the amounts 
involved were still quite small in comparison to the other taxes. 
- - 
21~omparable and separate tax liability figures for the New Entrants are not available. 
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Declining employment in the Traditional North American automobile industry 
imposed additional expenditures on US federal and state governments, mostly in the form 
of unemployment benefits. These expenditures have ranged from a low of $41 million in 
1978, to a high of $120 million in 1990. 





1978 1979 1986 1990 in 19901 Increase 
Federal Liability 
Income $3,848 $2,546 -$217 $1,174 $5,968 $4,794 
FICA 1,344 1,708 2,700 2,724 2,932 208 
FUTA 66 67 80 55 60 5 
Excise 1,8572 2,0362 1,559~ 1,3672 1,367 - 
Total Federal Liability 7,115 6,357 4,122 5,320 10,327 5,007 
State & Local Liability 
Income & Franchise 538 255 145 306 1,556 1,250 
SUTA 374 349 616 356 374 18 
Sales & Use 106 62 173 157 172 15 
Real Estate & Property 842 640 805 805 - 
Excise 26 26 37 4 1 41 - 
Other 21 1 152 142 134 134 - 
Total State & Loc. Liability 2,097 1,484 1,918 1,733 3,016 1,283 
Total US Liability 9,212 7,841 6,040 7,053 13,343 6,290 
FICA = Social Security and Medicare payroll taxes. FUTA = Federal unemployment inswance 
SUTA = State unemployment insurance. 
1. Does not include offsetting decline in transplant and foreign manufacturer tax liability. 
2. Adjusted to Federal Highway Administration Total 
Although corporations enjoyed a substantial tax reduction under the 1981 
Economic Recovery Tax Act, most of those benefits were removed by subsequent tax 
increases in 1982, 1984, and 1986. According to the Internal Revenue Service, North 
American automobile industry income tax after credits declined by 64% between 1978 
and 1986. Income subject to tax, before deductions, declined by 55%. This demonstrates 
that declining income was responsible for approximately 86% of the decline in tax 
payments. 
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Increased US Tax Payments if1978 Market Share Were Restored 
If the Traditional North American Automotive Industry 's sales and profitability in 
1990 were equivalent to those implied by its 1978 market share, total US tax liabilities in 
1990 would have risen from $7.05 billion to $13.35 billion, for an increase of $6.30 
billion, or approximately 89%. Taxes paid by New Entrants would have declined with 
their associated decrease in market share, but because these f m s  have reported less 
profit than Traditional North American firms from comparable assets and sales, that 
reduction likely would have been only a fraction of this estimated increase. This would 
leave a net increase for US governments of approximately $4.6 billion in 1990 dollars. 
Even if New Entrants replace the levels of Traditional activities in the future, the short- 
term costs in employment and lost government revenues are enormous. 
Canadian Federal and Provincial Income Taxes 
The Canadian motor vehicle and parts industry (including New Entrants) has 
incurred increasing federal and provincial income tax liabilities as shown in Table 2.3. 
Federal liability for motor vehicle and parts manufacturers jumped from $183 million in 
1978 to $508 million in 1986, a 178% increase. Provincial liability rose by an even 
larger 250%. While figures for 1990 are not yet available, the direction of change in 
Canadian income taxes in 1990 is expected to be up slightly. In contrast to US tax 
payments, then, Canadian tax payments have increased. This largely reflects a shift by 
Big Three assembly activities to Canada since 1978. 
Table 2.3. Canadian Federal and Provincial Income Tax Liabilities (Millions of $ Canadian ) 
1978 1979 1986 1990 
Motor vehicles 
and parts manufacturers 
Federal 183.1 195.6 508.4 NA 
Provincial 81.0 92.3 283.6 NA 
Truck bodies manufacturers 
Federal 9.8 14.6 19.6 NA 
Provincial 4.6 7.3 9.1 NA 
Source: Statistics Canada 
In 1991, retail vehicle sales and servicing accounted for a little over one-third of 
total Canadian retail trade. The federal and provincial governments in Canada (except 
Alberta) collect substantial consumption taxes on the retail sales and use of vehicles. The 
largest taxes in revenue terms are the federal goods and services tax (GST), which is 
applied at a 7% rate, and the provincial retail sales taxes, which have rates ranging to over 
10%. (The federal GST on vehicles sold at retail replaced the federal sales tax levied on 
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manufacturers in January 1991.) In Ontario, for example, the combination of the federal 
GST at 7% and the provincial tax at 8% produces a combined sales tax burden of 15%. 
In 1991, new motor vehicle sales in Canada totaled almost 1.3 million units. 
Assuming an average retail sale value of $15,000, and using a 15% tax rate, it is 
estimated that the sales tax revenues generated for the federal and provincial governments 
by vehicle sales was on the order of $2.9 billion. If sales in 1991 had remained at 1990 
levels, revenues would have totaled an estimated $3.5 billion. 
Potential Economic Impact of Increased Vehicle Production in the US 
The preceding sections of this chapter have assessed the diminished contribution 
of the automotive industry to the economies of North America, resulting from declining 
production volumes by the Traditional industry. This final section assesses the potential 
economic contribution of increases in vehicle production of 500,000 units by the 
Traditional industry in the United States and Canada, respectively. 
Table 2.5 shows the results of a sustained annual production increase of 500,000 
units in the United States by the Traditional industry (substituting for imported vehicles). 
As the table indicates, a 500,000 annual unit production increase in the United States will 
result in a number of positive economic benefits by 1995, including: 
Creation of 119,000 high-paying jobs in the US. Of these 119,000 jobs, about 15,000 
(13%) will be in vehicle assembly, and 72,000 (60%) in related supplier industries- 
including automotive parts and components, engineering and support services, and 
related nonmanufacturing businesses. Finally, 32,000 jobs (27%) will be created through 
increased consumer spending and business investment. 
An increase in labor income and company profits of $4.3 billion, or $8,600 per vehicle. 
An increase in net local, state and federal revenues of $2 billion or $4,000 per vehicle. 
A reduction in the trade deficit of $7 billion. 
A decrease in government transfer payments, such as welfare and unemployment 
compensation, of approximately $1 billion. 
An increase in personal disposable income of $2.3 billion. 
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Table 2.5. Impact on the US Economy 
of Annual Increase in Domestic Production by 500,000 Vehicles. 
Table 2.6 provides a breakdown by industry of the 119,094 jobs that would be 
created by 1995 through increased annual US production of 500,000 units. The 119,094 
jobs include 15,336 direct jobs for motor vehicles. A direct job is one immediately 
Additional shipments 
($billions 1990) 
Estimated Change in net 
exports ($billions 1990) 
related to building and assembling a vehicle. An indirect job is one that results from 
increased purchases by domestic suppliers, while an induced job results from the 
additional purchasing activities of consumers and business investors. 












Labor & proprietor's * 
Transfer payments 
Employee Soc. Sec. Taxes 
Federal, state, & local 
personal income taxes 
Disposable personal income 
Real disposable personal 
Income ($billions 1982) 























































Table 2.6. Employment by Industry Division and Source of Demand, 199522 
~loyment TactTotal 1 
Induced Industry division (1977 SIC code) 
Total private n o n f m  employment 
Manufacturing 
Durables 
Stone, clay, glass (32) 
Primary metals (33) 
Fabricated metals (34) 
Nonelectrical machinery (35) 
Electrical equipment (36) 
Motor vehicles (37 1) 







Rest of nondurables 
Private nonmanufacturing 
Construction & mining (10- 17) 
Trans., communication, & public utilities (40-49) 
Trucking (42) 
Other 
Wholesale trade (50-5 1) 
Retail trade (52-59) 
Eating & drinking (58) 
Rest of retail 
Finance, insurance, & real estate (60-67) 
Insurance (63-64) 
Rest of finance, insurance, & real estate 
Services (70-89,07-09) 
Personal services & repairs (72, part of 76) 
Business services (73, part of 76) 
Professional services (8 1,89) 
Other services 
*Includes the direct effect of 15,336 for motor vehicles. 





































The geographic distribution among major economic regions of the short-term 
employment impacts resulting from 500,000 additional vehicles produced in the US is 
shown in table 2.7. 
22~nstitute of Labor and Industrial Relations, University of Michigan, and Regional Economic Models, 
Incorporated (REMI). 
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Table 2.7. Short-Term Regional Impact 
of Increased Vehicle Production by 500,000 units per year, by 1995. 
As revealed in the first column of table 2.7, the region that benefits the most from 
an increase in domestic motor vehicle production, in both an absolute sense and in terms 
of percentage, is the Great Lakes Region. Two-thirds of the national gain in employment, 
or 80,213 jobs, will occur in this region by 1995. The regions with the next largest 
impacts, as a percentage of total employment, are Kentucky-Tennessee and the plains 
region (the latter due largely to Missouri, where Traditional assembly activity is 
substantial). However, it is the case that all regions gain some additional employment. 
In summary, the short-term economic impact on the US economy of increasing 
domestic motor vehicle production by 500,000 units is substantial. The benefits of the 
are realized across many industry divisions, including those in private nonmanufacturing. 
All regions in the US benefit to some extent in terms of jobs, but the regions with a 













Potential Economic Impact of Increased Vehicle Production in Canada 
The employment impact on the Canadian economy of increased Canadian 
production would be somewhat smaller than a comparable increase in the US due to the 
high level of US-produced components used in Canadian assembled vehicles. Increased 
Employment Impact 
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production of 500,000 vehicles in Canada would create approximately 45,000 automotive 
related jobs-14,164 direct jobs and 30,098 indirect jobs.23 
Summary 
The advent of Japanese production of automotive parts and components as well as 
vehicles in North America will mean further share loss for the Traditional industry, 
including additional losses of Traditional supplier business at the Traditional 
manufacturers, leading to economic dislocation in traditional production regions. Further 
expansion of the New Entrants can mean more jobs and more plant openings for some 
communities. Unfortunately, patterns to date suggest that New Entrants and their 
suppliers are unlikely to locate in the same communities that the Traditional industry may 
abandon, so some communities will suffer while others prosper.24 
Moreover, the location patterns of New Entrant suppliers suggest that 
proportionately fewer "new" job opportunities they provide will go to minority citizens 
than these citizens lose as the Traditional industry has declined. Since it is likely that the 
majority of New Entrants have already established their locations, resolution of this 
problem is neither easy nor readily at hand.25 
Even if, in the long run, Japanese direct investment were to have little effect on 
North American automotive activity beyond a flow of profits to Japan, the two North 
American economies will face significant and substantial transition costs, as new capacity 
replaces traditional capacity. These costs will fall especially hard on some individuals 
and communities, as the New Entrants have primarily located in communities distant 
from those that host the Traditional industry. While we welcome direct foreign 
investment by the Japanese industry, we think it raises a series of important questions. 
On balance, the New Entrants cannot replace the activity of the Traditional industry on a 
one-to-one basis without significant risks and costs for the two economies. 
23~e.sRosiers Automotive Consultants and Statistics Canada. 
24~ee, for example, Richard Florida, Martin Kenney, and Andrew Mair, "The Transplant Phenomenon," 
Commentary, Winter, 1988, pp. 3-9. 
250n racial effects of new e n m t  siting, see Robert E. Cole and Donald R. Deskins, Jr. 'Racial Factors in 
Site Location and Employment Patterns of Japanese Auto Firms in America." California Management 
Review> Volume 31, Number 1, Fall, 1988, pp. 9-22. Note that the adverse effects may be lower for new 
entrant suppliers than for manufacturen. On the creation rate of new entrant suppliers, see Brett C. Smith, 
Japanese Automotive Supplier Investment Directory, Fourth Edition, UMTRI, Office for the Study of 
Automotive Transportation, October, 199 1. 
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Manufacturing is becoming increasingly internationalized, and the tern global 
economy has as much, if not more meaning, in the automotive sector than in other 
economic arenas. It is useful, therefore, to examine the worldwide activities of the North 
American industry and assess its competitive position and prospects on a worldwide 
scale. The global performance of the North American industry-whether Traditional or 
including New Entrants in North America-is key to its role and economic contribution 
to the US and Canadian economies. 
National and regional automotive industries exist in a world automotive economy 
and involve numerous relationships, some of which are illustrated in figure 3.1. The 
automotive industry cannot be understood without some knowledge of the worldwide 
patterns of production and distribution. This is particularly the case for the North 
American industry, since it serves at once as the world's largest automotive market and a 
substantial participant in many other countries' industries through its subsidiaries, joint 








Figure 3.1. Selected Affiliations Among Global Automotive Firms-- 
Includes Equity Interest, Joint Ventures, and Licensing Agreements. 
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Global Production and Market Share 
The global automotive economy continues to expand, growing from a worldwide 
production level of 42.3 million units in 1978 to just over 48 million in 1990. Table 3.1 
presents the production levels of the three major producing regions of the world for 1978, 
1986, and 1990: North America, Western Europe, and ~ a ~ a n . ~ ~  These three regions 
typically account for over 90% of the world's vehicle production. In terms of countries, 
the United States was the leading vehicle producer until 1979; in 1980, Japan emerged as 
the leading production source. Since 1978, North America has lost just over 10.5 share 
points, or 5.1 million vehicles at 1990 worldwide production volume. Modern assembly 
plants are designed for about 250,000 vehicles a year, so the loss of 5.1 million units is 
the equivalent of 20 assembly plants worth of employment and supplier business. 
Table 3.1. Percent of Worldwide Production for Three Major Sources 
% Change % Change 
Source m I286 m '78-'86 '86-'9Q 
Japan 2 1.9% 27.1% 28.0% +23.7% +3.3% 
N. America 34.8% 29.1 % 24.3% - 16.4% -16.5% 
W. Europe (Including NA 
owned production) 38.3% 36.9% 38.7% -3.6% +4.8% 
All Three 95.0% 93.1 % 91.0% -2.0% -2.3% 
World Production 42.3 45.3 48.1 +7.1% +6.2% 
(millions of units) 
The Traditional North American industry plays a major, if indirect, role in 
production in Western Europe and elsewhere through the substantial participation in 
those countries' production by subsidiaries of Ford and General Motors. The North 
American companies-both in North America and Europe-accounted for 33% of 1989 
worldwide production, with a total of 16.0 million vehicles, while Japan accounted for 
another 30%. The North American companies lost one point compared with 1988, while 
Japan gained one pint?' 
26 Source: MVMA Facts and Figures '91. We mix regions and countries in this comparison for a number 
of reasons. First, the United States and Canada are linked by the Auto Pact. Second, the integration of 
Western Europe into the European Economic Community has facilitated inter-European trade in vehicles. 
The European producers, therefore, do indeed build for a "common market." In neither case, of course, 
have all issues of national self-interest and concern been resolved. 
27~bid., p. 3 1. 
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Production capacity in Europe and North America is roughly balanced with 
regional demand, as shown in figure 3.2. In contrast, production capacity in Japan and 
South Korea is more than twice that of regional demand, placing great pressure on those 
nations to pursue aggressive automotive export strategies. 
N. America Europe Japan Korea 
Figure 3.2. Global Automotive Production Capacity and Demand by Region28 
It is particularly important to recognize that the Japanese vehicle manufacturing 
industry is advantaged by a secure domestic automotive market-the second largest of 
any individual country in the world. This domestic market has been virtually immune to 
foreign penetration in both vehicles and automotive components. (Some reasons for low 
import penetration in Japan are discussed in Chapter 5.) Table 3.2 shows the import 
share of the automotive markets of 8 of the 12 largest producing nations in the world for 
1978 and 1989. All of these markets have witnessed increased market share for 
imports--especially Spain as it has become an important production center. 
However, Japan's import share today is virtually identical to Spain's in 1978, and 
is just a small fraction of other major producing nations. While Japan's market may be 
formally open, it is difficult to accept that it is in fact truly open, when such small market 
shares accrue to vehicles from other nations. 
28~ource: Ford Motor Company 
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France 28.9% 57.0% 
Germany 39.3% 49.0% 
Italy 46.7% 54.4% 
Japan 1.2 % 2.7 % 
Spain 2.8 % 37.7 % 
United Kingdom 46.2% 57.9% 
United States* 14.8% 22.3% 
(*Figures do not include US-Canada trade.) 
This secure home market provides numerous advantages to the Japanese 
automotive manufacturers, including capacity utilization, scale economies, and large 
profits that afford resources and opportunities to focus strategically on other markets. As 
figure 3.3 reveals, Japan's automotive companies made profits of $9.9 billion in Japan in 
1990, while accumulating losses of $4.4 billion in North America and Europe. The 
ability to offset financial losses abroad by large profits in the home sanctuary enables the 
Japanese automotive industry to undertake huge capital expenditures both at home and 
abroad, with a view toward continued market expansion. 
Figure 3.3. Japanese Automotive Profits and Losses by World Regions30 
2 9 0 ~ ~ ~  calculations; data drawn from Ward's Automotive Yearbook, 1991, Fifty-third edition, Ward's 
Communications, Detroit, 1991. Note that US and Canadian import shares are net of bilateral vehicle trade. 
30 Forbes, March 16, 1991, p. 43. 
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Historical Overview of the North American Automotive Industry 
Since 1900, there have been thousands of vehicle nameplates and hundreds of 
automotive manufacturers in North America. The lion's share of North American 
production has long been held by the Big Three-ranging from 36% in 1910, reaching 
nearly 90% just prior to World War 11, and staying well above 90% as recently as the 
early 1980s. Most of these earlier manufacturers were short-lived makers of specialty or 
niche vehicles, and for the most part struggled along as marginal producers. In that sense, 
the automotive industry fairly rapidly became concentrated, and by the 1960s the 
manufacture of vehicles was dominated by just a few companies. 
The historical development of the automotive industry in North America has been 
heavily local. The manufacturers relied on local sources for raw materials, parts, 
components, and production equipment, built their vehicles here, and for the most part 
marketed them here. North American manufacturers maintained virtually exclusive 
control of the North American market from the early 1900s through the late 1960s. The 
European industry influenced the domestic manufacturers in technical and design areas, 
but it is still the case that the industry in North America was overwhelmingly domestic. 
The use of motor vehicles for personal transport rather than for commercial 
movement of people and goods developed early and rapidly in North America. 
Beginning in the postwar period, from the late 1940s through the end of the 1960s, the 
industry produced vehicles increasingly tailored to the needs, preferences, and 
pocketbooks of the North American driver. Imported vehicles filled niches, competing 
for the relatively small sales volumes available in the sports, extreme luxury, or budget 
small car markets. Detroit was not concerned about the small import market share in 
these relatively low volume niches. 
Lack of concern was the predominant response of the Traditional manufacturers, 
even to the sharp surge in imports by Volkswagen in the late 1950s and early 1960s. By 
and large, the importers had little interest in challenging this situation. North American 
sales of foreign automobiles were small by North American standards, but they were 
often large and indeed quite profitable by the importers' own standards. 
The integration of the Canadian and US industries was ratified by the Autopact in 
1965, an agreement that provided for tariff-free trade in automotive goods subject to 
assured Canadian participation in production activities. Nevertheless, the industry 
remained under US ownership, and this has sometimes created tensions between the 
manufacturers and large suppliers with Canada. Some of this tension increased when the 
Canadian Auto Workers separated from the United Auto Workers in the early 1980s. 
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The North American companies quite early became active in producing offshore 
for offshore markets. That, combined with their market- tailored local production, 
resulted in their North American operations exporting very few vehicles outside of the 
two countries. Thus, the industry was simultaneously insulated from broad foreign 
competition and cut off from export opportunities. American automotive suppliers were 
more actively engaged in export, but the larger supplier companies also followed the 
strategy of establishing facilities abroad to service European manufacturers, including the 
offshore production of North American-based manufacturers. This encouraged the 
transfer of technology and jobs offshore, and provided a profit flow back to North 
America. 
The Industry's Downturn 
The North American automotive industry experienced a severe downturn from 
late 1979 through 1982. Sales, employment, and the market share held by domestically 
produced vehicles were all dramatically lower in 1982 than their pre-1979 levels. By 
1986, the Traditional industry recovered, although production only returned to levels well 
below good years of the 1970s, and has fallen rather steadily since 1985, as New Entrant 
production steadily climbed. 
The period from 1978 to 1987 witnessed a major shift in the production sources of 
passenger vehicles sold in the North American market. Sources other than the Traditional 
manufacturers more than doubled their share of the market in ten years. The loss of 
market share by the Traditional manufacturers has been precipitous. Two critical 
developments-the "oil shocks" and the initiation of agreements limiting Japanese access 
to the North American market-are important to an understanding of the dynamics of the 
North American market during the period under consideration. 
The North American auto industry developed behind a natural protective wall. 
Consumer requirements and preferences were different from other major markets, 
especially in regard to preferences for performance over fuel economy. These 
preferences were supported by low fuel taxes compared with those of either Europe or 
Japan. When the two oil embargoes of the 1970s hit, North American consumers became 
concerned about the price and availability of fuel, and turned to import vehicles to allay 
these concerns. The Japanese manufacturers gained share after each oil shock, and, after 
the second one, were able to expand that share further. They offered consumers 
excellent, fuel-efficient vehicles while the North American industry struggled to convert 
its product offerings to the new dictates of the market and government-imposed fuel 
economy regulations in both Canada and the United States. 
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In the early 1980s, the United States and Canada entered into separate voluntary 
quotas limiting the import of Japanese vehicles. The US agreement was specified in 
units, and thus failed to protect the Traditional industry from Japanese market share gains 
as the total market plunged in the early 1980s. Canada set a market share limit, thus 
providing more effective protection in the developing market. The Japanese government 
continues these limits unilaterally, perhaps as a way of disciplining its industry, although 
the raised limits have not been binding for some years. Japanese unit exports to North 
America have fallen, as the Japanese industry established numerous New Entrant 
facilities in North America. The pace of this investment was hastened by the rapid rise in 
value of the yen in the mid-1980s, as the yen costs of North American investments 
plunged by one-third in a little over a year, and the dollar costs of exporting automotive 
good from Japan increased by 50%. 
The European Automotive Industry 
The automotive industry originated in Europe over 100 years ago. France and 
Germany led the world in initial manufacturing and patent application activity through 
1900. In 1885 these countries were producing approximately 150 vehicles per year. The 
United States produced less than 10. However, in 1900 the United States produced 4,200 
vehicles versus France's 3,000 and Germany's 2,312. Detroit, with its concentration of 
mechanical wizards and machine shops, history of wagon and carriage production, and 
central location as a transportation hub, quickly overtook Europe in production and 
innovation. By 1907 more than half of the world's production was located in the United 
States. 
Throughoct this period the United States had a 45% tariff protecting its industry 
while most European countries were in the 3% to 10% range. This changed in the 1920s 
with tariffs reaching 30% to 50% in Germany, 33% in England, and 45% to 55% in Italy. 
Production and registrations were growing in Europe and General Motors and Ford 
Motor wanted to be a part of this growth. 
Ford opened its frrst European assembly plant in England in 191 1, followed by 
facilities in France (1913), Spain (1920), Belgium (1922), Ireland (1923), and Germany 
(1926). General Motors established an assembly plant in London (1924). However, it 
primarily pursued an acquisition strategy, acquiring Vauxhall (1925) and Adam Ope1 
(1929). Initially the Ford facilities built knock-down kits while GM quickly pursued a 
strategy of localized design and sourcing. 
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The 1920s were a period of rapid expansion by indigenous European producers; 
Peugeot expanded into Italy and Germany; Citroen into Britain, Italy, Germany, and 
Belgium; and Renault into Belgium and Britain. As a result, between 1924 and 1938 
production grew in Germany from 18,000 to 342,000; in Britain from 147,700 to 
445,000; and in France from 145,000 to 227,000. Today, Western European production 
accounts for approximately 30% of world motor vehicle production or approximately 16 
million units (excluding North American owned facilities). 
Current Status 
The 1990 Western European car market totaled 13.2 million units, and is 
predicted to expand to 14.7 million units by 1995, while the Eastern Bloc is expected to 
maintain 2.3 million unit sales.31 This market is carved up in the following manner: 
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European auto manufacturer profitability has declined over the last three years, 
due to pressures from slowing market growth, increasing Japanese market share, 
regulatory compliance expenses, product development pressures, and aggressive capital 
investment efforts in emerging countries, as depicted in table 3.4. 
Table 3.4. Selected Euro~ean Auto Manufacturer Profit M a r ~ i n s ~ ~  
3l Financial Times, September 1 1 ,  1991, p. 1 1  1. 
32~etroi t  Free Press, February 15, 1992. 
33~etroi t  Free Press, February 28,1992. 
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Expected additions of European and Japanese capacity suggest that European 
overcapacity will rise from 674,000 units in 1989 to 2.5 million units by 1995. These 
pressures have led to the frequent projection that a restructuring may occur within the top 
six European producers. 
Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the UK account for the majority of automotive 
production in Europe and control 90% of the total automotive component production, 
value added, consumption, and employment.34 Germany by itself controls 35% of the 
vehicle production, but accounts for 39% of component production and 44% of total 
component value added. 
European CommunityJapan Auto Agreement 
The European Community has agreed with the Japanese government to limit 
annual Japanese passenger car sales, The agreement states that at an industry level of 
15.1 million units in 1999, the Japanese would be allowed sales of 2.43 million units for a 
share of 16%. If the market is less than 15.1 million units, the Japanese would have to 
absorb 75% of the difference so that their share would fall. On the other hand, if the 
market is more than 15.1 million units in 1999, the Japanese would be allowed to capture 
66% of the difference, for an increased share. The agreement targets 5.3% Japanese 
share in France (150,000 units), Italy (138,000 units), and Spain (79,000). Great Britain's 
Japanese share will grow to 7% (190,000 units) and Portugal's to 8.3% (23,000 units). 
The Japanese share of the German market will grow slowly beyond its current 15% rate. 
Other nonproducing or nonrestricted European Community members have Japanese 
shares of more than 40%. 
Expanding North American-European Linkages 
North American vehicle manufacturers are looking towards Europe for expansion. 
Chrysler leads the Big Three export efforts, exporting approximately 50,000 vehicles to 
Western Europe in 1991, and about one-half of these are mini-vansa3j Chrysler has an 
expanded export target of 60,000 vehicles for 1992 through its growing 1,000 European 
dealership base. Chrysler will assemble approximately 25,000 complete mini-van knock- 
down kits annually in Austria (a 50-50 joint venture with Steyr-Daimler-Puch). General 
Motors distributes approximately 20,000 North American produced vehicles through 400 
European-authorized dealerships. GM expects 1992 exports to grow 10%. 
34 The Competitive Challenge Facing the European Automotive Components Industry, PRS and Boston 
Consulting Group, February 199 1. 
35 Wards Automotive Reports, 9/23/91. p. 2. 
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In addition to exports, North American manufacturers have significant direct 
investments in Europe. GM is making the most aggressive eastern European expansion, 
including the manufacture of vehicles in Poland (initially 35,000 in 1993 expanding to 
100,000 to 150,000 units annually). GM owns 50% of Saab Automobile and 100% of 
Lotus. GM also has a 60% stake in IBC Vehicles, a Great Britain partnership with Isuzu 
that produces vans. Ford Motor owns 100% of Jaguar and has controlling interests in AC 
Cars and Aston Martin. 
The Emergence of Japan's Automotive Industry 
The impressive emergence of Japan as a leading producer of vehicles is probably 
the most significant development in the world automotive economy in the past two 
decades. Japan is the first major producing country to rely heavily upon a surplus of 
exports over imports for the development of its industry-even after its domestic market 
grew significantly. While it is the second largest national vehicle market in the world (to 
the United States), it still is exporting almost half of its total production. At the same 
time, as already noted, imported vehicles represent an unusually small fraction of Japan's 
domestic market. 
While many of the European producer nations rely upon substantial export 
volumes, these are typically balanced by significant import volumes. Because of Japan's 
reliance on exports, much of the growth of the world automotive economy in the past two 
decades has meant growth for Japanese producers. The dual practice of emphasizing 
exports and minimizing imports has enabled Japan to benefit from the growth of its own 
domestic market virtually to the exclusion of other producers, while it has simultaneously 
gained sales from worldwide growth as it exports into other markets. 
Early efforts to develop domestic auto producers in Japan date back to the 1930s. 
The Japanese government offered reluctant domestic producers financial incentives to 
enter the business against Ford and GM local subsidiaries that assembled cars and trucks 
from imported knocked-down components. Ford and GM dominated Japan's domestic 
market until they were shut down during the 1930s by Japan's government, and Japanese 
production then turned to military purposes. 
The industry grew during the 1950s, focusing mainly on trucks. US military 
demand for trucks, components, and spare parts in Korea helped the industry's early 
development. By 1959, the industry was producing 350,000 units, all but 50,000 of 
which were trucks. During the 1960s, Japan's auto industry took off, especially in 
passenger cars. In 1959, Japan's passenger car production was approximately 50,000 
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units per year. Ten years later, it was 2.6 million units. Japan became the world's second 
largest auto producer, including trucks, by 1970. Earlier, passenger cars had not been a 
priority of the government; producers could get financing for new truck plants but little 
for cars. 
But Japan's growing prosperity stimulated strong car demand in the 1960s. The 
early 1960s saw four new competitors-Mitsubishi, Daihatsu, Fuji Heavy, and Toyo 
Kogyo-enter the passenger car business against Toyota, Nissan, and Prince. Honda 
soon followed. 
The 1960s saw Japan become a major exporter of passenger cars and light trucks. 
In 1961, Japan exported only 1 1,000 passenger cars, most of them to other locations in 
Asia. By the end of that decade, Japan exported one million passenger cars. The keys to 
this dramatic rise to competitiveness were several, including some public policy and 
some producer-driven influences. 
First, Japanese producers invested aggressively in new plant and equipment, and 
developed deep, technically well-grounded organizations. Japan's auto industry was the 
first outside Western Europe and North America to prepare itself for true technical 
independence and innovation. Second, the industry's rate of combined productivity and 
quality improvement exceeded the rapid rise in wage and salary levels in Japan, so costs 
came down sharply. Sometime in the late 1960s, Japan became the pure low-cost 
producer of subcompact cars in the world, eventually opening up the price-driven bottom 
of the North American market for them. Most of Japan's early auto exports of course 
were to the rest of Asia and other developing markets, not to North America. Japan's 
producers generally sold fitst into less demanding, less competitive markets to build 
experience. 
Third, government policy was pro-industry and aggressively implemented. The 
classic conventional policies of import substitution and subsidization of exports were 
used. The Japanese government took unusual measures to make the components industry 
more cost and quality effective-a major reason for Japan's eventual export success. 
Also, foreign producers were excluded until late in the industry's production cycle, when 
weak domestic producers demanded that the government allow them to have minority US 
partners.36 
Mitsubishi and Isuzu argued they would be stronger domestically and 
internationally if they could get additional capital, management and technology input, and 
access to US producers' distribution networks. Chrysler and GM acquired minority 
36~or a discussion of  Japanese automotive trade barriers, see pages 146-155. 
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equity positions in Mitsubishi and Isuzu, respectively, and made major contributions, 
especially in passenger car engineering and styling, in international management systems, 
and provision of North American marketing outlets. Both companies were made 
stronger. Later, Ford tied up with Toyo Kogyo (Mazda), and GM with Suzuki. 
Today Japan is the leading national producer of motor vehicles. Its 1990 
production of nearly 13.5 million vehicles exceeded that of the second place United 
States by about 38%, and was some 16% higher than total North American production. 
Although the Japanese industry has made substantial investments in offshore production 
capacity, and its export share of production has fallen, it still exported some 45% of its 
1989 vehicle output, and thus continues to rely heavily on net exports to ensure its 
volumes.37 
However, the Japanese industry is not the monolith that many believe, and the 
capabilities and success of its nine light duty vehicle producers vary substantially. Thus, 
five of its passenger car assemblers-led by third place Toyota and fourth place Nissan- 
are among the dozen worldwide manufacturers with 1989 production in excess of one 
million vehicles, while the remaining four are not. In a recent survey, North American 
top management identified the Japanese Big Four as more competitive than the Big 
Three, but Toyota and Honda lead Nissan and Mazda by far more than Nissan and Mazda 
lead Ford and GM. Moreover, while Toyota and Honda are expected to maintain a 
shrinking lead through the year 2000, Ford and GM are expected to pass Mazda and to tie 
Nissan by then.38 
South Korea's Automotive Industry 
South Korea's automobile industry development has been effective by many 
standards and includes a period of spectacular domestic and export passenger car success. 
Motor vehicles had been assembled in small numbers in South Korea since the 1950s 
dating back to the war with the North, but serious efforts at production did not come until 
the 1960s. Production volume in these early years was small, and total output was as low 
as 37,000 units as late as 1975. The Korean government acted to sharply limit the 
number of producers and focused them by vehicle type. The role of foreign capital was 
highly restricted, especially in the early stages, to enable government to have more 
37~a ta  developed from MVMA Motor Vehicle Facts and Figures 1991, pp. 30-34. 
38~mst & Young and the Office for the Study of Automotive Transportation (OSAT), The University of 
Michigan, The Car Company of the Future: A Study ofpeople and Change, 1991, pp. 15-16. 
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influence over investment decisions and industry discipline. Government ensured that 
foreign components critical to exporting competitive vehicles were imported. 
By the end of 1979, passenger car annual production capacity was 229,000 units, 
but only half was used. The government aggressively managed producers' product line 
focus and scale, and closely watched each producer's financial performance. Part of the 
government's strategy of conserving scarce industrial resources and foreign exchange was 
to limit the growth of the domestic market through heavy taxes. In 1979, domestic car 
demand of 95,000 units, while a peak for South Korea, was still well below what per- 
capita income levels would have predicted. Demand was held down by several measures. 
Gasoline prices were twice as high in South Korea in 1981 as in Malaysia, Hong Kong, 
and Singapore, all similar markets. Car sales taxes were high. Bus transportation was 
heavily subsidized. South Korea's government tried to apply as many resources to truck 
and bus vehicles, to support the continued industrialization of the economy. 
Exports drove the auto industry's growth in the 1980s, in particular Hyundai's car 
exports to North America. The export burst was sudden. In 1983, South Korean car 
exports totaled 16,000 units, compared with 106,000 domestic units. Six years later, in 
1989, car exports reached 350,000 units, nearly 40% the domestic demand of 860,000. 
All this export growth was essentially Hyundai sales to North America. 
Three qualifications of Hyundai's export success bear mention. First, all critical 
engineering and a majority of total component value in the exported Pony and Excel 
came from Britain, Japan, and the United States. Hyundai assembled and marketed the 
cars, and made especially good use of Mitsubishi engineering and components. It was a 
classic global-era partnership around a particular model series. Probably no auto 
company today can rapidly go alone from initial development to large-scale exporting to 
advanced economies exclusively using internally developed domestic components. The 
Excel was a selectively sourced and brilliantly managed package. Second, the Excel was 
Hyundai's accomplishment, not the South Korean auto industry's. Daewoo and Kia, the 
other passenger car producers, together exported fewer than 1,000 units in 1986. 
However, by 1989, exports of these two companies had grown to 150,000, while 
Hyundai's exports collapsed due to quality and performance problems. In 1989 Hyundai 
established an assembly plant for its new Sonata in Quebec, but 1991 production of only 
30,000 units was far short of its 100,000 unit capacity. 
The Ford and GM low-end car sourcing from their south Korean affiliates is 
characteristically global in pattern. Ford sources the subcompact Festiva from Kia, and 
more than half of the component value comes directly from Kia, Ford, and Mazda, which 
codesigned the car with Ford. The Festiva is sold in South Korea through Kia, in the US 
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through Ford, and in Japan through Mazda. Ford owns 10% of Kia, and Mazda owns 
8%. General Motors has Daeww assembling its Pontiac LeMans, aimed like the Festiva 
at first-time US car buyers at the $7,000-$9,000 price range. The project involved a $430 
million Daewoo capacity expansion in engines, stampings, and assembly. Opel, GM's 
West German affiliate, designed the car. Initially, an estimated 40% of component value 
came from outside Korea. 
Components 
South Korean auto producers are relatively integrated, and each producer 
manufactures components and has group affiliates that also make components. Hyundai, 
for example, produces engines, axles, seats, and lighting in addition to doing main body 
stamping and assembly; and its affiliated companies supply most brake, suspension, 
steering, and electrical components. South Korea's pattern of strong vertical integration 
inside the group is somewhat like Toyota's and Nissan's pattern of affiliated Japanese 
first-tier suppliers, although these two Japanese companies often have only minority 
positions. South Korean auto producers have closely managed the vertical supply chain, 
reflecting their modeling of Japan. 
South Korea's auto authorities have encouraged foreign technology introduction 
into the country but have sparingly approved major foreign equity participation until 
recently. Government wanted the auto producers-rather than foreign component 
makers-to control component strategy. The government now favors US and European 
component ventures, trying to reduce dependence on Japan, which is regarded as 
withholding its most advanced technology fiom South Korea. 
Mexico's Automctive Industry 
Mexico's first auto development policies were shaped in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, resulting in a major policy decree in 1962. Under the leadership of the state 
development bank, a brave, if perhaps naive, industry vision was drafted, and parts of it 
actually became policy and law. The draft was aggressive: no more than four or five 
vehicle producers with obligatory Mexican majority ownership; and, each producing only 
one model, with at least 60% local Mexican content and parts standardization across the 
components sector. Import restrictions were in place, and Mexico aimed to develop this 
tight industry structure under the hand of the state. 
Political forces against the restrictive draft were strong, including existing US Big 
Three-owned assembly operations that imported knock-down units. The eventual decree 
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did not limit entry or require Mexican ownership or limit model proliferation. Ten of the 
eighteen applying vehicle companies were allowed to produce. Ford and General Motors 
retained 100% ownership. Chrysler owned 33% of Fabricas Auto-Mex. The other seven 
were wholly or majority Mexican-owned. However, by 1970 these seven were either out 
of business or foreign-owned by Volkswagen and others. Meanwhile, Nissan and other 
foreign companies entered. Consequently, Mexico, like Canada, does not have a 
domestically controlled vehicle industry. 
The Big Three's early interest in Mexico was to establish a domestic market 
position and sell cars and trucks. Mexico was not seen as a source for components or a 
major market for their US component factories. Mexico was too small even with growth 
projections to have much operating impact on the rest of the Big Three's systems. 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Mexico experienced a cycle of truncated growth 
and contraction. Total vehicle production reached 351,000 units in 1974, but fell to only 
272,000 in 1986. The peak was over 600,000 units in 1990-a full recovery from the oil 
price collapse and the debt crisis of the mid-1980s. Clearly, these external events 
handicapped the industry's development. However, even during the economy's strong 
periods, Mexico's industry did not make satisfactory progress in cost, quality, and design. 
Mexico, unlike South Korea and Japan, did not design original vehicles. Production cost, 
in general, remained well above US levels. Auto producers often operated at a financial 
loss. As late as 1981, vehicle exports were only 16,000 units, or 3% of production. By 
1989, exports had risen to 200,000 units, or approximately 30% of total production. In 
components, Mexico, as late as 1984, was achieving local content in passenger cars of 
only 50%. Mexico ran a serious components trade deficit until quite recently. 
Successful Component Arrangements 
Mexico's most successful auto-related activities have been in component product 
arrangements in conjunction with US auto producers. One is the Border Industrialization 
Program, begun in 1965. The government established a duty-free export processing and 
assembly zone within a 12-mile strip along the Mexican-US border. Companies can 
import materials duty free, process or assemble them, and reexport. The companies are 
known as maquiladoras. In 1985, there were fifty-nine maquiladoras in the auto 
industry. By 1991, the number of automotive maquiladoras had grown to over 100. 
Most of these operations produce medium-technology, labor-intensive, and less critical 
components, and have strong US management and technical input, as well as materials. 
As a result, they far outperform their purely Mexican domestic counterparts. Some 
maquiladora plants have achieved quality levels comparable to their US parent's plants 
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and costs that are lower, especially in labor-intensive processes. Others have been less 
successful. The border program has helped industrialize several areas of Mexico, but has 
only indirectly helped the Mexican vehicle industry, which continues to use purely 
domestic components for the most part. 
The second, and larger, component success has been the engine export programs 
with US and European auto producers. In 1977 and 1983, decrees by the Mexican 
government developed a program aimed at increasing major component exports by the 
foreign-owned companies in Mexico back to their own vehicle assembly operations in 
their home markets. The government recognized that engines made in Mexico for the 
Mexican market did not meet the cost or quality specifications in US and European 
markets. It also recognized that Mexican production scale based on Mexican domestic 
volumes would never allow engines to become competitive. So, the decree gave tariff 
and financial incentives to foreign producers operating in Mexico to establish large export 
platforms in Mexico, and the government started more rigorous enforcement of the 
export-import balancing requirement. 
These government initiatives alone would not have generated a successful 
program had not the US and European auto companies involved found them timely. 
These auto companies needed to tool production for new fuel-efficient engines. They had 
developed pockets of technical infrastructure in Mexico, and several knew of high-quality 
Mexican manufacturing companies outside the auto industry who could be partners in a 
new world-class engine joint venture. Producing and exporting engines in high volume 
to support their home US and European assembly plants would allow them to import 
more components or vehicles into Mexico. The age of specialized global component 
sourcing was just beginning, and engines looked appropriate for Mexico. Starting in the 
early 1980s, dedicated engine facilities were built. 
The local content of the engine operations varies, but is rising. Most started with 
the casting of engine blocks, some rough machining and assembly. Gradually, the more 
sophisticated engine components are being produced in Mexico. Local content progress 
in these engine programs differs from local content in Mexican domestic market-oriented 
production because the foreign auto producers making the engines control all the inputs. 
In Mexico's domestic sector, components are largely supplied by domestic manufacturers 
of uneven quality. The engine sourcing system is more self-contained, with all inputs 
coming from foreign auto producers or their closely managed suppliers. 
The results have been good in the view of both sides. From the producers' 
standpoint, favorable economics have taken the pain out of compliance. The large-scale 
Mexican-based operations with global subcomponent sourcing now produce lower-cost 
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engines than in their home US plants. Mexico, whose auto-related trade deficit had 
surged to $2 billion in the early 1980s, developed a new net export source that is worth 
hundreds of millions of dollars each year. Moreover, the program is upgrading the 
nation's auto industrial base and raising wages. 
In the last few years, this idea of performing large-scale specialized value added 
on products for import has been applied to assemble cars in Mexico for export, using 
heavily imported components. General Motors has begun assembling pick-up trucks and 
passenger cars for export. Mexican-sourced engines are used. Ford has a new advanced 
assembly facility at Hermosillo, Mexico that Ford's chainnan describes as the company's 
most modem. It assembles passenger cars, with 70% of the components imported from 
the US, Japan, and Korea. 
Global Automotive Markets 
As of 199 1, approximately 420 million registered motor vehicles constituted the 
active world fleet. In the 1950s and 1960s the great majority of the world's motor vehicle 
fleet was found in North America, as shown in figure 3.4. By the 1970s a growing share 
of all vehicles in use was found in other regions--primarily Western Europe and Japan. 
Together, these three regions account for over 90% of the world's vehicle fleet in 1992. 
Increasingly, a larger share of world vehicle sales and vehicle fleet will be found outside 
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Figure 3.4. Motor Vehicle Registrations Worldwide and North America, 1946-2000.39 
3 9 ~ ~ ~ ~  World Vehicle Data ,1991. 1992-2002 based on OSAT projections. 
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Original equipment and aftermarket business will move as production bases and 
operating fleets increase concentration beyond North American borders. Aftermarket 
parts and service business will expand rapidly outside North America with the 
corresponding growth in registrations, establishment of dealer and service channels, 
development of individual as well as commercial markets, and increasing product 
sophistication. International supplier companies serving the original equipment market in 
non-North American production bases may have an initial lead on this business. 
However, corporate economies of scale and profits may exist for companies efficiently 
serving emerging aftermarkets through local production or trade. 
Future Motor Vehicle Sales Patterns 
Between 1992 and 2002, approximately 600 million new motor vehicles are 
expected to be sold world wide, as portrayed in figure 3.5. Consumption increase in the 
mature markets is expected to be slow, and market growth is unlikely to surpass 1%-2% 
in the coming decade. By contrast, demand growth rates in emerging automotive markets 
-such as Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia, and South America-will likely be more 
rapid, ranging from 596-154 annually, depending on the specific country and region. 
Figure 3.5. Projected Cumulative New Motor Vehicle Sales by Region, 1992-2002 4o 
4 0 ~ ~ ~ ~  estimates. 
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Nevertheless, because the base level in these emerging automotive markets is so 
low, the total number of vehicles sold there will be modest, and it is expected that over 
75% of the 600 million motor vehicles sold between 1992-2002 will be purchased by 
consumers in North America, Europe and Japan. Therefore, while the North American 
industry should aggressively develop and penetrate the emerging automotive markets-in 
vehicles and parts, in both original markets and the aftennarket-it is equally critical that 
the Traditional industry regain market share in North America, maintain its market share 
in Europe, and significantly expand its market share in Japan. This will require 
substantial investment at a time when there are many other pressing needs for capital. 
Summary 
Japan and North America are the world's leading producers and consumers of 
motor vehicles. While the established European automakers, as well as the more recent 
participants, including South Korea, Mexico, and Brazil are forces to be reckoned with in 
the global automotive industry, the major international competitor to the Traditional 
North American Automotive Industry -at least for the next fifteen years-will be the 
Japanese industry. This report consequently focuses quite explicitly upon the competitive 
situation of the North American industry with regard to Japan. It is this competitive 
situation that forms the basic context for many of the decisions and responses that the 
North American industry will make throughout the next five to ten years. 
In terms of market share, the North American manufacturers have performed 
reasonably well in recent years in only one of the three major automotive markets- 
Europe. If the North American industry is to regain its global competitiveness, it must 
not only reclaim lost market share in North America, but must also make inroads into the 
Japanese market-if not in assembled vehicles then certainly in parts and components. 
Finally, the North American industry must be cognizant of opportunities in emerging 
automotive markets and be prepared to nurture and participate in those new opportunities. 
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IV. COMPETITIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE NORTH AMERICAN INDUSTRY 
How competitive is the Traditional North American Automotive Industry in 
1992? How does it compare to its major international rivals-the Japanese and European 
industries? What does the future hold for this critical industry, and what role will the 
New Entrants to North American production play? 
Defining the Competitive Challenge 
In the North American view, the Japanese automotive industry represents the 
most serious competitor now and for the foreseeable future. Because of this, much of the 
material in the report focuses on the North American industry in comparison to the 
Japanese automotive industry. These comparisons-some of which determine Japanese 
advantage in certain areas-are not intended to suggest in any way that the competitive 
outcomes are fixed, or that the Traditional industry is fundamentally and irretrievably 
uncompetitive. Rather, the report describe the industry's competitive trajectory, cment 
situation, and possible futures. Further, the report communicates the North American 
industry's views of its own major competitive challenges, while explaining its current and 
probable responses to those challenges. 
Competitive assessments typically focus on the performance of a particular 
company, measured against the performance of other companies. As companies compete 
against each other across national boundaries, the differing economic and policy 
environments characteristic of their home markets become more than shapers of possible 
strategies: they become significant sources of competitive strength and weakness. 
Many Traditional North American companies will survive in the global 
automotive industry of the future, no matter where they locate their activities. The real 
question for North America is how many of these companies will survive and produce in 
North America. A key determinant is whether the North American policy and economic 
environment sets the survival hurdle higher or lower than other national or regional 
environments. Setting the survival hurdles higher than those faced by the industry's 
international competitors means that fewer North American companies will survive-at 
least in North America. The following chapter addresses the policy environment and its 
impact on competitiveness. 
This chapter of the report reviews the industry's recent performance along a 
number of dimensions, and assesses its overall competitive strength. The emphasis will 
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be on comparisons between the Traditional North American industry and the Japanese 
industry-both in Japan and as reflected by the Japanese New Entrants in North America. 
Market Size and Demographics 
The sheer size of the North American light duty vehicle market is an important 
determinant of its competitive dimensions and challenges. The North American market 
for light vehicles was well above $200 billion in 1991, In that year, North Americans 
logged over two trillion inter-city passenger miles in automobiles-meeting over 80% of 
their travel demand-and trucks accounted for over 25% of freight ton-mile~.~~ Market 
size has shaped the industry and the kinds of challenges it now faces, accounting for 
some of its actions that seem, in retrospect, to have been mistakes, and explaining its 
attractiveness to other national industries. 
A motor vehicle is a major purchase for the North American consumer, and its 
operation and maintenance takes a significant portion of the typical household budget. 
Vehicles are classic 'big ticket' consumer durables, and sales are cyclical, moving in 
lagged step with the economy. That poses problems for such a capital-intensive industry. 
Between 1978 and 1990 light vehicle sales fell as low as 11.5 million in 1982, and rose as 
high as 17.8 million in 1986, a swing of over 55%. Sales fell approximately 18% from 
1979 to 1980, and rose by about the same percentage from 1983 to 1984--wide 
fluctuations indeed.42 
Most economists and industry executives expect the balance of this decade to see 
slow growth in the North American population and economy. A recent survey of top 
level management in the North American industry forecasts annual vehicle sales for the 
duration of the 1990s to be below the record year of 1986.43 There are a number of 
reasons for these cautious expectations. First, purchasing and operating costs of a vehicle 
continue to grow as a percentage of slowly growing disposable income, largely driven by 
regulatory-but not necessarily customer--demand. Technical improvements to secure 
higher levels of fuel efficiency, lower levels of emissions, and safer vehicles are 
desirable, but they add cost to the product, and that restricts the size of the market. 
Second, lower birth rates in the 1970s and 1980s means fewer fust-time buyers as well as 
an aging population characterized by lower vehicle ownership and use rates. Third, 
-- 
~MVMA World Vehicle Data 1991, pp. 55-56. 
4 2 ~ ~ ~ ~  World Vehicle Data 1991, pp. 16,18, and 35.
43~rnst & Young, Car Company of the Future. 
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vehicles are lasting longer and requiring replacement less frequently. These expectations 
may be overcome by other factors, but the planning horizon for the industry is cautious. 
The Traditional North American industry faces a particular challenge in the 
demographic profile of the population. Import car buyers are younger, more affluent, and 
better educated than are the buyers of traditional cars. However, these age differences are 
concentrated in only two segments of the market: the upper middle and the luxury 
segment, as displayed in table 4.1. These segments are especially critical to the 
Traditional manufacturers, because the upper middle segment contains their 'bread-and- 
butter' vehicles-profitable, reasonably high volume cars-and the luxury segment 
provides an enormous share of their profits. In the upper-middle, the average age of the 
traditional car buyer is about 52, while the Import buyer averages 39. For the luxury 
segment, the ages are 58 and 44 for Traditional and Import vehicles, respectively. 
Assuming equal satisfaction and loyalty (repeat purchases) for both sets of buyers, 
imports can look forward to some four or five more sales from cunent customers, on 
average, than can the Traditionals. Since conquest sales cost more than repeat sales, this 
is an important Import advantage. These age differences may also confer an "image" to 
the vehicles, and in a society that values youth, an older image is not a sales asset. 
Table 4.1. How New Car Segments Differ by Age Groups 
Age category as a percent of segment purchases44 
Moreover, unless buying patterns shift with age, the population of car buyers will 
become increasingly composed of people more likely to buy import vehicles. To be sure, 
there are a number of reasons why buying patterns might shift with age. Older buyers do 
have somewhat different use requirements for vehicles, and some of these-family size, 
for example-suggest the purchase of larger vehicles. However, there is no certainty that 








44 Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association (MVMA). Facts and Figures 1989, p. 42. 



























the customer loyalty it supports. The optimistic expectation of many in the Traditional 
industry in the early 1980s that customers would grow out of small Japanese cars failed to 
take into account the Japanese industry's successful upscaling and growing of their 
product offerings for their loyal customer following. 
Bases of Automotive Competition 
Because a motor vehicle is a significant investment, consumers take care in 
selecting a specific product, often seeking detailed product information, 
recommendations, and engaging in extensive comparison shopping. Competition for 
sales is fierce, since these sales drive production and profit for manufacturers and their 
suppliers. The industry has recognized that today's market place requires extreme 
attention to customer satisfaction, however it is defined, and however it shifts over time. 
There are simply too many product choices for the customer to accept anything less than 
total satisfaction from his or her vehicle. But what are likely to be the sources of 
customer satisfaction in the years ahead? 
The automotive market is driven by several key fundamentals. Product price, 
total manufacturing cost, and product quality are all absolutely essential for 
competitiveness and survival. However, these factors simply represent the necessary 
conditions for participation. Success may well be gained by performance along four 
competitive dimensions, assuming that cost and quality among surviving manufacturers 
have reached rough parity. 
First, minimal lead time fosters closeness to market and customers, satisfying 
their need for newness and product differentiation, and confemng important advantages. 
Lead time should approach two years from conception to production for the best 
performing companies by 2000. For suppliers, that means participating in extremely 
compressed product development. 
Second, selling and servicing-the total purchase experience and relationship- 
will be critical. The customer will not tolerate less than world-class sales and service 
experience, even if the manufacturer has low control over dealers. If the numerous 
vehicles in the market are more similar in their attributes, the customer will partially base 
the purchase decision on the overall quality of the sales and service experience. The 
assemblers will also insist on this from suppliers. 
Third, consumers increasingly demand a level of style that is more like fashion, 
the illusive total reaction to the vehicle as the customer 'wears' it. The vehicle is 
becoming a 'life-style' choice, reflecting-and announcing-the values and views of its 
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owner. Fourth, product technology will remain important, but, like styling, it is rapidly 
changing in character. The traditional "bells and whistles" approach is giving way to a 
concerted effort to provide technology that has immediate and perceived customer value. 
Anti-lock braking systems and air bags have this characteristic, unlike the talking 
dashboards of the early 1980s. 
Finally, the customer base may be changing from a more materialistic orientation 
to one that reflects more concern with broader social and environmental issues. This 
provides a climate that will probably support more regulation of the industry, but also 
suggests a fifth source of competitive advantage: being a corporate good citizen. With 
parity of vehicles on many dimensions, a significant portion of the market may choose to 
buy from a company respected as a good corporate citizen, contributing to a better quality 
of life through its products, it operations, and its personnel. 
Product Quality 
There is little question that the quality of the Traditional North American vehicle 
has improved substantially, although it is less clear that this improvement has markedly 
assisted sales volumes. Perhaps the broadest measure of quality is the customer's overall 
satisfaction with the vehicle sales and ownership experience. The J.D. Power 
organization has tracked one indicator of such satisfaction after one year of ownership. 
Figure 4.1 shows the comparison of Traditional North American, Asian, and European 
vehicles from 1986 through 199 1. Over that period, Traditional ratings improved by 
28%, while European and Japanese vehicles improved by 20% and IS%, respectively. 
While there is still a gap between North American vehicles and the competition, that gap 
is narrowing and is expected to be eliminated by the mid- 1990s. 
In the most recent J.D. Power Consumer Satisfaction survey, three Traditional 
manufacturing divisions-Cadillac, Buick, and Oldsmobile-performed quite well. 
Among nonluxury nameplates, Buick (at 137) followed only Honda (146) and Toyota 
(144), while Oldsmobile tied for fifth at 128 with Nissan and Mazda. Among higher- 
price vehicles, Cadillac, the 1990 Malcolm Baldridge Award winner, virtually tied with 
Audi and placed ahead of BMW. The Traditionals are typically rated ahead of European 
vehicles on the "technical" dimension of quality in these surveys, though lagging them on 
the "service" dimensions. 
The service dimension reflects the important role played by dealers. The typical 
consumer does not analytically separate the manufacturer and the dealer, and responds to 
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the total experience of purchasing and owning the vehicle. The dealer almost totally 
mediates the manufacturer's relationship with the vehicle customer. 
North America Japan Europe 
Figure 4.1. Consumer Satisfaction Index, 1986- 1991 
If we focus on another J. D. Power indicator--defects after 90 days of 
ownershipthe Big Three have also improved substantially. In 1981, the typical 
passenger car built in North America had about seven customer-reported defects, while 
the typical Japanese vehicle had but two. Both industries improved by 1991: the 
Traditional North American product fell to about 1.5 defects per vehicle, while the 
Japanese nearly reached 1.2, as shown in figure 4.2.45 
These data suggest that the Traditional industry has eliminated about 95% of its 
1981 disadvantage in defects, compared to the Japanese industry. Moreover, it is no 
longer the case that all Traditional nameplates trail all or almost all Japanese nameplates. 
Ford, for example, is virtually tied with Subaru, and trails only Toyota and Honda among 
Japanese nameplates. A popular consumer magazine recently reported much lower 
overall defect levels, but the same magnitude of narrowing of the gap, as shown in table 
4.2.46 
4 5 ~ a r ~ u r  & Associates. The Harbour R e p o r d  Decade Laer,  1990. 
46~onmmer Reports, April, 1991. 
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Figure 4.2. Vehicle Defects per 100 Cars: Japan vs. Big 3, 1981-1991 
Table 4.2. Eleven Years of Quality Progress: 
Customer-Reported Defects per 100 Vehicles 
198 1 1991 % of 1981 ~ i f f e r e n c ~  
Japanese Average 205 123 60% NA 
Big Three 730 151 21% 28 
Chry sler 810 173 21% 50 
Ford 670 130 19% 7 
GM 740 157 21% 34 
If the performance gap in quality has closed to such an extent, why have the 
Traditional manufacturers been unable to halt their market share erosion? It may be that 
consumer perceptions and attitudes are lagging the actual situation, that consumers are 
not yet aware of the closeness of the industries on this important measure. On the other 
hand, many North American consumers tumed away from Traditional vehicles in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, when the comparative quality performance of the Traditionals 
was truly dismal. These consumers may be very reluctant to risk another such 
experience. It may take many years of good reports to outweigh those memories, or 
substantial inducements to take such risks.47 Many consumers remain loyal to brands 
that meet their requirements. While bad quality will lose a customer, there is no reason to 
expect equivalent quality to capture a sale. 
To be sure, quality is not the only basis of competition, and consumers may fully 
recognize the vastly diminished quality difference. Other factors in consumer decisions 
47Economists refer to this form of consumer reluctance as "Ackerloff s Lemon Law." 
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may explain continued Traditional share erosion. Some of these factors might include 
styling, image, perceptions that Japanese-badged vehicles are more high-tech and 
therefore better, and the feeling that buying Japanese is 'sensible' from many perspectives, 
much as buying Volkswagens was sensible in the early 1960s. Perhaps improved quality 
has paid a return, but that return is simply the slowing of share erosion due to other 
factors, and is not itself powerful enough to reverse that erosion. 
Krafcik analyzed the Power Report's measure of defects during the first 90 days 
of ownership, and identified those defects attributable to the assembly plant.48 His 
findings, presented in figure 4.3 suggest that North American, Japanese-badged New 
Entrant plants were some 5% higher than Japanese plants, while Traditional plants were 
about 50% higher than Japanese plants, and 43% higher than New Entrants. All these 
plants average well below one defect per vehicle, an outstanding performance. It also 
merits comment that the best Traditional plant is slightly ahead of the best Japanese and 
New Entrant plants. 
Best 
Weighted Average 
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Figure 4.3. Quality Performance by Parent Plant and Location, 1989 
48~omack,  Machine, p. 86. 
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Supplier Quality 
Product quality at the supplier level is extremely important, both to suppliers' 
manufacturing customers and for the suppliers' ability to secure new business and have 
some chance of success independent of those traditional customers. A recent review 
reports that Traditional North American suppliers achieve a defect rate below 2%, but 
well above Japanese and New Entrant supplier rates of 0.01%, as reported by the 
manufacturers.49 Interestingly, New Entrant manufacturers reported far fewer defects 
from North American suppliers (0.1%) than did Traditional manufacturers (1.8%). It is 
unclear whether this reflects different manufacturer demand or more rigorous and 
restrictive company definitions. Using J.D. Power data, Nishigushi found Traditional 
North American suppliers averaged about one-third of a defect per vehicle, less than one- 
tenth of a defect higher than the Japanese supplier leveL50 
Suppliers' views of their customers' demands are powerful determinants of 
supplier behavior. Numerous surveys of North American suppliers' views of the 
Traditional manufacturers' supplier selection criteria report that quality is the single most 
important criterion in the purchasing decisions of the manufacturers, although it had been 
a distant third to short-term price and delivery performance in the past. The 
manufacturers' quality awards suggest substantial quality progress over the past few 
years. If initial improvement in the quality of shipped parts too often reflected a culling of 
parts produced, rather than the reductions in scrap and rework required for real cost 
reductions, Traditional suppliers are now making solid progress on produced as well as 
delivered quality.51 Other survey work reveals that the Traditional manufacturers 
emphasize quality as much as their Japanese and New Entrant corn petit or^.^^ 
The Traditional Automotive Industry began making serious efforts to redress 
fundamental quality problems in the 1980-1982 downturn, rather than just taking 
temporary measures and waiting for the upturn of the business cycle to carry them along. 
There is little doubt that the competitive strength of the Japanese vehicle manufacturers 
49~usumano, Michael A. and Akira Takeishi. "Supplier Relations and Management: A Survey of 
Japanese, Japanese-Transplant, and U.S. Auto Plants." Strategic Management Journal, 1991, p. 576. 
Unfortunately, their sample does not permit complete comparisons between the suppliers because no 
Japanese plants in Japan reported North American suppliers, while the North American manufacturers had 
no Japanese suppliers. 
50~omack, Machine, p. 157. 
51 Michael S, Flynn "Supplier Perceptions of Customer Quality Expectations." Paper p~sented at the 
American Society for Metals Conference on CustomerISupplier Relationships, Chicago, Illinois, 
November, 1985; and Michael S. Flynn & David J. Andrea Capacity and Competition: the 1988189,OSAT 
Supplier Survey Respondent Report, UMTRI, Office for the Study of Automotive Transportation, June, 
1989. 
52~usamano and Takeishi, "Supplier Relations", table 9, pp. 571-572. 
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played a major role in these reactions, leading the Traditional North American 
manufacturers to undertake major efforts in pursuit of cost reductions, quality 
improvement, and productivity gains. The industry, by all reports, is continuing these 
efforts. However, some observers have expressed concern that the Traditional industry 
may note these small remaining absolute differences, declare the quality challenge met, 
and allow itself again to fall behind the Japane~e.~~ 
The Traditional North American industry has made a fundamental shift in its 
thinking over the past few years. That shift was necessary for its survival, but is no less 
impressive for that. Simple points such as the advantages of defect prevention over 
defect detection strategies for improving quality are neither simple nor obvious when 
they challenge an overall production philosophy-a philosophy that was enormously 
successful under the competitive conditions in North America before 1970. The very 
complexity of the industry only increases the time required for general acceptance of 
these new ways of defining problems and seeking solutions. 
The remaining differences in customer-reported defects between Japanese-badged 
and traditional cars are small in an absolute sense. After all, they are about one-third of a 
defect per car in the consumer's possession, about one-quarter defect per car from the 
assembly plant, and another one-tenth from supplier plants. However, they are still quite 
large in percentage terns: about 30% higher at the consumer, 50% at the assembly plant 
and 38% at the supplier plants. If consumers react to the percentage gap, that may 
explain why there appear to have been few market returns to the Traditional industry's 
great improvement in average defect performance. 
Productivity and Total Cost Reduction. 
Productivity is the efficient conversion of inputs to outputs. It is critically 
important in manufacturing because the more efficient a company is-that is, the higher 
its ratio of output to inputs-the lower its cost. If a company has a cost advantage over a 
competitor it has a formidable competitive weapon, because it can select from an array of 
competitive strategies. It can compete on price, maximize its market share, resmct its 
competitors' profitability, and garner higher levels of net revenue itself. That revenue 
can be used to increase its investment~xpand capacity or develop new p r o d u c t ~ r  to
support higher levels of returns to its investors. In traditional mass production industries, 
53~obert  Cole, "U.S. Quality Improvement in the Auto Industry: Close but No Cigar," California 
Management Review, Summer 1990, pp. 71-84. 
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like motor vehicles, cost advantage serves many competitive purposes, and is a key 
competitive advantage. 
Manufacturing Cost Studies 
In the early 1980s, the Traditional North American industry came to believe that it 
faced a serious cost disadvantage relative to the Japanese ind~stry.5~ Numerous analyses 
supported this belief, and the industry's conventional wisdom focused on the concern that 
the Japanese industry could manufacture a small car considerably more efficiently than 
could the Traditional North American industry. Common estimates placed this 
Traditional North American cost disadvantage at $1,500 to $2,500 per unit. 
While most of the Traditional industry accepted the basic premise that it faced a 
serious competitive cost gap, there was much less agreement as to what the sources of 
that cost gap might be. Various members of the industry selected different theories for 
public presentation and, at least for some time, those theories drove their internal 
strategies for responding to this competitive challenge. 
The various analyses, both public and proprietary, agreed that a serious labor 
productivity gap existed, and that wage and benefit costs in North America were 
considerably higher than comparable costs in Japan. Most analyses implicated the 
general policy and economic environment in one way or another. However, beyond those 
basic and very general agreements, little consensus existed, as companies initially 
focused on different factors and selected quite different strategic responses. 
The great manufacturing cost difference debate spurred the Traditional industry's 
first public recognition that the Japanese indeed posed a substantial competitive 
challenge. The Traditional industry had largely viewed Japanese share gains in the 1973 
and 1979 oil shocks as temporary, and their products as inexpensive, unimpressive, entry- 
level vehicles at best. The cost studies solidified a much deeper concern about the 
Japanese challenge, and an even more fundamental concern with the long-term 
implications of a "business as usual" approach to the future. However, these studies 
focused almost exclusively on assembly labor productivity, often only addressing hourly 
labor productivity, yet the results were assumed to hold throughout all activities and 
levels of the industry. 
54~obert  E. Cole and Taizo Yakushiji, eds. The American and Japanese Auto Indrcsnies in Transition: 
Report of the Joint US-Japan Automotive Society. Center for Japanese Studies, The University of 
Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1984. 
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Plant Labor Productivity 
Those early studies have been updated by a number of authors, and while they 
reveal possible improvement in Traditional North American assembly labor productivity, 
they continue to show a competitive gap with the Japanese and New Entrant industries. 
While short on specific details, these newer studies have challenged some of the 
assumptions of the earlier work, most notably that the cost gap can be explained by 
Japanese use of technology or lack of North American worker effort. The most thorough 
assessment of assembly labor productivity is without question the work of John Krafcik 
for the MIT International Motor Vehicle Program.55 Krafcik made every effort to 
account for differences in levels of vertical integration, technology, and work flow among 
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Figure 4.4. Productivity Performance by Parent Plant and Location, 198956 
These estimates suggest that Japanese plants, on average, require only two-thirds 
the labor content, while New Entrants require 84% of the labor content at Traditional 
North American plants. Even more disheartening is the fact that the best Traditional 
North American plant requires some 11% more labor content than the average of the 
55~omack, Machine. 
%bid., P 85. 
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Japanese plants, although it is slightly ahead of the best of the New Entrant plants. On 
the other hand, the Traditional North American producers expend only about 70% the 
labor hours required by European producers, whether foreign (primarily North American) 
or European owned. Finally, Traditional North American labor productivity is well 
ahead of the NICs, requiring 61% of their levels of labor content. 
These results also highlight the variability of Japanese manufacturers' 
performance. The labor content in the least productive Japanese plant is 96% higher than 
in the best, while the Traditional North American industry's least efficient plant is 65% 
higher than its best. Even if these labor content differences obtain across the entire 
manufacturing chain, they can be overcome and/or compensated. The Traditional North 
American producers are reducing their labor content, and they have other advantages that 
can offset these weaknesses. 
Another recent report examines the 40 North American assembly plants, and 
ranks them according to labor hours in the vehicle.S7 While controversial, this report 
clearly indicates that there are substantial differences among the Traditional North 
American producers, and suggests that one of them-Ford-is doing quite well in the 
productivity competition, both against its Traditional rivals and the New Entrant plants. 
Simply dividing total labor force into production suggests that Ford is the most efficient 
Traditional North American producer, followed by Chrysler, and then General Motors, 
operating at about half of Ford's level in both 1989 and 1990.58 However, recent labor 
contracts have effectively moved to converting labor to more of a fixed cost, and limited 
the companies' options to lay off workers in slack times. These comparisons are 
therefore sensitive to capacity utilization and may be misleading at any given point in 
time. 
One of thc important lessons of the work done on manufacturing plant 
productivity has been that productivity must be assessed comprehensively, and it is 
necessary to recognize the relationship of all inputs to all outputs across the entire range 
of activities. Moreover, the industry by and large now recognizes that productivity, even 
narrowly construed as labor hours in a vehicle, is influenced by a wide range of factors 
that are themselves highly interconnected: product and process design, worker training, 
management coordination, and supplier quality and reliability, to list the most prominent. 
57~arbour and Associates, Harbour Report. 
58~ernstein Research, The Automobile Industry, New York: Sanford C. Bernstein & Co., Inc., 1991, p. 28. 
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Product Development Cycles 
Clark and his colleagues have done excellent work on differences in the product 
design cycle among the major world motor vehicle manufacturers.59 While this work 
suffers from the same focus on labor hours that plagues most productivity comparisons, it 
also delves much more deeply into the sources of these differences than is typically the 
case, and, perhaps for that reason, appears to have had more immediate effect on 
performance. Clark finds that the typical Japanese new design requires 46 months and 
about 1.7 million labor hours to complete, while the Traditional North American 
manufacturers and their European rivals invest about three million labor hours and take 
about 60 months for a new design. 
The Japanese advantage of 14 months in lead time is purchased by investing labor 
hours differently, and by investing fewer labor hours. In fact, the Japanese require 57% 
of the labor hours required by either the Traditional North Americans or their European 
rivals, a larger advantage than revealed in assembly plant comparisons. One of the key 
differences appears to be the Japanese reliance on their suppliers to perform design 
activities, a finding confirmed by more recent analyses as well.60 While Traditional 
North American suppliers have long participated in design work for their traditional 
customers, this often resulted in duplicate effort, as the manufacturers' virtually 
performed the design and engineering work over to ensure its accuracy.61 
Supplier Productivity 
Unfortunately, no studies of suppliers comparable to Krafcik's work on assembly 
plants exist. Moreover, the role of the supplier in industry productivity remains a 
somewhat contentious issue. Many personnel at the Traditional manufacturers assume 
that suppliers suffer the same-r greater4sadvantage that is revealed in manufacturer 
comparisons, while numerous suppliers insist that their own internal studies show them to 
be much more competitive than their manufacturer customers believe. 
Nishiguchi found that Japanese suppliers required about 32% of the time to 
change dies, and New Entrants about 56%, compared with the Traditional North 
American suppliers. However, it would be extremely rash to generalize these results 
across all supplier activity, especially since focusing on reduced die change time has been 
59Kirn B. Clark and Takahiro Fujirnoto, Product Development Performance: Strategy, Organization, and 
Management in the World Auto Industry, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 1991. 
60~usarnano and Takeishi, "Supplier Relations", pp. 572-573. 
61~irn B. Clark and Takahiro Fujirnoto, Product Development . 
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a hallmark of the Japanese industry for many years, and a relatively recent effort for the 
Traditional North American industry. 
Labor Productivity 
Other data on labor productivity paint a less somber comparison. These data, too, 
require cautious interpretation, but do suggest that the North American automotive 
industry may be more robust than do the specific, focused studies. Data from the Japan 
Productivity Center indicate that the US automotive industry had a labor productivity 
advantage over the Japanese industry as recently as 1986, the latest year for which data 
are available. On a labor-hour base, US productivity was 32% higher than Japanese, 
down from a 36% advantage in 1980. These data reflect value of output rather than units, 
so they are not directly comparable to the data reported above. These comparisons also 
indicate that the US productivity advantage in the automotive industry is larger than in 
two other important manufacturing (and auto supplier) industries: steel, where US 
productivity in 1986 was 5% higher, evidencing a remarkable turnaround from a 13% 
disadvantage in 1980; and electrical machinery, where a 43% advantage in 1980 became 
a 13% disadvantage in 1986. The quick turnarounds in steel and electrical machinery 
both suggest the instability of these comparisons.62 
Japan's rate of productivity growth in all manufacturing has been sufficiently 
higher than North America's to support real wage hikes while closing the manufacturing 
cost gap. Hourly wages in manufacturing in Japan exceeded those in both Canada and 
the United States for 1988, but Japan has maintained virtually the same rate of change in 
its wage cost index from 1985 to 1989 (.951) as the United States (-943) because of its 
higher rate of productivity growth. Japan clearly has achieved higher wage and 
productivity growth, while the United States has experienced both lower wage and 
productivity growth.63 
The auto industry and its stamping suppliers have both increased their labor 
efficiency between 1978 and 1988-some 34% for the automotive industry and 30% for 
the automotive stamping industry. These are healthy rates of growth, especially since 
1978 Traditional North American production was some two million units higher than in 
1988, and some one million higher than combined Traditional and New Entrant 
production in 1988. These productivity growth rates were somewhat higher for 
production workers than for nonproduction workers in automotive stampings (31% vs. 
62~apan Economic Institute of America, Japan-U.S. Business Repory, Japan Economic Institute of 
America, Washington, 1991, Table 8-7, p. 71. 
631bid., Tables 8-1,8-5, & 8-6, pp. 68 & 70. 
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24%), while the reverse held in the automotive industry (where nonproduction workers 
achieved a 38% growth compared with 32% for production workers).64 
Process Technology and Productivity 
The Traditional North American companies face a continuing, if shrinking, 
competitive gap in the deployment and effective utilization of numerous process 
technologies, especially those that can be termed 'soft technologies'-major sources of 
productivity and quality improvement. These soft technologies are the techniques and 
routine behaviors embedded in the patterned activities of humans in the manufacturing 
enterprise that support and implement machine technologies rather than the technologies 
that are contained in the machines themselves. The traditional industry has rapidly 
adopted some of these technologies, such as just-in-time (JIT) manufacturing, statistical 
process control (SPC), and continuous quality improvement (CQI), although the pace of 
dissemination is somewhat slower within the supply base than at the manufact~rers.~~ 
Soft technologies that link activities, rather than those that focus on a specific activity set 
are especially important, because they promote a broader systems approach to 
manufacturing, at once spanning the worker/machine interface and crossing activity 
boundaries within a process. 
However, a recent study suggests that the North American industry still lags 
behind the Japanese in some of the fundamental building blocks of productivity 
improvement.66 Thus just over 10% of US companies and just under 20% of Canadian 
companies always or almost always use process simplification techniques, and about 20% 
of either regularly use cycle time analysis. Japanese companies are much more likely to 
make frequent use of each of these two techniques, at 47% and 55%, respectively. 
Total Factor Productivity 
Winston examined the Traditional US industry's cost competitiveness with Japan, 
concluding that the Japanese vehicle makers' cost advantage decreased through the mid- 
1980s, reflecting the strengthened yen and enhanced competitiveness of US 
manufacturers.67 In a related paper, Winston estimates that an exchange rate of 152 yen 
to the (US) dollar would yield cost parity between the US and Japanese automotive 
@~ertzenber~, "The Internationalization of the Auto Parts Industry," Table 32A. 
65~rnst & Young, The Car Company of the Future. 
66~rnst & Young, and the American Quality Foundation, International Quality Study, 1991. While 
published results are for a number of industries, these are reflective of the automotive subsample (personal 
communication, 2/92). 
67~lifford Winston and Associates, Blind Intersection, Washington, D.C., The Brodrings Institution, 1987. 
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industries as of 1987.68 Winston finds that production scale and product mix provide a 
substantial Japanese advantage. 
Fuss and Waverman analyzed the productivity of the Canadian, US, and Japanese 
industries from 1970 through 1984 and concluded that Japanese efficiency improved at 
approximately three times the rate of the Canadian and US industries, resulting in a 17% 
efficiency advantage by 1984. Their work assesses total factor productivity, including the 
price of materials and capital-both financial costs and prices of equipment and 
facilities-as well as the price of labor, and nets out the effects of capacity utilization. 
Their similar results for the United States and Canada reinforce the linked fate of the 
North American ind~stries.~9 
Fuss and Waverman have updated their analyses as a special project for this 
report. Their results suggest that the US industry may have achieved a slight cost 
advantage over Japan in 1988, moving from 55% higher costs in 1984 to almost 5% 
lower costs in 1988, primarily because of the substantial revaluation of the yen-dollar 
exchange rate. Most of this US advantage is due to 19% lower input costs from supplier 
industries,70 and the industry itself still faces a substantial productivity gap. In fact, if all 
factor prices had been equal in the two countries, production costs would have been over 
15% higher in the United States due to lower levels of efficiency. The US continued to 
face about a 4% disadvantage in the cost of labor in 1988, but enjoyed a 2% advantage in 
total costs of capital, as lower prices for equipment and facilities overcame a 4.5% 
disadvantage in the financial costs of funds. 
These results appear to challenge a range of studies from the early and mid-1980s 
that showed Japanese cost advantages as high as 50% for the manufacture of small 
vehicles. The exchange rate used in these types of comparisons is critical, and these 
results are quite consistent with those earlier studies when the exchange rate is 
app.ropriately adjusted.'l Similarly, the estimates for efficiency are consistent with 
Krafchik's results, and their capital estimates are also consistent with other work on cost 
of capital. However, these are general results for the industry, and may be quite different 
from the results of cost comparisons of particular US and Japanese companies. 
68~bid., pp, 6-35, 
6 g ~ e l v ~  Fuss and Leonard Waverman, Productivity Growth in the Motor Vehicle Industry, 1970-1984: A 
Comparison of C a d ,  Japan, and the United States. 
70 Though these findings are counter to the conventional wisdom, the results are consistent with major 
studies from the early 1980s showing lower Japanese costs due to changes in exchange rates. 
71~ee for example Industrial Renaissance by William J .  Abernathy, Kim B. Clark, and Alan M. Kantrow, 
Basic Books, New York, 1983, as well as subsequent work by Ira Magaziner. 
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Since the exchange rate for 1988 (128:l) approximates the rate current in early 
1992 (130: I), these results might seem to represent a best estimate of relative costs as of 
1992. However, actual productivity and costs in a capital intensive industry are tightly 
linked to capacity utilization, and today's US utilization levels are far below those of 
1988. Indeed, adjusting these 1988 results to 1991 capacity utilization rates totally 
eliminates any US advantage, as the industry's efficiency disadvantage grows to 21% and 
the Japanese industry achieves a one percent cost advantage. 
To be sure, industry capacity rates reflect the general performance of the 
economy, and the weak economy of the past few years has hampered the automotive 
industry. However, automotive competition also directly influences capacity rates. 
Beyond general economic circumstances, North American producers are afflicted with 
lowered capacity utilization rates because such a substantial share of the market goes to 
imports, captives, and New Entrants. New Entrant capacity has resulted in excess 
capacity in the Traditional industry, as New Entrant sales have largely represented 
additional sales rather than substituting for Japanese imports, and that has decreased 
industry-wide utilization rates. Vehicle importers from Japan benefit from increased 
capacity utilization rates at home because of these North American sales. Moreover, the 
exceedingly small share of the Japanese markets that goes to imports protects and 
supports Japanese utilization rates, while effectively denying sales that could support 
Traditional capacity in North America 
The US relative efficiency position improved from a 17% disadvantage in 1984 to 
a 15.6% disadvantage in 1988, a relatively small improvement of about eight percent. On 
the other hand, the US disadvantage in production efficiency was steadily increasing over 
the 1975-1984 period, and this erosion appears to have stopped over the 1984-1988 
period, and even reversed slightly, as the North American industry has improved its 
efficiency. It should be stressed that the major roles of the change in the exchange rate on 
improving US performance is not necessarily disappointing. Many observers believe the 
yen's low value against the dollar as recently as 1985 distorted underlying competitive 
comparisons then, rather than that today's exchange rate in some sense 'artificially' 
distorts them today. 
These 1988 results include the performance of New Entrants, suggesting that the 
New Entrants will not, by themselves, resolve the productivity challenge from Japan. In 
fact, had the New Entmts not been included, the materials cost advantage for the United 
States might be somewhat larger, in view of the New Entrants' high levels of sourcing 
from Japan. 
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Is North American cost parity-or even advantage-competitively meaningful, 
even at a viable level of capacity utilization? To date, Japanese manufacturers have been 
quite successful in passing through less than the full effect of the change in the exchange 
rate. If they are able to pass through only some 60% of that currency change, then these 
objective, overall comparisons of economic efficiency have less meaning, especially in 
determining comparative advantages in the market place.72 Some of this reduced pass 
through has been achieved by improved productivity, but much of it appears to be 
effectively supported by profits in a secure home market. 
Total factor productivity analysis shifts the emphasis from an evaluation of hours 
of labor in a product to a broader comparison of inputs evaluated on the common basis of 
cost. Whatever the overall comparison at any particular point of time, the Traditional 
manufacturers still incur significant cost disadvantages in identifiable areas, such as labor 
productivity and certain fringe benefits, discussed in a subsequent chapter. In particular, 
New Entrants enjoy many advantages, some passed through from Japan, and others 
because some North American costs (such as pension and health care costs) are 
inherently lower for a New Entrant than an established producer. Moreover, cost is only 
one element of competitiveness-albeit a crucial one for survival. Beyond cost, quality, 
styling, product coverage, and customer value are all critical to success. 
s-v 
A number of these factor productivity studies focus on limited sets of activities 
within automotive production, and the comparative information is of questionable 
generality, whether across operations or types of companies. However, these limited 
focus studies have helped the Traditional industry target areas needing improvement, and 
that has been valuable indeed. It is important to recognize that even the most dire of 
these analyses do not suggest that the Traditional North American industry has incurred 
irreversible competitive di~advantage.~3 
This review of comparative productivity between the Japanese, New Entrant, and 
Traditional North American automotive industries suggests a number of conclusions. 
First, the Traditional industry continues to suffer an efficiency disadvantage in labor 
utilization compared with the Japanese or New Entrant industries-at least at the vehicle 
assembly level. Why this is so is less clear, although it probably is more due to capacity 
utilization and maintenanceflabor deployment practices than to technological, worker 
72hlichael S. Flynn, Sean P. McAlinden, David J. Andrea, The US.-Japan Bilateral 1993 Automotive 
Trade Deficit, Office of the Study of Automotive Transportation (OSAT), University of Michigan 
Transportation Research Institute, September, 1989. 
7 3 ~ o t e  that if this is m e  of North America, the comparative picture in Evmp is even more grim. 
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skill, or worker effort factors. Second, if those differences at the assembly level pervade 
the manufacturers, then some overall industry performance data suggests that North 
American suppliers are more efficient than their Japanese  competitor^.^^ Third, if the 
North American industry suffered a cost disadvantage in the past, the change in the 
currency exchange rates has certainly lessened it, and perhaps even provides the North 
American industry a cost advantage under comparable competitive conditions. However, 
the conditions of the North American and Japanese industries are not comparable: low 
North American capacity utilization rates and low pass-through rates by the Japanese 
industry have effectively countered these exchange rate movements, and the North 
American Traditional industry may well continue to face an effective cost disadvantage. 
The industry clearly needs to continue to address and improve its internal 
efficiency. However, those who argue that the industry itself is hopelessly behind its 
Japanese competition-and thus any efforts to sustain or develop its competitiveness are 
wasted-must now confront contrary evidence. In fact, the industry has substantially 
closed its cost disadvantage with Japan under comparable market and operating 
conditions. If this was aided by changes in the exchange rate, other policy-driven 
circumstances, discussed in a subsequent section, continue to place the industry at 
competitive disadvantage. 
Pricing 
Price continues to play a critical role in the North American market, but primarily 
through influencing consumer choice among different types of vehicles-for example, 
between a standard-equipped small car and an option-loaded large car. However, it has 
played a remarkably small role in the consumer's choice of the manufacturer. 
Throughout the post World War II period, perhaps until recently, General Motors has 
exercised price leadership in the market. Until recently, the market was largely 
traditional, and General Motors was the low cost producer. It was reluctant to compete 
on price for fear that increasing its market share would lead to government intervention 
on antitrust grounds. Ford and Chrysler were reluctant to challenge General Motors, 
because, given relative production costs, that strategy involved much more risk than it 
promised reward. 
7 4 ~ e w  entrant suppliers constitute such a small percentage of North American automotive suppliers that 
they probably have little effect on these industry-wide performance statistics. No direct evidence of their 
aggregate performance suggests that they are any more or less efficient than traditional North American 
suppliers. 
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As import vehicles captured a larger share of the US market, they closely matched 
their pricing with the pricing of the Traditional manufacturers, although it may now be 
less clear that there is one price leader.75 Rather, importers and Traditional North 
American manufacturers have chosen to compete on other bases. In particular, imports 
have chosen to compete on fuel efficiency, reliability, and, in the case of some European, 
and now Japanese nameplates, on prestige. For those importers with lower 
manufacturing costs, such as the Japanese (before 1985), matching, rather than 
undercutting the prices of the Traditionals meant larger profits. While it is somewhat 
surprising, the North American mass vehicle market has seen little price-based 
competition between manufacturers. However, the Traditional North American 
manufacturers may be faced with an extremely difficult challenge in winning back 
customers they may have disappointed in the past, as well as customers who have always 
owned imports or New Entrants and find them quite satisfactory. 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 19119 199d , 
Figure 4.5. Price of North American Vehicles as a Percentage 
of Import Vehicles, 1979- 1990. 
From 1979 through 1981, the Traditional and New Entrant vehicles commanded 
higher prices than Imports, largely reflecting differences in the mix of vehicles offered. 
As shown in figure 4.5, starting in 1982 and accelerating through 1984, North American 
vehicles fell behind imports in price. This reflected the changing mix of imports and the 
voluntary restraint agreement (VRA) that limited Japanese imports in a recovering 
market, thereby supporting price premiums. North American sourced vehicles, whether 
New Entrant or Traditional, have sold at a substantially lower price since 1984, as the 
75hlichael S .  Flynn, Bilateral 1993 Automotive Trade Deficit, pp. 64-65. 
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strengthening of the yen in 1985 pressured Japanese prices. However, Import vehicles 
include increasingly higher-priced European cars, North American sourced vehicles 
include less expensive New Entrants, and the segment mix of sales differs as well. 
Therefore these data do not clearly establish the competitive pricing relationship between 
Traditional vehicles and their Japanese-badged competitors. 
Price differences between Japanese-badged passenger cars, whether imports or 
New Entrants, and Traditional North American passenger cars are beginning to emerge.76 
It is still the case that the typical Japanese-badged vehicle is less expensive than either a 
Traditional North American car or products from other importers. However, that reflects 
the segment mix of sales, and the comparison is quite different if we examine vehicles 
within the same segment. Table 4.3 displays these results.77 
Table 4.3. 1991 Model Year Prices, By Manufacturing Source and 
Traditional New Entrant Japanese 
Semnents N & r u w h n  Badeed 
Lower Small $6,732 $7370 $7,016 
(Ford Escort, Subaru Justy) + 638 + 284 
Upper Small 9,942 9,649 10,108 
(Pontiac Sunbird, Toyota Corolla) -293 + 166 
Small Specialty 10,629 1 1,970 1 1,828 
(Eagle Talon, Hyundai Scoupe) +1,341 + 1,199 
Lower Middle 11,387 1 1,989 11,812 
(Chevrolet Lumina, Honda Accord) +602 + 425 
Upper Middle 15,507 NA 17,44 1 
(Ford Taurus, Infiniti G20) + 1,934 
Mid-Specialty 13,290 16388 15,811 
(Chrysler LeBaron 'J', Toyota MR2) + 3,098 + 2,521 
Lower Luxury 22,573 NA 22,596 
(Oldsmobile 98, BMW 325) + 23 
Luxury Specialty 29,714 NA 23,820 
(Lincoln Continental, Jaguar US)  - 5,894 
Luxury Sports 39,705 NA 54,772 
(Chewlet Corvette, A c m  NSX) + 15,067 
All sales, 1990 base 19,982 10,607 14,112 
- 9,375 - 5,870 
Note: NA=Not Available. The specific model nameplates are meant to illustrate the types of vehicles in each segment 
but do not necessarily correlate directly to the listed prices. 
76~his  development may be one of the traditional industry's better kept secrets. The proportion of 
advertising that mentions these price differences seems quite small. Perhaps the industry's marketing 
strategies reflect a by-gone era when price differences did not merit much copy or air time. 
7 7 ~ e  use list price for these comparisons. We simply lacked the time and resources to correct these prices 
for the bewildering array of incentives offered over the past year, although we note that incentives have 
tended to be more frequent and larger for traditional products. The difficulty of obtaining transaction prices 
is well recognized, and while these are superior indicators of price, they simply are not available. 
7 8 0 ~ ~ ~  calculations. This table does not display four segments, including three (large, large specialty and 
mid-luxury) where the traditionals offer 27 models and there are no Japanese-badged competitors; and one 
(upper-luxury) where there two Japanese-badged and no North American competitors. However, the prices 
for these segments are included in the totals. Prices are U.S. dollars, and are for the U.S. market While we 
do not have data on Canada, we have no reason to expect that its market would be substantially different. 
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Figure 4.8 (on page 96) also indicates that the decade of the 1970s produced six 
years that were more profitable-in pretax, constant dollars-for the North American 
industry than was 1984, the most profitable year in the 1980s. Figure 4.6 reveals one 
reason for this: vehicle price increases lagged behind the increase in the CPI for nine of 
the 11 years from 1980 through 1990, and exceeded CPI increases only in 1986. While 
some have criticized the Traditional industry for raising prices to increase profits during 
the 1980s, rather than maintaining prices to regain market share, this argument lacks 
merit. First, constant dollar prices for all vehicles fell over the period. Second, North 
American prices fell behind imports, as displayed earlier. Third, the Traditional industry 
by 1990 commanded lower prices than either Japanese imports or New Entrant vehicles, 
as also shown above. It is difficult to discern a strategy of increasing profit when profits 
and prices fall, in both real and comparative senses. 
American Vehicle Rice 
Figure 4.6. Percentage Price Change of New North American Made Vehicles 
Compared With the Consumer Price Index, 1978- 1990.79 
Traditional and New Entrant vehicles compete in five segments of the market, and 
in four of those, the traditional vehicles bear a lower average base price. Traditional 
")US Deparunent of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. 
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vehicles compete with Japanese-badged vehicles in nine segments, and in eight are priced 
lower. New Entrants have a price advantage only in the upper small segment, and 
Japanese-badged vehicles only in the luxury specialty segment. 
The continuing share loss by the Traditionals, in spite of a price advantage-in 
some segments a substantial one-is puzzling. It may be that consumers are unaware of 
these direct price comparisons, and believe that the average price difference- 
uncorrected for vehicle mix-that favors Japanese-badged vehicles, applies across the 
range. Certainly anecdotal evidence of this point abounds. However, it seems unlikely 
that consumer perceptions would differ from reality to such a degree, especially for a 
major purchase like a car. Price variations in large purchases are generally more 
restricted than in smaller purchases precisely because consumers invest the time and 
effort required to check prices and compare products when the purchase is large. 
It may be that many North American consumers are willing to pay a premium for 
a Japanese-badged car. It is unclear whether this reflects a willingness to pay for the 
higher quality levels consumers may attribute to these vehicles, or because their 
ownership projects a positive image (be it youth or sensible shopper), or because their 
consumer appeal (styling, comfort) is simply higher. The ability of Japanese imports to 
command price premiums enabled the Japanese manufacturers to reduce their reported 
losses in North America during the latter part of the 1980~.~O It is clear that the 
Traditionals must identify, target, and overcome that advantage, whatever its source, even 
if that requires providing consumers a larger price incentive to purchase traditional 
vehicles. 
Parts Pricing 
While the prices of vehicles produced in North America and Japan differ 
somewhat across matching segments, prices of automotive parts in Japan and North 
America are quite markedly divergent. A recent survey conducted jointly by the US 
Department of Commerce and the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI) found that prices of comparable uninstalled parts averaged 87% more in Japan 
than in the US,81 For installed parts, the prices were 31% more in Japan. 
These price differences indicate that the Japanese parts market is not competitive, 
and imposes barriers on foreign manufacturers wishing to sell into the aftermarket. Not 
only are North American parts manufacturers deprived of sales into the Japanese market, 
8oFred Mannering and Clifford Winston, "Brand Loyalty and the Decline of American Automobile Firms," 
Brookings Papers: Microeconomics ,1991, pp. 67-114. 
8 1 ~ ~  Deparunent of Commerce (DOC)/Japan Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), 
"Automotive Parts Survey," Washington, D.C., June 27, 1991. 
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but Japanese consumers must pay significantly higher prices for automotive parts than do 
North American consumers. The issue of non-competitive pricing is further discussed in 
the section on export barriers in the next chapter. 
Capacity 
It is extremely important to understand that the North American domestic 
automotive industry faces a serious problem of overcapacity in the near future. Many 
observers see as much as 30% more capacity than demand during the next decade. 
Production capacity to serve the North American market in 1991 totaled approximately 
17.6 million units-about 17% excess capacity during an average North American sales 
year of 15 million units. Increasing excess capacity will not result from a cyclical 
downturn in demand-a situation the industry faces every few years. Rather, it appears 
to be structurally redundant capacity.--capacity that will not soon be required to meet 
market demand. In the view of virtually all observers, most of this excess capacity is 
targeted at the North American market. Because of North America's problems in 
exporting, that exerts the most pressure on the Traditional North American industry to 
reduce capacity. 
Three factors produce this excess capacity. First, the level of imports targeted to 
North America is expected to rise. New manufacturers are targeting the North American 
market, and the Japanese industry is adding capacity at home. Market sluggishness at 
home and the recent agreement to limit Japanese exports to the European Community 
may pressure the Japanese manufacturers to reverse the declining trend in their unit 
exports to North America. While the Japanese government lowered the level of 
allowable exports to the United States, this limit can be raised in the future. 
Second, the strategies of the Big Three are eroding the utilization of their own 
traditional manufacturing capacity. Chrysler and GM have both opened new and 
expanded old North American capacity. The Traditional strategy of building locally 
rather than exporting led GM to open new capacity in Europe, rather than supporting 
North American capacity through exports to Europe from North America. The Big Three 
also continue their reliance on captive imports and New Entrants to service certain 
segments of the market, and these vehicles displace cars they might have produced 
themselves. Ford replaced the Lynx with the Tracer, sourced from its Mexican 
operations for the United States and from Taiwan for Canada, and that brings extra 
capacity to bear on the market. General Motors is sourcing the Pontiac LeMans from 
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South Korea. Chrysler continues to source a wide variety of vehicles from Mitsubishi, 
although in declining numbers. 
Finally, the onshore manufacturing activities of foreign nameplate manufacturers 
have increased markedly since 1986. The New Entrant operations of the Japanese alone 
have announced capacities to produce roughly three million vehicles in the United States 
by 1994, as displayed in table 4.4. That is equivalent to the output of 12 Traditional 
assembly plants. 
Table 4.4. 1994 New Entrant Capacity Estimates for North America82 
All three ctrcumstances result in more vehicles for the domestic market, and none 
of them is likely to increase the size of that market. The result is overcapacity. 
Observers are unanimous in expecting the brunt of the overcapacity burden to be borne 
by the manufacturing facilities of the Big Three, as evidenced by GM's recent 
announcements of plant shutdowns and layoffs during the next few years. 
Overcapacity at the Traditional manufacturers means falling business levels for 
Traditional suppliers. In addition, there is a burgeoning New Entrant supplier industry, 
now numbering at least 350 Japanese-owned or joint-ventured operations, There is over 
150% supplier capacity available to serve traditional demand through the early 1990s, 
82~ean  McAlinden et al., U.S.-Japan Automotive Bilateral 1994 Trade Deficit; and Economic 
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while available supplier capacity for New Entrant manufacturers may be as high as 
190%.*3 If we eliminate import capacity from these estimates, and assume all sourcing 
will be from North America, suppliers still suggest at least 35% overcapacity for the 
Traditionals and nearly 50% for New Entrants. 
Profit Trends 
The vehicle industry was, for many years, the most profitable manufacturing 
industry in North America. This is no longer the case. The constant 1983 dollar pretax 
profits for the US and Japanese motor vehicle industries for the period 1970-1990 are 
shown in figure 4.7. 
Figure 4.7. US & Japan Motor Vehicle Industry 
Constant $ Pre-Tax Profits 1970-199084 
s3 Michael S Flynn and David J. Andrea, Capacity, Competition, and Change. 
84~ureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), US Department of Commerce (DOC), Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS), US D e p m e n t  Of Labor @OL), Japan Industrial Development Bank. 
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US motor vehicle industry earnings have trended down since the early 1970s. 
Profit troughs have deepened in severity since 1974, while cyclical peaks in real profit 
may have started to erode in the mid-1980s. While this downward trend in pretax 
earnings is superimposed over a highly cyclical pattern, it is likely that future profit peaks 
in high-volume sales years will be lower than in the past. 
Figure 4.8 sheds additional light on the reasons for the downward trend in US 
motor vehicle industry profits: troughs and peaks in capacity utilization are clearly 
correlated with troughs and peaks in industry earnings until 1984.85 In the 1985-1990 
period, however, US industry profits declined at the same time utilization rates remained 
generally at a level of 80%. Analysis shows that the US motor vehicle industry clearly 
experienced a rise in periodic fixed costs in the early 1980s compared with levels that 
existed in previous years, raising the break-even capacity utilization for the industry from 
about 62% in the 1970s to about 85% or higher in the late 1980s. The most powerful 
explanatory variable connected to this shift is the change in the consumer price index on 
health care services and price incentives-contributing to the burden of industry health 
care expenditures. 
-50 
Capacity Utilization (Federal Reserve Board) 
-75- * 
I Constant Pre-Tax Profib (1982-1984 = 100) I 
- 1 0 0 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I  
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Figure 4.8. US Motor Vehicle and Equipment Manufacturing: 
Capacity Utilization Versus Pre-Tax Profits, 1970- 199 1 
85 Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), US Department of Commerce 0, Federal Reserve Board. 
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This severe break in the relationship between industry capacity utilization and 
pretax profit during 1985-1991 can be partially explained by a transfer of a significant 
share of the North American passenger car market from the largest Traditional producer 
(GM) to Japanese transplant producers in the United States. This transfer may have 
amounted to over one million vehicle sales on an annual basis by 1990. Since GM was 
for many years the most profitable motor vehicle firm in the industry and since New 
Entrants have not reported significant profits to date on their US operations, profitable 
capacity was replaced by unprofitable capacity during the period.86 This loss of domestic 
profit by GM is exacerbated by reduced profits contained in its remaining sales of 
vehicles produced in low utilization plants, and by the loss of profits experienced by its 
independent suppliers. 
The profit performance of the Japanese motor vehicle industry provides a sharp 
contrast to the US industry in 1970- 1990. Japanese industry pretax profit in constant US 
dollars is shown in figure 4.7. The consistent growth of Japanese industry profits is 
remarkable, increasing by almost 600% over 20 years. Current dollar levels of Japanese 
industry profit reached a level of $10 billion in 1989 and 1990. 
As shown in figure 4.9, Japanese industry profits measured in constant yen cycled 
during 1970-1990, with peak profit years in 1985 and again in 1990.87 Profit troughs are 
generally shallower over the 20 year period and cyclical peaks generally higher, 
suggesting falling fixed costs. It is clear that the Japanese industry now possesses a 
major advantage over its North American rivals in internally generated funds available 
for capital. This advantage could be made permanent if these profits are largely 
committed to investment in future competitiveness. 
86 For example, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce reports that 
foreign owned U.S. affiiiates in motor vehicle and equipment manufacturing had negative net income in 
1988 and 1989(-$371 million in 1988 and -$669 million in 1989). Some observers charge that transplants 
use transfer pricing to avoid payment of U.S. federal income taxes on U.S. produced income. Transplant 
representatives claim their U.S. operations are naturally unprofitable in the current early stage of 
investment. It is also true that wholesale affiliates of these firms report significant profits in 1988 and 1989 
($2.8 billion in 1988 and $3.3 billion in 1989). It is presumed that these wholesale profits include those 
earned on import as well as transplant sales. The BEA reported that foreign affiliate automotive 
manufacturing f m s  (SIC 371 only) had an employment total of 33,700, and owned total assets of $7.6 
billion. See "U.S. Affiliates of Foreign Companies: Operations in 1989," Swvey of Cwent Business, Vol. 
71, No. 7, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. DOC, Washington D.C., July 1991, pp. 72-93. 
87~apan Industrial Development Bank. 
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Figure 4.9. Constant Yen Japanese Motor Vehicle Industry 
Pretax Profits 1970- 1990. 
Investment Levels 
Investments in new product, plant facilities and equipment are critical and 
traditional determinants of competitiveness in the world motor vehicle industry, 
Investment becomes even more important if the industry is undergoing a competitive 
phase characterized by rapid rates of innovation in products and processes. The Japanese 
motor vehicle industry now clearly exceeds the North American industry in terms of 
profitability and investment activity. Combined Japanese car and light truck program 
development projects for North America alone, for 1991-1996, exceed the North 
American industry efforts by almost $69 billion. If product diversity or process 
innovation are connected to competitive performance, the Traditional North American 
industry will likely face continued erosion in domestic market share. The Traditional 
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industry probably cannot meet the competitive challenge through internal cash financed 
investment alone because of inadequate profits. This investment challenge becomes even 
more critical if major demands are placed on the industry for radical improvements in 
fuel economy or emissions performance, draining money from existing programs to 
finance nonmarket, mandated product change. 
Figure 4.10 presents an 11 year record of both US and Japanese motor vehicle 
investment in new plant and equipment measured in constant US dollars.88 
Constant US P&E 
I I I I I I 
80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 9 
Figure 4.10. Constant $ Expenditures on Plant and Equipment: 
US Versus Japan Motor Vehicles Manufacturing. 
US industry investment peaked in 1985, fell the following three years, and leveled 
off during 1988-1990. New Entrant investments in the United States are included in the 
US totals and may have amounted to more than $10.5 billion in current dollars, largely 
invested during 1985-1990. Japanese industry investment passed US industry spending 
in 1988 and only recently peaked in 1990, at a record $17.5 billion in current dollars. 
Investment in research and development activities is also a critical determinant of 
competitiveness. Research and development expenditures are combined with industry 
88~ureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), US Department of Commerce (DOC), Japan Industrial 
Development Bank. 
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investment in plant and equipment to produce a total investment series for 1980-1989, 
measured in constant 1990 dollars, as shown in figure 4.1 lS89 
-4- Plant & Equipment Expenditures 
80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 
J V .  
28.- 
, : 
Figure 4.1 1. Constant $US Motor Vehicles & Equipment 
Industry Investment, 1980- 1989. 
Total investment peaked in 1985-1986 at about $22 billion each year, or about 
24:"' Net of New Entrants = $1718 bil. 
20.. 
17%-18% of the value of domestically produced vehicle shipments. Total investment 
- ,
then fell to an annual level of about $18 billion-$19 billion by 1988-1989, or about 12%- 
- -- 
1980-1989 Tot& 
Total P&E = $115.6 bid. 
Total R&D = $66.7 biL 
Total Investment = $1823 bil. 
13% of the value of vehicle shipments. A fall in plant and equipment expenditures from 
their al l  time high of almost $15 billion (1990 $) in 1985 to a level of $12 billion by 1989 
was only partially offset by gradually increasing expenditures on research and 
development during the same period. In fact, research and development expenditures 
rose, on an annual basis, from a level of $6 billion in 1980 to a level of $8 billion in 
1988-1989. This larger share of R&D in overall automotive investment reflects both 
increasing demands for compliance in product performance by government regulatory 
agencies and increased competition in the product development area. 
Data on research and development expenditures by the Japanese motor vehicle 
industry are not available, but the figures on Japanese plant and equipment expenditures 
89~ureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), US Department of Commerce (DOC), National Science 
Foundation. 
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should be examined in constant Japanese currency. In figure 4.12, these figures are 
shown together with Japanese pretax industry profits for 1980-1990; the two sets clearly 
move together. 
Figure 4.12. Constant Yen Japanese Motor Vehicle Industry Pretax Profits and 
Investment in Plant and Equipment, 1980- 1990. 
Future Capital Needs 
What are the future capital needs of the North American motor vehicle industry? 
How is the Traditional industry faring in terms of needed competitive investment in 
product development or facilities, equipment, and tooling? Examining current product 
development plans of competitors in the North American motor vehicle market for 
passenger cars and for trucks and vans provides a partial answer. These plans should be 
examined in terms of estimated development costs and in terns of the ratio of change of 
the industries competing in North America. Table 4.5 and table 4.6 display these plans, 
exhibiting projections on four types of product devel0pments.9~ First, major facelifts- 
estimated at a level of $625 million-include costs for changes in stamping and 
assembly, and for engineering development. Second, minor facelifts-estimated at $350 
million-include costs for changes in stamping, assembly, and vehicle interior, and for 
engineering development. Third, new model introduction on an existing platform- 
estimated at $825 million-includes costs for changes in stamping, assembly, and vehicle 
9 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ,  Vehicle Product Planning Directory, UMTRI, Office for the Study of Automotive 
Transportation, September, 199 1. 
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interiors, and for engineering development. Finally, a new vehicle platform--estimated 
at a level of $2.05 billion-includes costs for changes in stamping, assembly, vehicle 
interiors, one-half the development cost of a new powertrain, and for engineering 
development. 
While evidence indicates that the Japanese can achieve far lower cost levels for 
this type of product development, we apply the North American rates to Japanese 
development activity for the purpose of comparison. Table 4.5 projects 79 new platform 
introductions, 46 models introduced on existing platforms, and 465 major and minor 
vehicle facelifts during the 1991-1996 period in the North American car market. The cost 
k 
Table 4.5. Product Development Plans and Associated Cost Passenger Cars-Traditional Domestic vs. 
Imports and New Entrants, 199 1 to 19% (estimated costs in current US $ billions) 
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of this product development effort is estimated at $438.4 billion. The Big Three are 
projected to spend $139.4 billion, or 32%, of the total. The Japanese are projected to 
spend about $223.1 billion (51% of the total) on product development for their New 
Entrant and imported cars. 
These plans suggest that the Traditional North American industry will be heavily 
outspent in the next five years in terms of product development in the passenger car 
market. The Big Three are expected to increase their number of existing car platfonns by 
a net 17% during 1991-1996, while the New Entrants and imports will increase their total 
by 88%. The Big Three vehicle producers clearly intend to maintain a high ratio of 
model facelifts per platform (5.0), while foreign competitors concentrate on further 
extensions of their product lines into new segments such as the upper middle. To match 
this 88% rate of new platform introduction, the Big Three would have to introduce an 
additional 25 platforms, at an incremental cost of $50 billion. To match the total number 
of expected competitor platforms in 1996 would require an additional 94 Big Three car 
platforms, at an incremental cost of $188 billion. 
Table 4.6 forecasts product development in the truck and van market. The 1991 - 
1996 truck and van market will see 43 new platform introductions, 12 new models 
introduced on existing platforms, and 123 major and minor facelifts. The total cost of 
this product development effort on the part of all competing f m s  is $160.3 billion. The 
Big Three will spend $83.9 billion or 52% of the total, while the Japanese vehicle 
producers are expected to spend $69.0 billion or 43% of total new product development 
cost. However, the Big Three are expected to increase the number of truck and van 
platforms by only 2 (7%), although 55% of their 1996 platforms will be new or 
replacements during 199 1 - 1996. 
The Japanese industry, on the other hand, will increase its truck and van platform 
lineup by 15 (150%), and 92% of their 1996 platforms will have been introduced or 
replaced during 1991-1996. In other words, the Japanese light truck product line will 
more than double by 1996, and be primarily composed of platforms introduced during 
1991-1996. 
Although Japanese development spending on light trucks will still lag behind the 
Traditional producers, it will reach a new record level, and accelerate the rate of new 
platform introductions in segments where the Japanese have not yet competed, such as 
full-size pickup. When this has happened in the car market, it has usually resulted in 
greater share loss for Traditional producers than from the replacement of existing 
platfonns. 
COMPETITIVE SURVIVAL: Private Initiatives, Public Policy, and the North American Automotive Industry Page 103 
In summary, the Traditional North American industry has experienced declining 
levels of profitability, while the profit levels of their major international competitors rise. 
The Traditional industry has invested huge sums, but Japanese investment levels have 
surpassed this since 1988. Product investment plans for the 1991 through 1996 period 
suggest that Japanese profits and capital access will support a heavy investment program, 
further intensifying the competitive challenge to the Traditional industry, and focusing it 
more in the light truck market than has been the case in the past. 
Table 4.6. Product Development Plans and Associated Costs: Trucks and Vans, Traditional Domestic vs. 
Imports and New Entrants, 1991 to 19%. (estimated costs in current US $ billions) 
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North America is increasingly recognizing that is must develop its human 
resources if it is to compete in the emerging international economy, and this applies as 
much--or more-to the Traditional Automotive Industry as to other manufacturers and 
all economic sectors. 
Human resources is a well-reviewed topic in both North American economies.91 
The general problems of the educational system are well documented, as are the 
international differences in training provided employees after they begin their work 
career. There is little question that Japanese manufacturers provide higher levels of 
training for their work force, and this is undoubtedly applicable in the automotive 
industry. A recent study suggests that Japanese automakers invest more than twice the 
hours of annual training in employees (80 plus) than do the Traditionais (about 30). The 
difference is even more extreme for new employees, as the Japanese industry provides 
over 300 hours of initial training, while the Traditionals provide fewer than 50?2 
To be sure, the permanent employment system in Japan provides an employer 
some assurance that it will reap the benefits of these investments, while a North 
American employer faces the possibility that the trained worker will leave for better 
employment opportunities. Germany also provides higher training investments, and 
government funding plays a much larger role than is the case in Japan. Perhaps 
government funding of these costs is a reasonable option for ensuring that the training 
takes place while preserving an open labor market. 
However, the Traditional industry, at least at the manufacturer level, has 
increased its expenditures for training the current workforce. In particular, recent 
contracts with the UAW in the United States have specifically reserved funds to support 
joint human resource centers at each of the Big Three, and these centers provide a wide 
variety of job-related training, from very job specific skills to broader human and job 
capabilities. So, too, the Automotive Parts Manufacturing Associatioq and Canadian 
Auto Workers are undertaking joint training efforts in Canada. Both these efforts, 
unfortunately, must often be targeted to areas that the Japanese manufacturer can more 
readily assume are provided in Japan's general educational system. 
A particular concern for manufacturing industries is the supply of technical and 
engineering personnel. On a per-worker basis, North America has about as many 
9 1 ~ o r  the United States see Council on Competitiveness and OTA; for Canada see Michael E Porter, 
Canada At The Crossroads: The Reality of a New Competitive Environment, A study prepared for the 
Business Council of National Issues and the Government of Canada, October, 1991. 
92~rafcik, 1990, as reported in Office of Technology Assessment Worker Training Sumnuuy, 1990. 
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engineers as does Japan. However, this parity is somewhat misleading, since a number of 
factors mitigate against the Traditional Automotive Industry 's current and continuing 
access to these human resources. First, the extensive US defense and aerospace 
industries provide attractive alternatives to North American engineers and technical 
workers; and they are, in fact, more intensive in their use of these workers than is the 
automotive industry.93 Japan's automotive industry is not faced with such strong 
competition for engineering talent. Lessening international tensions and reduced US 
spending for defense may free up a relatively larger supply over the coming years, but the 
handicaps imposed by this inter industry competition over the past four decades will 
continue to be a problem for the Traditional Automotive Industry for some years to 
come. 
Second, engineering entrants and graduates in North America are overwhelmingly 
white males, and the demographic composition of North America is changing; these 
individuals are a declining proportion of college-and workforce--entrants, Unless the 
selection factors that account for the low entry rates of females and nonwhites into 
engineering are altered, the supply of engineers will likely contract rather than expand in 
the future. Canada has had notable success in attracting immigrants with production 
skills, and is continuing to attract experienced workers from Eastern Europe. However, 
countries that currently export workers would undoubtedly raise serious objections to any 
concerted targeted program to encourage their engineers to emigrate to North America. 
Third, Japan's rate of engineers as a percentage of college graduates is 
considerably higher than the rate in North America. As Japan's affluence continues to 
increase, its lower overall college attendance rate will undoubtedly increase. If it 
maintains its higher concentration in engineering, the ratio of engineers per worker in 
Japan will sharply increase. 
Engineering and technical workers are a critical competitive resource in complex 
manufacturing industries like motor vehicles. Improving the supply of such workers is a 
critical competitive challenge for the North American economies, and the long-term 
solution clearly lies outside the control of the industry itself. The industry must 
effectively maintain and deploy its current human resources, but, ultimately, the issue of 
adequate supply rests in the broader economies and societies. 
Effective management is a critical human resource, and many critics of the 
performance of the Traditional industry over the past few years identify it as a major 
93~ean P. McAlinden, "The Importance of Motor Vehicle Manufacturing in the U.S. Economy," in 
Kenneth Lieberthal, Michael Flynn, Kim Woodard, et al., Paths to Sino-U.S. Automotive Cooperation, The 
University of Michigan, 1989. 
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source of the Traditional industry's competitive decline. Many of these critics decry the 
development in North America of a generalized management training and career 
orientation, pointing to the prevalence and even dominance of engineers among top 
management in the Japanese automotive industry, although no clear evidence exists that a 
manager's initial training has substantial effect on performance. Defenders of North 
American management see these problems as less poor management and more due to 
external business conditions. 
Management's role in and responsibility for the decline of the Traditional North 
American industry and the competitive crisis it faces today is one of the most difficult- 
and contentious-issues to assess. Some authors assign major responsibility to 
management's role, analyzing the decline of particular companies as due almost 
exclusively to management culture and actions.94 Other analysts portray a management 
that was, in some sense, hostage to a radically changing business environment and limited 
to noncompetitive options by the policies and practices of the nation and the companies 
that blocked necessary change.95 Still others take a middle ground, portraying 
management as making decisions that appeared to be reasonable at the time, but were 
often in fact not good decisions, sometimes reflecting managers' failure to adapt to a 
changing environment, sometimes subverted by events that could not be anticipated, and 
sometimes constrained by the business and policy environment.g6 
Nevertheless, Traditional North American automotive management bears some 
responsibility for the competitive situation the industry faces today. Some management 
was relatively slow in responding to the Import threat, resisted recognizing the Japanese 
as serious and consequential competitors, sought easy and quick fixes to the problems 
posed by the Japanese competitive challenges, and saw the silver lining in every cloud on 
the horizon. At the same time, it must be recognized that the industry was, in some sense, 
a victim of its own success in earlier times. It is no easy task to change the strategies and 
tactics that made one remarkably successful over a long period of time, nor is it easy to 
recognize the environmental signals that fundamental change has occwed. 
94~or example see Maryann Keller, Rude Awakening: The Rise, Full, und Struggle for Recovery of Generul 
Motors, New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1989. 
9 5 ~ o r  example see Davis Dyer, Malcolm S. Salter, and Alan M. Webber, Changing Alliances, Harvard 
Business School Press,Boston, 1987. These authors admire and praise many of the same decisions by 
General Motors that Keller criticizes in Rude Awakening. 
96~avid Halberstam, The Reckoning, New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1986. 
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Manufacturer-Supplier Relations 
Most of the performance measures reviewed above are appropriate measures of 
the competitiveness of an individual company, however complex and even external the 
performance sources may be. There is another competitive performance measure that is 
extremely important for assessing the position of any complex manufacturer: the nature 
and strength of the manufacturer-supplier relationship. This is a performance dimension 
that is often identified as a major competitive advantage of the Japanese industry. 
Supplier relationships are critical to the final cost and quality of the vehicle. In the long 
run, a key ingredient in how effectively suppliers contribute to the manufacturers' 
competitiveness lies in the management of the manufacturer-supplier relationship. 
The relationships between the manufacturers and the suppliers that constitute the 
Traditional industry have often been stormy. The manufacturers have the in-house 
capability to perform most of the types of work that the suppliers do, and however stable 
the levels of vertical integration have been, the exact mix of the make-buy decisions by 
the manufacturers has varied, often from year to year. The supplier, then, is often in 
competition with the manufacturer itself for the manufacturer's business. The 
manufacturers have historically preferred maintaining multiple sources for parts and 
components, partly to assure themselves of uninterrupted supply, but also to reduce 
piece-prices through direct competitive bidding in an open market. 
The Role of the Supplier 
The manufacturing and marketing of automobiles involves numerous, complex 
activities of differing degrees of complexity and sophistication. This activity requires 
enormous coordination of capital and human resources, tying together thousands of parts 
from hundreds of locations, so that an affordable, reliable vehicle rolls off the final 
assembly line. How that activity is structured, and the ways that structure is changing is a 
key performance dimension of automotive industry competitiveness. 
There are five important roles played by companies in the North American 
automotive industry. First, the manufacturing companies assemble and distribute the 
finished vehicle. Second, there are the allied or captive supplier divisions of the 
manufacturing companies. Their role is to manufacture parts and components. Third, 
there are the independent suppliers of raw materials, parts, and components that are used 
in the production of the vehicle. Fourth, there is a set of specialty suppliers that provide a 
range of supporting goods and services, from both product and process engineering to 
heat treating and plating of traditional parts and components. Finally, there are suppliers 
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that only serve the automotive aftermarket. The changing role of suppliers and their 
relationship with their manufacturing customers is a fundamental dynamic of the 
changing North American industry, and a critical path to its competitiveness. 
Factors in Restructuring 
Japanese manufacturers and New Entrants are more efficient and more effective 
in coordinating their own efforts and those of their suppliers than are the Big Three.97 To 
compete effectively with Japan, the Traditional industry must continue to improve its 
performance as an industry in addition to the individual efforts of its companies. That 
will involve numerous changes in traditional business patterns. 
Suppliers face excess capacity, reflecting falling production at their traditional 
customers, and the advent of New Entrant suppliers to serve the needs of New Entrant 
manufacturers. The establishment of these manufacturing facilities afforded an 
opportunity for offshore suppliers to enter North American production and over 350 
Japanese suppliers have established their own facilities here.g8 These new suppliers 
represent additional capacity, and compete for Traditional supplier business both at the 
Big Three and the New Entrant manufacturers. 
A recent case study suggests that Honda-perhaps the New Entrant with the 
highest level of North American sourcing-sources at most 20% of its purchased content 
from Traditional suppliers, 32% from New Entrant suppliers, and 48% from Japan.99 
This obviously directly hurts Traditional suppliers, who cannot secure business with the 
New Entrants to replace business lost as their traditional customers have lost production 
share. While for a time the Big Three had increased their levels of offshore sourcing of 
parts, components, and raw materials, reliance on offshore sourcing-particularly from 
the Pacific region-has recently been reduced. 
Vertical Integration 
The North American automotive industry functioned in a naturally protected 
market through the early 1970s. Import competition was restricted to a few segments, 
and there was little price competition. Thus, the cost of manufacturing the vehicle was 
primarily important in influencing the size of the market and the level of profits, rather 
than the manufacturer's market share. The automakers pursued a classic strategy for this 
97~ichael  A. Cusurnano and Akira Takeishi, "Supplier Relations". 
98~rett C. Smith, Japanese Automotive Supplier Investment Directory, Fourth Edition, UMTRI, Office for 
the Study of Automotive Transportation, October, 1991; and OSAT estimates for Canada. 
99~ean P. McAlinden et al., U.S.-Japan Automotive Bilateral 1994 Trade Deficit, Table 16. 
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environment, seeking high levels of vertical integration and manufacturing high 
percentages of the vehicle's total content.100 
In the mid-1980s, the Traditional manufacturers rediscovered outsourcing- 
purchasing parts, components, and even complete vehicles from an outside supplier rather 
than manufacturing them in-house-as a competitive strategy for meeting the cost and 
quality challenges of their international competitors. Most observers expected major 
increases in the level of outsourcing by the early 1990s. 
This reappraisal of the value of outsourcing reflected a major difference between 
the Traditional manufacturers and their Japanese rivals. The Japanese industry is less 
vertically integrated, in a formal sense, concentrating responsibility for manufacturing 
and assembling smaller portions of the vehicle's total value within the assemblers. In all 
probability, Toyota is the least vertically integrated major automotive manufacturer in the 
world, at perhaps as low a level as 25%. The Traditional manufacturers were persuaded 
that lower vertical integration played a significant role in the final cost and quality of 
Japanese vehicles, allowing work to be performed within more specialized and expert 
producers, typically at lower labor costs than would be required by the Japanese 
assemblers. 
The strong drive towards increased outsourcing has abated, and the evidence 
suggests that the Big Three have not lowered their levels of vertical integration to the 
levels analysts expected. Two factors appear to account for this arrested trend. First, 
recent labor contracts between the Big Three and the UAW have restricted outsourcing 
by providing workers the opportunity to make a final bid against outside suppliers. 
Company management and labor appear to be reasonably effective in developing these 
counter-proposals. Second, many of the in-house component divisions at the Big Three 
were either not as uncompetitive as they were viewed, or they have evidenced remarkably 
rapid improvement. Nevertheless, changing levels of outsourcing are a continuing source 
of tension between Traditional manufacturers and their suppliers. 
Evolving Relationships 
The Traditional manufacturers see in the Japanese industry a model of an 
efficient, productive supplier base and healthy supplier relations. The Japanese supplier 
industry numbers far fewer f m s  than its North American counterpart, and is structured 
in a fairly rigid systems of tiers, where each tier supplies the companies in the tier 
immediately above it. These tiers contain smaller numbers of companies as they near the 
l o O ~ .  Monteverde and D. Teece, "Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Auto 
Industry," Bell Jourol of Economics, Volume 13, Number 1, Spring 1982, pp. 206-213. 
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assembler, the capstone of the pyramid. Further, Japanese suppliers are less likely to 
supply multiple assemblers than are North American suppliers, just as the Japanese 
assemblers more often rely on one supplier as the sole source for a purchased part or 
component. Purchase contracts in North America typically are for one year, whereas in 
Japan they more typically run the life of the vehicle model. Major or first-tier suppliers 
in Japan--companies like Nippondenso or Aisen Seiki of the Toyota group-are 
expected to make significant engineering contributions to their customer, as well as to 
their own lower-tier suppliers. Japanese suppliers typically commit themselves to shared 
cost reductions with their customers, and closely adapt their production and delivery 
schedules to their customers' needs. The Japanese supplier, in turn, is provided with a 
more secure business environment, and a longer period for planning investments and 
securing returns. The larger North American supplier industry is far more amorphous, 
and it is not always clear who does what for whom. 
The structure of the Japanese industry, including equity holdings by the 
manufacturers in their suppliers, transfers of employees from manufacturers to suppliers, 
and the keiretsu relationships common in the industry, fosters a form of vertical 
coordination that provides many of the benefits of vertical integration, without some of 
its penalties. However, this Japanese-style vertical integration is a complex web of 
elements, and probably cannot be duplicated by simply copying one or two key aspects. 
Moreover, there are legal impediments to such practices in North America, where they 
are often viewed as anticompetitive. 
The relationships that developed in the domestic industry between the 
manufacturers and their suppliers reflected the manufacturers' view that independent 
suppliers often represented a less preferred alternative, except when suppliers had 
proprietary technology, and even then they were often viewed merely as necessary evils. 
Their major value was that they represented flexible capacity-useful when the market 
was strong and not a burden when the market was weak. Their secondary value was that 
they provided a mechanism for disciplining the manufacturers' internal, captive, or allied 
supplier divisions. 
From the suppliers' point of view, the manufacturer often treated them as 
conveniences to be exploited and discarded when a short-term advantage became 
available elsewhere. Suppliers competed on price, and to a lesser extent, on delivery 
performance, except those that had proprietary technology. Quality, engineering 
contribution, innovation, and manufacturing competence were neither consistently nor 
highly valued by the manufacturers. Even suppliers with proprietary products were often 
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required to share production volumes with the manufacturer's own allied supplier division 
or to release their drawings to their own competitors for bids. 
The competitive situation that encouraged this structure and permitted these 
relationships has changed drastically, The domestic manufacturers can no longer afford 
to support a large, amorphous, uneven supplier industry valued for flexible capacity and 
piece-price discipline alone. Rather, a smaller, more reliable, and more broadly 
competent supplier base is required to meet the Japanese challenge in cost and quality. It 
is increasingly clear that it is not the simple buy-versus-make activity in Japan that 
matters so much as it is the capability of the suppliers and the nature of the relationship 
between them and their customers that makes the Japanese assemblers such effective 
competitors. 
Traditional domestic suppliers report changes in both the sourcing criteria used by 
the domestic manufacturers and their standard business practices with suppliers. While 
the importance of price has not diminished, numerous other selection criteria, such as 
quality, delivery performance, engineering competence, and location have all increased in 
importance. The changes in business practices, such as just-in-time (JIT) manufacturing, 
earlier supplier involvement in development, supplier self-certification of quality, and 
increased reliance upon supplier engineering all reflect a greater dependence on the 
supplier's broad competence. 
The Traditional manufacturers have all developed complex and important supplier 
rating systems. These systems are at once a mechanism for supplier improvement, the 
development of better relationships with the manufacturers, and evidence of the 
industry's serious pursuit of more effective and competitive performance. 
These changes in the relationship between Traditional manufacturers and their 
suppliers have been underway since the early 1980s, and are not yet complete. They are, 
however, moving relatively rapidly, and suppliers expect the remaining differences 
between the Traditional manufacturers and the New Entrants to largely recede by the year 
2m.lOl 
Two developments reflect the complexity of these evolving relationships. First, 
there is a move to system, or modular, sourcing: the manufacturer buys a built-up unit 
from one supplier, rather than some or all of the discrete parts or components for such a 
unit from numerous suppliers. The sourcing of built-up modules can provide the 
manufacturers with enormous benefits in both cost and quality, reducing the 
l o l ~ m s t  62 Young, The Car Company of the F u n .  
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manufacturers' transaction and coordination costs and avoiding duplication of purchasing 
and inspection efforts. 
Systems suppliers will become the fmt-tier suppliers. They will be expected to 
have a high degree of technical sophistication, including good design and manufacturing 
engineering capability, management skills, and electronic communication capability. 
They will need to meet rigorous quality and productivity demands, and will in turn have 
to manage their own suppliers for the module to assure their performance. The higher the 
tier, the higher the value-added for the supplier, and the more critical the supplier's own 
sourcing decisions throughout the manufacturing chain. lo2 
Second, a key change in sourcing practices will be required for system sourcing to 
provide its full range of promised benefits. The manufacturers must be willing to transfer 
the engineering responsibility for the module to the module supplier. The transfer of 
engineering responsibility has always been a sticking point for the Traditional industry in 
the past, meeting resistance because of an unwillingness to accept the loss of control and 
the increased dependence upon suppliers that such a transfer entails. However, many 
Traditional suppliers are themselves strong in engineering, and suppliers are supported by 
a competitive and strong independent engineering service sector, including the contract 
engineering and design houses, largely centered in the Detroit area. 
s-ry 
The structure of Traditional North American manufacturer-supplier relationships 
is changing in a number of ways. These include a reduction in the number of suppliers 
(at least direct suppliers) and a tiering of the supply base, with fmt-tier suppliers required 
to make substantial engineering and technical contributions to the manufacturers, and 
coordinate the production of systems/modules, while lower-tier suppliers will be required 
to achieve true manufacturing excellence. The integration of New Entrants into the 
Traditional industry is slow at best, and that unfortunately may restrain the rate of the 
Traditional industry's improvement on some key performance dimensions. 
Comparison of North American and Japanese New Entrant Suppliers 
New Entrant suppliers have numerous important competitive advantages that they 
share with New Entrant manufacturers. These include lower labor costs, which are 
primarily due to lower fringe benefit costs (especially health care) for a younger 
lo2~ichael  S. Flynn, "Currencies and Competition: Implications for Michigan Suppliers", Auto in 
Michigan Project Newsletter, Volume 2, No. 1, November, 1986.. 
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workforce and the need to support few retirees. While the New Entrant manufacturers 
have higher assembly productivity levels, the comparison of the North American and 
Japanese supplier industries, discussed above, suggests that this advantage may not carry 
over to the supply base. The New Entrant suppliers have had the same opportunity as 
New Entrant manufacturers to select and carefully train their workforce, they have the 
financial backing of their Japanese parents, and they benefit from any product andor 
image advantages that their parent might possess. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
larger, more capable Japanese suppliers have behaved similarly in North America to the 
New Entrant manufacturers, and probably have similar advantages. It is less clear that 
smaller New Entrants have secured these same advantages. Just as the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Japanese manufacturers vary widely, so too do the strengths and 
weaknesses of the supplier base, whether in Japan or as New Entrants to North America. 
New entrant suppliers have also often received subsidies from local and state 
governments, including waivers of various taxes and subsidies for training. Local 
economic developers wish to secure new facilities and jobs for their communities, and it 
is the New Entrants-not the Traditional suppliers-that are establishing new production 
facilities. 
Traditional North American suppliers are more competitive than often portrayed, 
yet still face major difficulties in gaining business at New Entrant manufacturers. 
Certainly the analysis by Fuss and Waverman for this report raises questions as to the 
often reported high prices of Traditional suppliers as a barrier to securing New Entrant 
business. On the contrary, those results suggest that New Entrants' offshore sourcing to 
higher cost Japan is somewhat puzzling. To be sure, the other explanation for this 
situation is that Traditional North American supplier parts and components are not of 
sufficiently high quality to meet the standards of the New Entrant manufacturers. The 
improved performance of the traditional vehicles, discussed above, certainly suggests that 
this should not be the extreme bar to securing business that it appears to be. Surely the 
best Traditional suppliers are more than competitive on quality. 
As discussed above, Japanese suppliers play a significant engineering and design 
role in the development of Japanese-badged vehicles, whether imports or New Entrants. 
This indeed poses a substantial barrier, since an estimated 70% of Japanese parts and 
components are supplier designed.lo3 Because of this, many assert that supplier business 
is only realistically available during the developmental engineering phase (or design-in 
stage) of the vehicle. This is for the simple reason that the supplier holds the drawings, 
lo3wornack, Machine, p. 157; Clark and Fujimoto, Product Development, Figure 6.1. 
COMPETITIVE SURVIVAL: Private Initiatives, Public Policy, and the North American Automotive Industry Page 114 
and is unwilling to share them with a potential competitor. This also presents a 
formidable barrier to Traditional suppliers to the North American aftermarket. These 
suppliers typically rely on prints supplied by the vehicle manufacturer. For Japanese 
vehicles, these suppliers report that they are told that prints must be obtained from the 
supplier, who generally refuses to share them with a competitor for aftermarket business. 
However, only 13% of supplier designs in the Japanese industry are proprietary 
(8% of the total), and most parts and components are dual sourced, although this varies 
somewhat by manufacturer.lo4 That means that those designs are indeed shared, but 
apparently only within the Japanese supplier community. The requirements for 
engineering and design contributions to secure major contracts, and the need to establish 
the credentials for participation in the early development work are indeed major barriers 
to Traditional North American suppliers securing access to New Entrant business, or to 
export opportunities in Japan. However, explanations for the low level of success that 
treat these, combined with alleged low quality and high prices, as the only barriers ring 
hollow. It is not surprising that North American suppliers feel that supplier nationality is 
a far more important selection criteria at the New Entrants than it is at Traditional North 
American manufacturers.lo5 This is important, both because of the growing volumes at 
the New Entrants and shrinking relative volumes at Traditional manufacturers and 
because Japan itself is the world's largest national producer of automotive vehicles, and 
therefore the world's largest single supplier market. 
The Automotive Industry Future 
Hoffman and Kaplinsky directly address the issue of the structure and location of 
future automotive manufacturing.106 Their analyses and predictions are cautiously 
optimistic from the perspective of developed automotive producing regions. They 
portray the decline of the Traditional North American manufacturers as reflecting 
changes in the nature of production, but argue that these very changes confer some 
locational advantages for continued production in developed regions like North America. 
If some work will inevitably be lost to offshore competitors and offshore sourcing of 
materials, parts, and components by Traditional and New Entrant North American 
manufacturers, much work will remain. 
lo4yoichi Ohta, Intercompany Relationships in Japanese Manufacturing Industries, Unpublished 
Master's Thesis, Trinity College, Oxford University, 1985. 
lo5Emst & Young, The Car Company of the Future. 
l06~urt Hoffman and Raphael Kaplinsky, Driving Force: the Global Restructuring of Technology. L h r .  
and Investment in the Automobile and Components Industry , Westview Fress, Boulder, CO, 1988. 
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They argue that the type of embodied technology employed in the production and 
distribution of goods, the nature of the labor process, and the nature of interfim 
relationships in the production chain reemphasizes production siting near final markets. 
This is particularly true in the context of a world where productivity and unemployment 
differentials across economies inevitably foster protectionism. However, the authors 
question how well the Traditional North American industry understands these new 
production imperatives, and their implications for production siting. Thus, the 
Traditional manufacturers continue to seek offshore sources for both vehicles and parts 
and components, and to close existing North American production facilities. Moreover, 
even if the industry understands, it feels pressured to meet the immediate Japanese 
challenge by pursuing low cost offshore sources for vehicles, parts, and components- 
however risky that strategy may be in the long run. Mexico, in this analysis, may pose a 
substantial threat to current North American production, as it offers proximity and 
sufficient skilled labor. 
The industry's top management view of its future is the topic of a recent study.lo7 
It is clear that the Traditional industry sees intense competitive challenges for the balance 
of the decade. There will likely be further share erosion at the Big Three, and increased 
offshore competition for supplier business. On the other hand, they see increased 
competitiveness within some parts of the Traditional industry, perhaps most especially at 
GM. 
The industry clearly recognizes the complexity of the competitive challenge, and 
is attempting to remold itself to meet that challenge. In particular, it recognizes that 
competitive survival will require numerous continuing changes in the industry's old 
business practices, as automotive companies become more knowledge-based competitors 
and must leverage all their human and financial resources. Most companies are 
undertaking a wide array of efforts to achieve these higher levels of competitiveness, 
although there is some suggestion that these efforts may not be as coordinated and 
focused as is desirable. 
While most expect the industry to shrink, the vast majority of companies are 
committed to continued participation, intending to make sure that other companies are the 
victims of industrial downsizing and restructuring. It is clear that industry leadership is 
undertaking myriad efforts to ensure survival into the next century. While survival will 
be determined by numerous events and factors, there is no evidence that the Traditional 
industry, at either the supplier or manufacturer level, will fail due to a lack of will. 
107m~t gt Young, T/E Car company ofthe ~uture .  
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Summary 
This review suggests that the Traditional North American industry has made 
impressive strides over the past decade, narrowing a number of serious competitive gaps 
against the Japanese industry, such as quality and cost. However, serious challenges 
remain, as the nature of Japanese competition has evolved, presenting the industry with 
broader-based and North American-sited challenges and threats. A particular threat is the 
industry's substantial need for investment capital to match new product offerings, and the 
difficulty the industry faces because of its changing profit performance. 
This competitive assessment largely addresses issues that most analysts have 
assumed are under the industry's control, although we have illustrated that this is often 
not the case. The next chapter will review some critical challenges facing the industry 
that are not under industry control, but more reflective of the general business 
environment and the public policies that shape it. 
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V. PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES 
Many industry observers and participants feel that the globalization of automotive 
competition-in large part driven by nations' trade policies--has significantly altered the 
automotive industry's competitive dynamics. The familiar company-against-company 
competition in a shared business environment and climate of management, labor, and 
government relations is now past. Today, management relationship with labor and 
government is critical to success because the management-labor relationship determines 
how well a company can organize and motivate employees to make low-cost, high- 
quality products, while the management-government relationship determines the 
operating environment to pursue competitive activities. Some scholars call this a national 
enterprise system. 108 
Companies no longer compete within the same fundamental business environment 
and enterprise system. Now they compete globally, and company level competition may 
be largely determined by the advantages and disadvantages conferred on a company by 
its national enterprise system. The national policies that shape national enterprise 
systems thus become key determinants of a company's competitiveness. 
The Japanese national enterprise system is particularly well suited to 
strengthening that nation's global competitiveness. In Dyer, Salter, and Webber's view, 
this enterprise system is the key to Japan's competitive success and rise to be the premier 
automotive industry in the world. It has six key characteristics: 1) legitimate shared 
authority and responsibility among all three enterprise elements--i.e., indusay, labor, and 
government; 2) all three elements recognize shared as well as distinct interests; 3) 
decision making is efficient, effective, and emphasizes economic consequences; 4) the 
system stresses adaptability and flexibility in the face of an environment that is assumed 
to be ever changing rather than stable; 5) all elements emphasize the strategic aspects of 
decisions; and 6 )  these relationships exist at the company level, and focus on the 
company in world rather than national competition. These characteristics emerged in a 
trial and error learning process after the War, often marred by serious disputes and 
confrontations. 
In North America and particularly in the United States, the relationship between 
government and the automotive industry has been significantly anticompetitive in the 
new global marketplace, in that the actions of government that help or hurt the industry 
have fluctuated with little regard to the political affiliation or ideology of the incumbents. 
lo8~avis  Dyer. Malcolm S. Salter, and Alan M. Webber, Chonging Alliances, Harvard Business School 
Press, Boston, 1987. 
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Many weaknesses of the North American economies that undercut the efforts of 
companies and industries to compete are well documented and have been extensively 
covered in other reports. Thus, the effects of the low US savings rate (below 5% since 
1985) compared to the much higher rates in Germany and Japan (above 11% and 14%, 
respectively since 1984) has received ample attention, if little action.lOg Although 
Canada has a much higher savings rate than the United States, its automotive industry is 
tied to US policies because of US ownership of much of that industry and the industry's 
need to draw on the larger US economy to meet its huge capital requirements. 
This chapter of the report begins with a broad, comparative overview of the policy 
environments in Canada, the United States, Japan, and Germany. We review the policy 
environments of Japan and Germany because these countries currently, and for the 
foreseeable future, possess the major competitor industries to the North American. Our 
review of the North American policy environment includes a discussion of government 
officials' views about and attitudes toward the automotive industry. The chapter then 
reviews four specific policy arenas of immediate concern to the industry: the 
comparative cost of capital, the industry's costs of providing health care for its 
employees, the effect of trade policies on industry performance, and the developing 
possibility of a North American Free Trade Agreement, expanding the FTA to include 
Mexico. The final section of the chapter presents and evaluates a series of simulations 
designed to identify the effects of a range of policy actions on the automotive industry's 
economic performance. 
Comparative Overview of Public Policies 
The performance of the automobile assemblers and parts makers is believed by 
some to be primarily a function of their management and labor practices. While a f m ' s  
management decisions and labor skills are indeed crucial for a company to compete, the 
public policy environment in which it operates can have a significant impact on the 
performance of a company. The legal, regulatory, social welfare, political, and financial 
environments in which a company operates can create a friendly or hostile environment. 
Even a perfectly run company may not survive when pitted against a foreign rival whose 
overall environment provides substantially lower direct costs for the manufacturer. 
The public policy environment for motor vehicle production and trade differs 
widely among the United States, Europe, and Asia. Much closer business-government 
Economic Outlook, 12\91, Table R12, pp. 202-203. 
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cooperation is characteristic of both European and Asian economies, with the state taking 
an active role in the development of certain industries. The reverse is true in the United 
States, where as a matter of economic belief, market forces are left to decide the fate of 
individual companies and where there is no close coordinating mechanism to assess and 
regulate the impact of disparate policies on the competitiveness of US companies. 
The development of public policy in Europe and Asia following World War II 
explains the significant differences in approach to the auto industry as compared with the 
United States. For European and Asian countries, the automobile industry has tended to 
represent a strategic industry whose development would foster industrial growth. Market 
forces alone would not bring about the development of an indigenous automobile 
industry. In some countries, governments subsidized or granted preferential tax breaks to 
encourage the growth of a domestic auto industry. Certain industries such as steel and 
energy received preferential treatment. As a consequence, they could provide the auto 
industry with lower costs inputs. 
Table 5.1 below presents an overview of public policy differences along several 
dimensions that impact industrial development, including the competitive arena in which 
the automakers operate. 
Policies to promote the auto industry have adopted a variety of approaches. In 
some nations, such as Brazil, South Korea, and France, there have been considerable 
direct and indirect subsidies offered to automakers. Japanese policies took a similar 
approach after World War 11. Not only were policies developed to aid in the growth of 
the auto industry, there were also direct subsidies offered to related sectors, such as steel, 
machine tools, and computers. The Japan Development Bank and other financial entities 
played a crucial role in assuring that the emerging Japanese auto industry had access to 
low-cost capital. With the growth of the auto industry, many of the direct subsidies 
available to Japanese automakers ended. However, indirect support continues, and the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) maintains close ties with the 
automakers. Thus Japan may only now be ending onerous requirements for individual 
testing and certification of import vehicles. The Japanese shaken system of car inspection 
stimulates demand for new cars among Japanese consumers by requiring frequent 
upgrading of key-and expensive-auto parts. MITI also plays a role in automakers' 
foreign lobbying efforts. Support for other sectors, including electronics and computing, 
has continued. 
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Table 5.1. A Comparison of Public Policy Impacts on the Automotive Industry 
German policies have relied upon regional assistance rather than national 
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US 
Most strict and thorough 
antitrust laws-apply to 
US companies but not 
effective with foreign 
industry. 
Low corporate tax rate 




Praised for academic 
education systems, 
criticized for stance on 
vocational mining 
system. Emphasis on 
science, not technology. 
Neutral to adversarial. 




Aimed toward private 
ownership, open 
markets and free 
competition. Banks 
prevented from playing 
role in industry as they 
do in other nations. 
Strict liability and large 
punitive damages 
contribute to litigious 
society. 
Laissez-faire. 
Governme"' opposed to 
industrial policy. 
Proponent of f'ree trade 
principles, even if 




No national system. 
Ballooning health care 
costs. Political pressure 
for health care reform. 
Patent granted to 
inventor, regardless of 
f h g  sequence. 
Protection for 18 years. 
Canada 
Less stringent than US 
laws. Illegal only if 
they unduly lessen 
competition 
Tax rates comparable 
with US. Higher 
corporate rate offset by 
other advantages. 
Province run, mix of 




geared to retraining 
Somewhat adversarial, 
social policy orientation. 
Strongunions. 
Privately owned, highly 
concentrated, strong 
government control, 




Tariffs and regulations 
to force local 
production. Auto Pact 




National health care 
system administered by 
provincial governments. 
Significant advantage 
from corporate view. 
Similar to US. 
Japan 
Keiretsu are the result of 
an attempt by 
government to limit 
excessive competition. 
Tax cuts, tax free 
reserves and other 
benefits aimed to help 
strategic industries. 
One of the highest 
percentages of high 







labor movement in early 
postwar years. Workers 
lack independent/ 
autonomous voice. 
Largest banks in the 
world control the 
industrial base and in 
tum are key to the 
economy. 
Legal system strucaued 
to discourage 
individuals from 
bringing cases to court. 
No punitive damages. 
Active government 
promotion and guidance 
of strategic industries. 
Government support of 
related industries (e.g., 
steel machine tools) 
indirectly boosted auto 
industry. 
National health care 
system, with 
supplemental health care 
system provided by 
some large firms. 
First filing wins, 
regardless of original 
inventor. Limited term 
of protection. 
Germany 
Laws are very weak. 
allows for the 
development of cartels. 
Generous credit 
incentives to industry 
offset high corporate tax 
rates. Indirect taxes 
promote savings and 
investment 
Strong aptitude based 
vocational training 
directed by government. 
Mefbestimmung- 
Codetermination. Labor 
and management have 
the closest relationship 
of any industrialized 
cour~~y .  
Banks are universal in 
their activities, this 
allows for more control 
in concentrating 
industry. 
Modest damages awards 
compared to us ,  also 
beginning to recognize 
strict liability. 
Modest use of 
incentives, often by 
local governments to 
help auto industry. 
Extensive universal 
health care, highly 
regarded. 
of the smaller, regional supplier firms to the auto industry. However, with the 
diversification of some auto f m s ,  for example Daimler-Benz's takeover of Deutsche 
Airbus, the federal government has provided funds to offset currency losses. The 
German government has also provided infrastructure development and environmental 
project funds to automakers. 
Education policies play a significant role in the public policies of North 
America's competitors. By providing a sound education, a country can help its citizens 
compete in the global economy. While the United States has received significant praise 
for its higher educational systems, it has met criticism concerning its stance on vocational 
training and is often viewed as providing inadequate general education in elementary and 
high-school levels. The educational systems of Germany and Japan are highly diverse. 
Whereas the German educational system provides an excellent vocational training for its 
nonacademically oriented youth, the Japanese system tends to train its workers at the 
factory. In spite of the differences, it is interesting to note that only the United States has 
a large private education system. Germany and Japan have primarily public school 
systems, and university education in these countries is usually free or requires at most a 
modest fee, in contrast to North America. Canada's education system combines aspects 
of both private institutions and public schools, though its higher education is similar to 
the US model. 
As the automobile industry becomes increasingly reliant on more sophisticated, 
often computerized components and manufacturing equipment, it will require a highly 
educated and competent labor force. Retraining schemes and technological innovations 
must be welcomed by management and labor alike if they are to match their competitors. 
That labor-management relations have a major impact on a corporation's 
competitiveness is widely recognized. It is also generally acknowledged that different 
countries have developed distinct labor union systems that affect their national economic 
competitiveness in varying ways. Favorable labor-management relations have been an 
essential factor in many nations' ability to effectively pursue their economic objectives. 
Germany and Japan are two major cases in point. Yet, the two differ greatly in their labor 
union systems. Although German workers enjoy genuine participation in management's 
decision-making process, in Japan, union structures-and particularly the phenomenon of 
enterprise unions organized on a company-by-company basis, not an industry-wide 
basis-have lessened, if not precluded, independent representation for workers. 
In the United States, relatively adversarial labor-management relations have had 
serious consequences for the competitive position of American corporations. In 1989, 
US companies lost more working days due to labor disputes-a total of 16,530 days (per 
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thousand workers)-than those in any other country analyzed in this report. Comparable 
figures for Germany and Japan were 100 and 219, respectively. 
Perceptions of the Automotive Industry by Government Officials 
Separate roundtable discussions among US and Canadian government officials in 
Washington and Ottawa on a broad array of issues related to the auto industry offered 
useful insights into officials' attitudes and perceptions, but very little hope that North 
America is on the verge of a new enterprise relationship between government and the 
automotive industry. Perhaps that is not surprising, in view of the laissez faire ideology 
of both governments, but it suggests that the industry will continue to face offshore 
competition without substantial support from government. 
Perhaps the most troubling characteristic of these officials' views, from an 
industry standpoint, is a pervasive us-versus-them attitude. Government officials tend not 
to identify with the Traditional North American Automotive Industry , but rather to view 
it with skepticism and sometimes disdain. In that respect, they do not see the industry- 
for all its faults-as an integral or indispensable part of the economic landscape. 
Ownership and constitution of the Traditional Automotive Industry could change 
drastically without greatly upsetting government officials. 
Also notable was the rather detached way in which the officials spoke about the 
industry's problems. There was no sense of urgency, no sense that one of the major 
engines driving the North American economy is on the brink of disaster, and finally no 
real sense that government policies are in any way responsible for the current state of the 
industry. Officials generally reacted more like consumers than policy makers, viewing 
the industry as responsible for its current plight and, therefore, as solely responsible for 
recovering. 
Many participants failed to see clearly the links between government policy and 
industry actions and reactions. They see the main problems facing the industry today as 
within the companies' control. Quality, responsiveness to consumer demands, 
management, and executive salaries are not only seen as central to the industry's 
competitiveness and image, but also as almost totally within the companies' pwiew,  and, 
therefore, as substantially unaffected by external factors, such as the policy environment. 
Although they feel that the Tradition-a1 auto industry is less competitive than the 
Japanese, they believe it is in better shape than the European. Asked to rate the North 
American, Japanese, and European car industries on a scale from 1 to 10, all the 
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participants agreed that the Japanese industry rated a 9. The North American rates ranged 
from 5 to 7, and the European rates ranged from 4 to 7. 
For people who spend their lives formulating policy, few of these officials have a 
clear picture of policy impact on the competitiveness of the industry. There is little sense 
of a systems approach to policy. Most felt that there is something basic lacking in 
government-industry relations, but there was no general agreement on the problem or its 
solutions. However, Canadian government officials tend to be both more knowledgeable 
about and more willing to work with the industry than are US officials, and in fact made a 
plea for a much closer dialogue with industry. 
The Impact of Government Regulations 
Policy options, like business decisions, are all too often considered in relative 
isolation: a problem is identified, a solution mapped out, action taken, and the results 
evaluated. Unfortunately, policy decisions often lead to unanticipated consequences, 
sometimes entailing direct costs that outweigh the desired benefits, and frequently 
incurring indirect costs in other arenas. In both the public policy and private initiative 
spheres, a systems approach to decision-making will often uncover these unanticipated 
costs and benefits, and thus improve the decisional outcomes. 
Policy demands and constraints upon the North American industry will grow in 
importance over the coming decade. Companies will find their change efforts often 
directed by regulatory initiatives and policy choices made with little regard to their 
effects on the industry. While there are exceptions, such as Canada's requirement for 
daylight headlamps, the automotive regulatory regimes of Canada and the United States 
are typically quite similar in the three major regulatory arenas of safety, fuel economy, 
and emissions. Meeting US regulations in these three areas accounted for some $1600 in 
price increases for new cars from 1978 through 1991.11° 
Two major environmental concerns face North America today: energy 
consumption and air quality, and vehicles play an important role in each, both as a partial 
source and potential remedies. There are ways to make progress simultaneously and 
more cost-effectively toward the goals of energy conservation and cleaner air, while 
providing a side benefit of economic growth in the auto industry. Although great strides 
have been made in automotive fuel economy, the automobile remains the single largest 
consumer of petroleum in our societies. While the exact contribution of automobiles to 
~ O M V M A ,  Facts & Figures, 1991, p. 76. Additional data from US Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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lower air quality is debatable, it does make a contribution, and, in some urban areas, it is 
a critical contributor. 
Policy proposals to address the automobile's role in energy conservation and air 
quality have been put forward, but typically each problem is addressed by a targeted 
policy. Few doubt that US Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) standards will 
soon be raised, while the Clean Air Act calls for more restrictive emissions standards for 
automobiles. These policies are likely to provide some movement towards achieving the 
goals of cleaner air and energy conservation, but many analysts are concerned that the 
environmental actions will have potentially serious negative economic consequences for 
the industry and for consumers-and thus for the two economies. The potentially 
disastrous effects of forcing the industry to bring high mileage cars to a market that 
resists them and the negative economic effects of adding cost to the automobile to 
improve air quality are clear to the industry, but may not be sufficiently understood by 
government officials. 
CAFE levels are once again the subject of heated legislative debate, and the 
industry again finds itself facing a truly uncertain future, as this important industry 
performance constraint is negotiated in a complex and unstable political climate. While 
industry observers expect major increases in CAFE standards, these are still well below 
some of the standards currently under debate.111 However, one can certainly question the 
wisdom of even less extreme CAFE standards. The marginal benefit of increasing miles- 
per-gallon performance is quite low, and increasing rniles-per-gallon from 30 to 40, at 
today's fuel prices and travel averages, amounts to about 30 cents a day in savings for the 
typical passenger car owner. Moreover, there is strong reason to believe that reducing 
travel through higher fuel prices will conserve fuel more effectively than further increases 
in vehicle fuel effisiency.112 Such a strategy also avoids putting the industry in conflict 
with its market, as CAFE will likely force the industry to impose size and weight limits to 
meet higher standards, while customers continue to demand larger and more powerful 
vehicles. 
The industry expects to see CAFE standards that exceed the level it can 
reasonably reach during the remainder of the decade.113 If CAFE standards require 
David E. Cole and Michael S. Flynn, "The Automotive Industry in Transition," Presentation to the 
Advanced Automotive Technologies Conference, National Institute of Science and Technology, 
Gaithersburg, MD, May 5, 1992. 
l2eharles River Associates, "Policy Alternatives for Reducing Petroleum Use and Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions," September, 1991. 
l 3 ~ a v i d  E. Cole, David J. Andrea, and Richard L. Doyle, Delphi VI Forecast and Analysis of the U.S. 
Automotive Industry Through the Year 2,000, UMTRI, Office for the Study of Automotive Transportation, 
19%. 
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extraordinary effort, they will inevitably take human and financial resources that the 
industry needs for product and facility investment. Most manufacturers have already 
fixed their product plans for 1995, and serious increases in CAFE standards cannot be 
met without enormous expense to revise those plans and bring new plans to market at a 
much faster than normal pace. Moreover, a longer term planning horizon permits 
numerous alternative avenues to achieve higher targets that will minimize the cost of the 
efforts. 
While the Traditional North American industry now produces vehicles that are 
more fuel efficient than Japanese-badged vehicles on a ton-mile per gallon basis, their 
CAFE performance is lower because of the mix of vehicles the Big Three produce.l14 
Experts expect these mix differences to continue, and thus reasonable CAFE targets for 
full-line foreign automakers are higher than those that are reasonable for the Big Three. 
Therefore, higher across-the-board CAFE standards will ultimately hinder the domestic 
industry in competition with foreign manufacturers, as they have in the past. The 
Traditional Industry will either be burdened by enormous investment requirements and 
extreme time pressure to attempt to meet the targets, face financial penalties for failure to 
meet the standards, or find itself forced to adjust its product mix away from its own 
strengths and toward the strength of its foreign rivals. 
The Clean Air Act calls for reduced vehicular emissions, and will lead to 
significant changes in engine, transmission, exhaust, and fuel systems. To be sure, 
powertrain developments would be significant in any case because of the pressures of 
competition and evolving technology. However, the Clean Air Act will likely redirect 
some of these efforts, and undoubtedly will press the pace of development. There are 
three major issues in this arena. First, the Clean Air Act presents another policy driver 
for and decisional constraint upon the industry's already stressed financial and human 
resources. Second, all manufacturers may not be equally able to develop and deploy the 
required technologies, and thus such a policy requirement might effectively sort out 
winners and losers. Third, there is serious question whether the Clean Air Act's 
automotive requirements will yield much immediate benefit, since they target only new 
vehicles. 
Both environmental policies achieve overall improvement through targeting new 
cars, and thus depend on a slow process of fleet replacement to provide their full benefits. 
The operating fleet of passenger cars in North America passed 155 million by 1989, and 
the average age of that fleet is almost eight years old, tying the 1950 level.l15 Moreover, 
1 %bid. 
~ ~ M V M A ,  Facts and Figures 1991. 
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over one-third of these vehicles are more than 10 years old, thus dating from periods 
when fuel economy and emission standards were both substantially lower than in more 
recent times. In fact, perhaps as few as 20% of the cars-those dating from preemission 
control days and poorly maintained vehicles-may account for as much as 80% of 
vehicle emissions. Even at record sales levels of some 12 to 13 million cars a year, it will 
take a very long time to improve the emission and fuel economy performance of the 
entire fleet. Of course, price increases associated with the costs of meeting higher CAFE 
and emissions standards are likely to slow sales, damaging the industry and the 
environment, as owners retain their older, more environmentally harmful cars. 
Newer automobiles are both cleaner and more fuel efficient than older cars. A 
sensible strategy of fleet improvement therefore should target the older and poorly 
maintained vehicles in the fleet, systematically removing the least fuel efficient and 
highest emission cars from service. Directing policy actions to these vehicles might be 
less costly to consumers, permit less adverse effect on the industry, and achieve more 
reduction in emissions and gains in fuel conservation. The economic consequences of 
such a strategy for the industry could well be beneficial, as demand shifts upward and 
provides additional new car sales. The most attractive strategy for targeting the 
retirement of older vehicles might be the type of incentive program that Union Oil 
offered, and Ford partially supplemented, in California in 1990. This program simply 
purchased older vehicles at prices above their market value, and removed them from use. 
The automotive industry needs to keep working on improving the environmental 
performance of newer vehicles, and there must be careful analysis of environmental and 
economic trade-offs, pricing strategies for vehicle retirement, the dismbution of the costs 
across the population, and the net benefits of differing retirement schedules. However, 
North America might well meet its short-term environmental goals for the automobile 
more effectively by shifting the policy targets from new to old vehicles, while continuing 
to balance this effort with the pursuit of longer-term technical improvement in new cars. 
There is another important emerging regulatory area, as social and environmental 
issues loom large. Recyclability is already a growing issue for the industry as regulations 
expand and multiply, perhaps imposing some competitive disadvantages on North 
America as a production location. We expect to see the demand for life cycle 
management, from manufacture to disposal, to grow, and that may bring major new roles 
for suppliers and manufacturers. We expect this area will also see the typical interplay 
between technology drive and business demand, as technical solutions to recycling 
problems define new business opportunities, and new business opportunities create the 
pull for technically and economically feasible recycling processes. 
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Above all, the auto industry is concerned that the Policy-Industry-Market mangle 
not become imbalanced in ways that are competitively damaging. This happened in the 
1970s when CAFE regulations required the industry to make extraordinary and rapid 
investments in more fuel-efficient cars that consumers then rejected. Even if that 
imbalance is avoided, policy demands compete for financing with other demands upon 
the business, such as R&D, facility and product investments, and stakeholder returns, 
whether in the form of returns to shareholders or income to employees. 
The Cost of Automotive Capital 
Capital is the financial and physical resource needed to carry out the business 
activities of a firm. The 1990s will be a decade of capital competition in the world motor 
vehicle industry, as automotive firms and national industries will compete increasingly on 
the basis of the effective use of capital. Capital will be required to engineer and build a 
continually changing product for an evolving, global automotive market. Needed 
capacity adjustments, whether additions or deletions, will require capital. Higher levels 
of capital are also required to cover enormous levels of new, fixed costs that are 
sometimes determined by the maturity of operations and their location. The sources of 
capital are expected to change in form and in terms of their location. Differences in 
national savings rates and changing demographics will complicate the traditional patterns 
of capital formation. Access to needed capital, then, perhaps even more than its cost, 
may well determine winners and losers in automotive competition. 
The most reliable and traditional source of capital for motor vehicle firms is 
earnings, but earlier sections of this report have shown that the profit performance of the 
Traditional industy has not and likely cannot support its competitively driven capital 
needs. Profit is not the sole source of capital, of course, for modem corporations. Firms 
can raise needed funds for investment through equity or debt financing, the capital 
markets. 
However, a major barrier to the acquisition of such outside capital is its cost-i.e., 
the cost of capital. Firms cannot justify the funding of investment projects that generate 
smaller returns than the actual or alternative cost of the required project capital. Thus 
firms that have access to a lower cost of capital or are more efficient in project 
performance will out-invest f m s  with a higher cost of capital or lower productivity in 
development. 
Many economic observers charge that Japanese multinational firms enjoy an 
unfair cost of capital advantage over their Traditional North American rivals. Japanese 
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f m s  may benefit from a special national financial system that channels high rates of 
personal savings by the Japanese population directly into the investment needs of 
Japanese export manufacturing f m s .  Special relationships between these firms, the 
Japanese banking system, and the Japanese system of equity finance result in a constant 
flow of low-cost equity and debt capital to Japanese corporations. The Japanese 
government practices deliberate industrial and monetary policy to assist this effort 
through special depreciation and tax treatment rules and through their final guarantee of 
all types of national investment risk. The final result is a Japanese large corporate 
manufacturing sector where bankruptcy is unknown, and where capital is always 
available at low cost that allows huge initial losses on market entry and unending 
investment in new product, plant and equipment. 
Other economic observers challenge the hypothesis of a major Japanese advantage 
in the cost of capital. This side of debate maintains that large North American firms, like 
the Traditional auto companies, face the same-or  even lower--cost of capital as the 
Japanese. These observers explain lower perceived levels of Japanese cost of capital by 
differences in inflation rates, as well as higher rates of taxation. Higher rates of 
investment are explained by higher levels of Japanese efficiency in such investments, 
including better management practice. For example, table 5.2 shows a major Japanese 
productivity advantage over North American firms in the number of engineering hours 
required to develop a new model. This results in a rate of product investment four times 
greater than Traditional North American f m s ,  and thus a new model for every 504,000 
sales compared with a new model for every 2.1 million sales for the Traditional North 
American industry. 116 
Table 5.2 The Cost of Diversity 
JWU nal North Amenca 
Number of Models 73 36 
Engineering Hours per Model 1.7 million 3.0 million 
Average Age (years) 2.1 4.6 
Average Annual Sales Volume/Model 120,000 200,000 
Cumulative Sales Volume/Model 504,000 2,116,000 
Engineering Labor Cost per Car Sold $438.39 $1 84.3 1 
(at $130/hr. loaded) 
1 6 ~ .  Sheriff, "The Competitive Producer Position of Automobile Manufacturers: performance and 
strategies," International Motor Vehicle Program, MIT, Cambridge, 1988; Clark and Fujimoto, Product 
Development; and NSF estimates of cost of R&D researchers. 
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The two sides of the debate can be placed on the same conceptual chart. Figure 
5.1 relates the level of the cost of capital to several schedules of the marginal mciency of 
investment (MEI). This schedule of the declining marginal productivity of investment is 
similar to the corporate practice of ranking development projects in order of the level of 
their returns. Firms take on projects until the last dollar invested provides the same return 
as the overall cost of capital. Proponents of a large relative cost of capital difference 
argue that the Japanese and Traditional North American auto industries face separate 
costs of capital (labeled N.A. COC and Japan COC), but possess the same ME1 
schedule-for example, N.A. MEI. A lower Japanese cost of capital would result in a 
higher level of Japanese investment. Proponents of greater Japanese capital efficiency 
would argue that the two industries face the same cost of capital-for example, N.A. 
COC-but two separate ME1 schedules. Since the Japanese possess a superior MEI, they 
would invest at a higher level (Japan Investment) despite facing the same cost of capital 
as their North American rivals. 
Cost I 
N.A. Japan $ of Investment 
Investment Investment 
Figure 5.1. Cost of Capital or Efficiency of Investment? 
The two sides of this cost of capital debate represent quite different views of the 
Traditional industry's current situation. If the differences in investment behavior reflect 
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differences in the cost of capital because of differential access to sources, then policy 
tools may be required to redress the imbalance. If, on the other hand, such differences in 
investment simply reflect the differences in efficiency of capital use, then that may be a 
competitive issue better sorted out in the market. 
Research performed by OSAT addresses this issue, providing estimates of the 
relative costs of capital for the North American and Japanese motor vehicle industries 
over the 1984-1990 period. We base our estimates on publicly available financial and 
economic data for four Japanese vehicle manufacturers and four automotive suppliers and 
three US manufacturers and 24 suppliers. We also collected documentation regarding 
current Japanese and US corporate statutory tax rates and regulations, and applied them 
for the entire period because we were unable to collect historical documentation for past 
Japanese corporate tax rates and regulations,l17 We thus use a combined federal and 
local tax rate of 37.0% for US f m s  and a 52.0% combined rate for Japanese f m s .  Our 
depreciation assumptions were a seven year double-declining balance method for US 
f m s ,  and a 10 year declining balance method for Japanese f m s .  
Inflation is an important determinant of the cost of capital in our models. We 
used a moving average of actual and forecast (OECD) CPI inflation rates for the United 
States and Japan to determine expected inflation in each of our analysis years, and note 
that the differences declined over the test period. We had to define total debt differently 
for the US manufacturers than for other f m s  in our sample because of their financial 
subsidiaries. We defined equity as the product of the historic share price and the number 
of common shares issued and outstanding. The percentage cost of equity is defined as the 
ratio of total earnings owed to common to total equity, or earnings divided by total 
equity. However, there were years in our analysis where large earnings losses reported 
by a single firm could actually result in negative cost of equity for the sample. There is 
also reason to treat earnings growth, because of its relationship to growth in dividends, as 
a superior measure of the required cost of equity. For these reasons, this study decided to 
compute three-year moving averages for all financial variables, and to use these moving 
averages in the computation of comparative cost of capital across the four samples. 
The financial data was aggregated for each of the four samples for each year. A 
set of simple three year moving averages was then calculated for the 1986-1990 periods 
for total interest expense, total debt, total earnings, and total equity. 
Three separate cost of capital formulas were used in our analysis, and both 
nominal and inflation-adjusted results evaluated. Our formulas are standard, and include 
1 7 ~ ~ ~  International, Japan International Tax and Business Guide, May 1991; Yuji Gomi, Guide to 
Japanese Taxes 1991192, CCH International, Chicago, 199 1. 
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the Weighted Cost of Debt and Equity, which combines the percentage cost of debt, and 
the cost of equity. These rates are weighted by the debt to total capital ratio yielding a 
nominal rate for US and Japanese firms, and inflation adjusted to yield real weighted cost 
of debt and equity. In 1986, the real cost of capital was nearly 15% for US vehicle f m s  
and 7.5% for Japanese vehicle f m s .  Second, we examined the Cost of Capital relative to 
a capital asset: the return required to cover the costs of debt and equity (including tax) 
used to fund the acquisition of the asset. Our formula reflects the cost of debt and equity, 
allowable depreciation, and statutory tax rates. In 1986, these real rates were 14.5% for 
US f m  and 11.2% for Japanese firms. 
Our third measure, Rental Equivalent, the annuity equivalent of the purchase price 
of the asset calculated at the above cost of capital, yields a 1986 estimate of 19.0% for US 
firms and 16.7% for Japanese firms. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 display our results for 
manufacturers and suppliers. 
Table 5.3. The Cost of Capital-Vehicle Firms Comparison 
US vs. Japan, 1986-1990 
US Big Three: GM, Ford, Chrysler 
Japan Big Four: Toyota, Nissan, Honda, Mazda 
A comparison of the results shown in tables 5.3 and 5.4 clearly shows major 
Japanese cost of capital and rental equivalent rate advantages for the 1986-1989 period, a 
period that includes financial data from 1984-1989. The Japanese vehicle fm advantage 
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in the rental equivalent rate was 2.3% in the 1986 period, although this changed to a 
Japanese disadvantage of 0.6% in 1990. This probably reflects falling Japanese equity 
prices in recent years, and even more to falling levels of earnings and costs of debt for US 
vehicle fums. The Japanese firms depend to a far greater extent than US firms on equity 
as a source of capital. What is striking is that the major source of the improved US 
position is the decline in US rental equivalents, rather than rising Japanese rates in the 
latter part of the decade. 
Differences in rental equivalent rates for US and Japanese suppliers are not as severe in 
the early years of this analysis, but broadened in the last two periods to a difference of 
1.5% in 1990. Very low rates for the cost of capital are shown in the Japanese supplier 
example, mostly from actual negative costs of equity in the 1989-1990 period. This 
difference may not prove minor in a competitive sense since Japanese suppliers produce a 
larger proportion of total automotive output in Japan than do suppliers in North America, 
and contribute much more of total product development cost (30% versus 7%). 
Table 5.4 The Cost of Capital: 
Supplier Firms Comparison, US vs. Japan, 1986-1990 
The significant advantages enjoyed by Japanese automotive f m s  in their cost of 
capital for long term projects in the middle 1980s certainly can explain their relatively 
higher rates of product development, compared with US vehicle f m s ,  in recent years and 
at present. The recent reversal of this advantage has occurred in the main because US 











































































costs of capital have fallen to Japanese levels. If this lower US cost of capital is 
maintained, then higher rates of investment generally, and product development in 
particular, should be expected from US firms. However, there is little reason to expect 
US f m s  to close the gap in product development that opened in the mid-1980s simply 
because of the closing of the capital cost gap today. The advantage they now hold is not 
as substantial as the mid-1980s Japanese advantage, nor may capital be as available to 
them. 
How do the results in tables 5.3 and 5,4 affect the relative cost competitiveness of 
national motor vehicle industries? Unit capital cost is the joint product of three 
components. First, the market prices of required inputs of physical and human capital 
needed to produce output, or prices of needed equipment, plant and engineering services. 
Second, the relative productivity of these inputs also directly determines unit cost of 
capital. Finally, the financial cost of required capital contributes to the total unit cost of 
capital. In the long run, the productivity and financial cost of capital factors are 
essentially linked, since the wider market for capital will force a firm or industry to 
employ capital at a level or rate that produces returns equivalent to that generated, on 
average, elsewhere. 
One way to illustrate the importance of cost of capital is to assess two identical 
projects-at the Japanese and US automotive finance costs of capital-and determine the 
"pure" financial cost of capital difference in terms of relative unit cost. 
Our example is for a vehicle platform development project that costs $2 billion at 
the outset and produces 200,000 vehicle sales per year for ten years. While some of the 
assumptions underlying this example-that total project cost is spent entirely at the 
outset, for example-are unrealistic, it serves to show the type of handicap North 
American firms faced in the mid-1980s solely due to the differential cost of capital. 
The first comparison assumes that vehicle assembly f m s  bear the entire project 
cost burden and that their rental equivalent rates alone are relevant. In 1986, US vehicle 
firms would have experienced a projected capital cost of $900 per vehicle, and the 
Japanese $670, or an advantage of $230. In 1990, the advantage would have been 
reversed to reflect a $60 advantage per unit for US vehicle firms. 
A more'realistic comparison, displayed in the bottom half of table 5.5, assumes 
that automotive suppliers bear some of the burden of project cost in proporeion to their 
reported share of project engineering effort-30% and 7%.l18 If so, project investment is 
likely shared at similar percentages and the supplier rental equivalent rates must be 
l8 Yuji Gomi, Guide to Japanese Tares, p. 137. 
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integrated to produce an effective industry-by-industry comparison. The industry 
comparison results in a $290 advantage per unit for the Japanese motor vehicle industry 
in 1986 and a disadvantage of about $8 per unit for the US industry in the 1990 period. 
The examples shown in table 5.5 are clearly limited in their practical applications. 
Most vehicles assembled in 1990 do not contain 1990 finance unit costs of capital. It is 
more likely that 1990 model cars and trucks were planned and costed five to seven years 
previous to 1990 when the US industry was at a relative cost of capital disadvantage. 
This could explain to a large extent the relatively higher rate of product development, 
and hence market share growth, of Japanese vehicle firms compared with US competitors 
in the 1986- 1991 period. 
Table 5.5. US versus Japan Project Finance Capital Cost Comparisons: 
1986 and 1990 in Constant Dollars 
The recent competitive balance between US and Japanese automotive costs of 
capital is heartening. However, the cost of capital falls into a range of unpredictable 
strategic factors meriting little confidence regarding future advantage. Such factors also 
include the yenldollar exchange rate, future mandated levels of Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy, and import restraints under Japan's Voluntary Export Restraint program. US 
cost of capital rates could rise again relative to the Japanese in the middle to later 1990s. 
If so, relative product development activities by the domestic industry would suffer. 
Firms are typically guided in forming expectations by their experience. Expectations 
based on two decades of high US rates and Japanese advantage in the area of the cost of 
finance capital can hardly be overcome by a few years of lower and relative comparable 
rates. 
While Japanese capital markets are opening to the world, they still provide 
important competitive resources to Japanese firms. Certainly future equivalence in 
US Vehicle Firms 
Japan Vehicle Firms 
US Industry 
Japanese Industry 



















capital costs can only assure that the Traditional North American Automotive Industry 
need not fall further behind. However, in and of itself, it cannot repair the past damage to 
that industry, nor protect against the continuing competitive advantage today of less 
expensive capital invested some years ago. 
The Cost of Health Care and its Impact on Competitiveness 
North America has the most expensive health care system in the world. Health 
care costs in the United States have increased, on average, at double-digit rates over the 
past 20 years with similar levels of increases projected for the future. The US annual 
national health care bill doubled in the last decade to more than $600 billion in 1989. In 
1992, health expenditures are projected to reach $817 billion, or almost 14% of GNP. 
Figure 5.2 displays health care costs as a percentage of GDP (gross domestic product) for 
a number of automotive producing countries. While Canada's health expenditures 
account for three percent less of GDP than do those of the US, they are also some 3% 
more of GDP than is the case in Japan. Moreover, Canadian automotive products contain 
high levels of US content, and thus bear some burden due to US health care costs. Thus 
our discussion focuses on the United States because that is where the bulk of the cost 
problem exists, but its effects damage Canadian automotive competitiveness as well. 
US Canada France Germany Japan England 
Figure 5.2. Comparison of 1990 Health Care Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP 
The United States is the only developed country without an effective ceiling on 
health care expenditures, because of its open-ended financing. In other countries, 
national budgets, expenditure limits, or some other explicit method of controlling 
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spending-such as Japan's fee schedule method-set an upper limit on these 
expenditures. As the nation's health care spending continues to increase, it pressures the 
allocation of national, corporate, and personal resources to other priorities such as 
housing, education, research and development, and rebuilding of the nation's crumbling 
infrastructure, Since these priorities directly affect long-term competitiveness, excessive 
health care costs drain national competitiveness. 
Despite these high expenditures, the United States has the only health care system 
where a large percentage (15%) of the population under age 65 is without health 
insurance coverage. All other industrialized countries (except South Africa) provide 
universal access for their people even while maintaining lower per capita health care 
spending than the United States. For US industry, this results in additional expenditures, 
as privately-funded coverage underwrites some of these costs. Moreover, business, 
which pays 34% of all US health care expenditures, often cannot price products to offset 
these health costs because of intense market competition, often from foreign companies. 
And, unlike other forms of compensation, health care costs, which have been doubling 
every five years, are neither predictable nor, in most cases, controllable. Higher health 
care costs require trade-offs that reduce the standard of living. Health benefits have now 
become a prime factor in labor negotiations, and contribute to strikes that covered 78% of 
all workers involved in major work stoppages in 1989.119 
International Comparisons 
Most nations' per capita health care costs are significantly below the US'S $2,566. 
For example, in 1990, US health care costs per capita were 43% higher than Canada's 
$1,795,99% higher than West Germany's $1,287, and 131% higher than Japan's $1,113. 
Comparative costs in the United States have worsened dramatically since 1980, as US 
costs over the decade rose 135%, while Germany and Japan experienced increases of 
83% and 113%, respectively. Thus US health care costs grew from 55% above German 
costs in 1980 to 99% higher in 1990, and from 1 13% to 131% higher than Japan's. 
Despite these high expenditures, the US trails many OECD nations on health care 
indicators such as infant mortality and life expectancy. Among the 24 OECD nations, the 
US ranks 21st in infant mortality, 16th in male life expectancy at birth, and 13th in 
female life expectancy at birth. To be sure, these indicators are a function of a country's 
demographic mix, lifestyle, level of uninsured, and other standard of living factors, as 
well as quality and distribution of health care. 
l19u.s. General Accounting Office, Health Care Spending Control-The Experiences of France, Germany, 
and Japan, November, 199 1 .  
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Some have argued that the US economy can afford to spend more than other 
economies on health care. While there may be some merit to this point, the United States 
spends some $600 more per capita than would be accounted for by 1989 per capita GDP, 
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Figure 5.3. Comparison of Relationship Between Per Capita GDP and 
Per Capita Health Spending, for Selected OECD Nations. 
System Comparisons 
A recent GAO study found that France, Germany, and Japan provide nearly 
universal coverage with private physicians, patient choice, employment-based coverage, 
and third-party payers. However, they differ markedly from the US system in providing 
wide preventive services, compulsory enrollment, payroll financing but broad population 
risk ratings, negotiated rates, and targeted limits. In all of these countries, budget 
controls have moderated spending growth, but have not eliminated all upward pressures 
on spending, in part because controls are not applied to all segments of health care 
expenditures, nor have they eliminated the underlying pressures for increased spending. 
Presently, Canada, Japan, France, and Germany are exploring modifications and 
supplements to their strategies for controlling health care expenditures and methods of 
public and private financing. These modifications do not include the elimination of 
expenditure controls. 
l 2 O ~ .  J Schieber and J. P. Poullier, "International Health Spending Issues and Trends," Health Affairs, 
Spring, 1991, pp. 106-1 16; and OECD Health Data, 1991. 
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Health Care Costs of the North American Automotive Industry 
We estimated automotive health care costs for the Traditional North American 
industry, including both US and Canadian components. Our estimates may be somewhat 
conservative, since our calculations exclude the proportion of corporate federal and state 
taxes that underwrite US health care costs. We employ two methods of looking at North 
American health care costs: cost per insured and cost per unit. Cost per insured permits 
tracking overall health care cost increases, while cost per unit captures inherent factors 
the Big Three cannot avoid, such as high retiree-to-active ratios. Cost-per-unit 
calculations directly influence the ultimate vehicle purchase price-hence the consumer's 
perceived value--of an automobile and highlight the effects of overall market volumes 
and market shares. 
We estimate Big Three US health care expenditures of $ti22 per unit and 
Canadian expenditures of $30 per North American vehicle produced in 1990. Correcting 
for vertical integration and the integration of the Traditional North American industry, 
and relying on known supplier health care costs, yields an estimate of $403 per unit for 
US suppliers and $31 for Canadian suppliers. Combining manufacturer and supplier 
costs results in a total unit health care cost of $1086. The much lower Canadian unit cost 
estimates reflect the averaging of the costs for Canada's lower actual production across 
all North American production, and Canada's lower health care costs. In fact, if Big 
Three health care costs in the United States were the same as they were in Canada for 
1990, US costs would have been 46% lower. Big Three US health care costs-not 
including supplier input cost estimates-have risen an average 7.6% per year between 
1985 and 1990 versus 4.3% per year for their Canadian costs. 
Total Big Three 1990 US health care costs were $5.96 billion, up 7.6% per year 
since 1985. If health costs of the traditional suppliers are included, that figure rises to 
$10.42 billion. However, the number of covered individuals fell, and the ratio of retirees 
to actives increased, so costs actually rose 8.2% on a per contract basis, significantly 
above the average medical care CPI index rate of 7.5% per year. Moreover, the 
intermediate materials stage of the producer price index is a useful measure of automotive 
input expenditures, and that index rose 2.2% from 1985 to 1990. The medical care CPI 
index thus increased 241% faster (7.5%/2.2%) per year than overall industrial inputs, 
while the Big Three actual costs increased 245% (7.6%/2.2%) more than their general 
input costs, and their per contract costs increased 273% (8.2%/2.2%) more. Thus health 
care in general experienced huge increases, and the pressure on the Big Three to contain 
health care costs as a component of their total input costs accelerated. 
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On a vehicle production basis, health care costs per vehicle rose an average 12.4% 
per year, some 65% higher than the medical care CPI for the same period and 450% 
higher than the intermediate materials producer price index annual increase, This reflects 
increases in health care costs, the growing number of automotive retirees, and falling 
production. If production levels were the same as in 1985, 1990 unit costs would have 
been $828. Therefore, $258 of the current cost per unit calculation is due to the decline 
in the overall market demand for vehicles and the Big Three's loss of market share. 
Currently, total health care costs account for 6.9% of the average consumer 
vehicle expenditure-up 35% since 1985. The Big Three thus face a dilemma: they can 
pass through these increased health care costs to the customer, reducing perceived vehicle 
value, or accept lower profit levels per unit, reducing dividends and/or investment 
resources. The difficulty for the Big Three is that they must develop wage and benefit 
programs, price their product, and develop investment strategies based on local market 
conditions, policies, and costs but compete against international corporate cost structures. 
A more difficult question to answer is the proportion of the health care cost per vehicle 
that is excessive, although it is clear that this cost is influenced by both private and public 
policy actions. From a competitive perspective, that quantity of the cost that can be 
considered excessive is that portion which exceeds Import and New Entrant cost. 
Japanese and New Entrant Comparisons 
International comparisons must be made to estimate the significance of Big Three 
disadvantages in health care costs. Unfortunately, comparable international data is 
unavailable, so we estimate these costs under conservative assumptions-i.e., 
assumptions that avoid minimizing the cost estimates. We developed an estimate for the 
Japanese industry by starting with a published 1988 estimate for manufacturer's health 
care costs of $220 per production unit.121 We first adjusted the North American cost 
estimates to Japanese levels of vertical integration to estimate manufacturers' share and 
then total cost. This estimate was updated to 1990 by adjusting it for changes in Japanese 
national medical care costs (9.1%) and changes in production (6.3%), to yield a total 
1990 cost of $552, reflecting manufacturer costs of $226 and supplier costs of $326. 
Our estimate, then, is that the Big Three incurred some $534 more per vehicle for 
health care costs than did their major offshore competitors. Based on 1990 production 
volumes, if the Traditional North American industry incurred Japanese level health care 
expenses of $552 per unit, $5.1 billion would have been available for other uses, 
121~emstein Research, The Automobile Industry, p. 53. 
COMPETITIVE SURVIVAL: Private Initiatives, Public Policy, and the North American Automotive Industry Page 140 
including additional product innovation, productivity improvement, employee 
development, and marketing activities. In the event that the Big Three again reached 
1985 production levels without adding employees-through increased capacity utilization 
and productivity, for exarnple-unit health care costs would decline to $828. The 
Traditional industry would still face a gap of $276 per unit, an extra cost of some $2.6 
billion compared with their Japanese competitors.122 
In estimating the New Entrant costs, we again began with a published 1988 
estimate of $85 manufacturer cost per unit. We adjust this for expanded employment, 
production, and medical care CPI, adding in supplier costs from Japan and North 
America in a 2: 1 ratio. This yields an estimate of New Entrant health care costs per unit 
of $475, yielding them an advantage of about $75 compared with Japanese production 
and about $600 compared with the Traditional industry. Indeed, the Japanese-owned 
motor vehicle industry had an additional advantage in health care costs because over 40% 
of their North American sales are sourced in the United States or Canada, where their 
health care costs are lower than in Japan. The reasons for the extremely low costs for 
New Entrants reflect a mix of their high unit productivity, their young workers, and their 
few retirees. The last two factors matter because of the method used to construct risk 
groups. 
Pension Costs 
Pension costs merit particular mention. A recent analysis reports that Ford and 
Chrysler, in 1987, paid over $2.50 per hour in pension benefits to active and retired 
workers, while GM costs were a bit under $1.00 per hour. Pension costs for New 
Entrants Toyota, Honda, and Nummi were all under $0.50 per hour. To be sure, this 
advantage may erode with the aging of the New Entrant labor forces, but that will take 
many years, and now constitutes a substantial area of cost advantage for New Entrants.123 
Policy Implicationr 
There can be little doubt that the health care policies of the United States place a 
major burden on North American manufacturers-like the automotive industry-that 
must compete against offshore producers. Further, that burden extends to Canadian 
products in industries, like automotive, where North American production is in fact 
highly integrated. The competitive damage is severe, suggesting that even high 
122~hus the health care cost difference, even at sustainable capacity utilization rates, by itself accounts for 
more than the 4% Japanese advantage in labor costs identified by Fuss and Waverman, above. 
123~hilarducci, as cited by Candace Howes, "The Future of U.S. Manufacturing: Auto Assemblers and 
Suppliers," Testimony before the Joint Economic Committee hearing, December, 199 1. 
COMPETITlVE SURVIVAL. Private Initiatives, Public Policy, and the North American Automotive Industry Page 141 
production years and no further escalation in medical costs would find automotive 
producers at a $2.6 billion disadvantage-a significant sum even in this huge industry. 
Some method of controlling costs must be found if the industry is to survive, and 
probably some redistribution of even controlled costs is also required. 
Retirees currently comprise 44% of the total Big Three insurance contracts. With 
continued efforts focused on downsizing the industry and promotion of early retirements 
it is feasible that within five years the Big Three in the United States will have as many 
retirees as active employees, and many new retirees will not yet be eligible for Medicare. 
This is a function of the industry's age and not within industry control. The issue of 
corporate long-term health care liabilities for this older workforce will be highlighted as 
companies begin to create reserves to recognize estimated future health care liabilities in 
accordance with Financial Accounting Standards Board ruling number 106-an issue that 
will certainly affect the ability and cost of raising capital. To meet these requirements, 
GM has recognized a past service liability for future health care costs of between $16 to 
$24 billion. Chrysler's reserves may reach $6 billion and Ford's requirements may be in 
the area of $10 billion. These reserves must start by 1993 and be fully expensed within 
20 years. 
The burden of retirees is particularly damaging, since downsizing in order to 
become competitive increases these costs tremendously, and spreads these costs over 
increasingly fewer vehicles. The health care cost and pension disadvantages grow as the 
companies shrink, and become a more and more important factor lessening the 
Traditional industry's chances for survival. 
Trade Issues 
The automotive trade deficit continues to be a major factor in North America's 
overall trade deficits. The US bilateral deficit with Japan reached $43 billion in 1991. Of 
this total, $32.4 billion was accounted for by automotive products-$22.5 billion by 
vehicles and $9.9 billion by parts. Canada's automotive trade deficit with Japan climbed 
from $3.9 billion in 1989 to approximately $4.6 billion in 1991. 
The trade pattern in automotive products parallels trade in other industries, as 
shown in table 5.6. The case is often made that any kind of government action undercuts 
the international competitiveness of an industry. Yet, both steel and machine tools, 
whose domestic shares are protected, have experienced export growth. The 
semiconductor industry has been negotiating market share targets with Japan, the largest 
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market for these devices for some years now, and, in spite of slow progress there, has 
managed to expand its export ratio. 
The share of the trade deficit accounted for by Japan has remained in the mid-to- 
highJO% range since 1985. For the United States, the 1989 automotive deficit was $56.6 
billion, accounting for 61% of the manufactured goods deficit, 52% of the merchandise 
trade deficit, and 51% of the total current account deficit. The automotive deficit peaked 
in 1987 at $61 billion dollars, and receded some 13% by 1990, to $53.3 billion. The parts 
share of the deficit increased sharply in 1986, and remained at about 20% of the 
automotive deficit in 1990. Japanese imports to the United States peaked in 1986, both in 
constant dollars and units. However, the unit decline of some 32% was much sharper 
than the value decline of about 24%, as the Japanese manufacturers moved to an enriched 
mix of vehicle imports. Parts imports increased some 67% over this same period, 
peaking in 1989 at $1 1.6 billion, and falling in 1990 to $1 1.4 billion. The 1990 bilateral 
parts deficit alone-at some $10.5 billion-accounted for 99% of the US worldwide parts 
deficit and almost 37% of the entire bilateral automotive deficit. 
Table 5.6 Imports and Exports as Share of Consumption and Production. 






Motor vehicles l 
Passenger Cars (units) l y 2  
Steel Mill Products 
Radio & TV Sets 
Leather Shoes & Boots 
1 Canadian imports and exports counted as domestic. 
2 Canadian and Mexican counted as domestic 
~omestic Product 
Table 5.7 examines bilateral automotive trade between the United States and 
Japan. 1989 data would lead us to expect that similar shares of each other's market- 



































exports. Instead, we find a ratio of almost excess of 64:1, over 30 times the expected 
ratio. Similarly in automotive parts, we would expect to find a ratio of Japanese to US 
parts exports of about .8:1, based on 1989 production levels. We actually find a ratio of 
nearly 13:1, some 15 times higher than the expected. Japanese auto suppliers, then, find 
themselves in a secure home market too. 
Table 5.7 Japanese and US Bilateral Automotive Exports, 1989124 
Japan to US to Expected Actual 
Automotive d u c t  US Japan u o  R a t i ~  
Vehicles (000s) 2,172.3 34.0 2.1 63.9 
Parts ($oOO,000) 11,351 893 0.8 12.7 
The low import share of vehicles protects the build level of their customers, and 
thus the business available to those suppliers. Moreover, the sourcing preferences of 
those customers effectively shield Japanese suppliers from substantial competition from 
other producing nations. It is simply not credible that these ratios solely reflect consumer 
choice in a free market and sound manufacturer sourcing and business practices. If that 
were the case, the question would not be why the Japanese automotive manufacturers are 
so successful in North America, but rather why they are so unsuccessful. 
There are two major sources of demand for imported Japanese parts. First, they 
are used in new vehicles, both by Traditional North American manufacturers and the 
burgeoning Japanese-badged New Entrants, either directly or through their own 
Traditional and New Entrant suppliers. Second, they are used in aftermarket servicing of 
the growing fleet of operating Japanese-badged vehicles. The demand for both uses has 
grown rapidly since the mid-1980s, as the operating fleet has grown, and 1990 New 
Entrant production more than tripled the 1986 level, reaching some 1.6 million vehicles. 
Our analysis suggests that the aftermarket, New Entrant production and Traditional 
production is the order of level of demand. 
Particularly disturbing is the high per-unit use of Japanese parts in New Entrant 
production. If, as most analysts expect, that production continues to grow rapidly, it will 
exert tremendous pressure on parts imports. We note that four Japanese companies have 
recently announced targets for substantially increased purchases of North American 
parts.125 If these programs are effective, and do not simply result in the purchase of parts 
that themselves have high import content from suppliers, then the pressure from New 
124~ertzenberg, "Internationalization of the Auto Parts Industry." 
125"~ig 3 chiefs return with some gains," Automotive News, January 13,1992, p. 44. 
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Entrant production will be somewhat alleviated. We also express apprehension that these 
targets will be met simply by increased production, thus failing to alter the underlying 
imbalance in any meaningful manner. 126 
Reasons for Automotive Trade Deficit 
Various reasons have been proposed regarding the source of this substantial trade 
deficit, One reason is a "too strong" dollar, driven up in value by US monetarism or by 
high interest rates brought about by the need to finance the national debt, and by the 
perception abroad that the dollar represents a "safe haven" currency in an uncertain 
world. This argument sometimes included a "too weak" yen, accompanied by the 
implicit or explicit notion that the Japanese government deliberately manipulated the 
value of the yen in order to foster exports. Nevertheless, the rapid appreciation of the yen 
in the mid-1980s, increasing some 85% in US dollar terms, has had remarkably little 
effect on the size of the stubborn bilateral automotive trade deficit. 
Some speculate that the real problem underlying low North American penetration 
rates in Japan is a lack of will on the part of the Traditional North American Automotive 
Industry to pursue sales in Japan. After all, these manufacturers' historic pattern has 
been to invest abroad and serve foreign markets from local production, an option denied 
them in Japan when it was an attractive and feasible business undertaking. However, 
since the Traditional North American manufacturers have no production base in Japan, 
there is no local presence that bars them from exporting. In fact, US vehicle exports to 
Japan, the world's second largest national automotive market, make up only 13% of US 
vehicle exports, even though the United States is the second leading automotive importer 
into Japan. Parts exports to Japan, the world's largest national automotive producer, are 
only 9% of US parts e ~ p 0 r t s . l ~ ~  Moreover, the various European industries have had 
little more success in penetrating the Japanese market, and only Germany held higher 
import share than the Traditional North American producers in 1990. 
Nevertheless, even if this is true, is there not a serious risk that any type of policy 
intervention will simply serve to protect the Traditional Automotive Industry from the 
appropriate consequences of its past poor management, and therefore defeat the effective 
working of market forces? We think not. Such concerns, we believe, are based on an 
incomplete and inaccurate assessment of the industry's current situation and the 
126Max Gates and Richard Johnson, "Big 3 expect little from talks with Japanese in Chicago," Automotive 
News, May 11 ,  1992, p. 4. 
127~eraenberg, "Internationalization of the Auto Parts Industry," calculated from data in tables 5 and 6 for 
vehicles (quantity basis), and table 2 for parts (value basis). Exports to Canada are excluded from total 
exports. 
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explanatory factors that account for it. To be sure, industry management has made 
mistakes and should not be insulated from the consequences of those mistakes. However, 
at least some of those mistakes reflect rational behavior in the business climate North 
America affords, and that suggests that international competition, in vehicles as well as 
other manufactured products, might require alteration of that climate to provide North 
American companies the opportunity to compete effectively. 
Some analysts highlight the particularly low level of US automotive exports to 
Japan-about $600 million in vehicles and almost $900 million in parts in 1990-as the 
root problem. This suggests an export-driven solution. However, many observers feel 
that Japan engages in a variety of exclusionary, if less formal, trade practices, ranging 
from barriers, such as product certification hurdles, to restricted access to distribution 
networks, and the like. It certainly is the case that exports could form an important part 
of the solution in automotive parts, where a few, key decision makers-the Japanese 
manufacturers-control an enormous potential market, both for original equipment and 
aftermarket uses. 
It is particularly unfortunate that the aftermarket in Japan has proved so difficult 
to penetrate, as this has imposed high costs on Japanese consumers and denied business 
to North American suppliers. One aftermarket supplier has market shares around the 
world ranging from 23% to 70% and is the world market-share leader, but has only been 
able to capture 1% of Japan's market, where it has been active since 1973. It is difficult 
to understand such disparities without investing some credence in the argument that 
Japan is different, and some of the difference lies in exclusionary practices. 
North America has a trade surplus with Western Europe, although it has a deficit 
in the automotive sector. The European manufacturers have generally competed at the 
high end of the market, exporting luxury and specialty vehicles. Perhaps because of the 
lower volumes from Western Europe, the smaller portion of the deficit it represents, and 
the fact that the European deficit comes from a number of different countries, debate 
about the automotive trade deficit has not focused on Western Europe to nearly the 
degree that it has upon Japan. 
It is difficult to believe that the efforts of the North American automotive 
companies in Japan have met with so little success for purely market reasons-i.e., 
absence of competitive product or lack of initiative. The performance of the North 
American industry elsewhere in the world simply does not support such an interpretation. 
Some steps to rectify the policy and practice barriers to the Japanese vehicle and parts 
market should clearly be a high priority for both North American governments. 
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Export Barriers to Japan 
There are numerous barriers to automotive imports into the Japanese market. 
Some of these barriers are formal and some are informal, and this distinction underlies 
much of the dispute between the Japanese and North American Traditional industries, as 
well as the overall trade friction between Japan and many of its trading partners. Japan 
compares quite favorably with other major automotive producers in terms of strictly 
formal baniers, such as tariffs and quotas; less favorably in quasi-formal baniers, such as 
product standards and certification procedures; and quite unfavorably in informal 
barriers, such as access to dismbution systems. It is probably the case that formal 
baniers are easier to negotiate and dismantle, simply because there is little dispute as to 
their existence and effects. On the other hand, there is often dispute about the importance 
and even the existence of less formal barriers, lengthening the process of identifying 
them, negotiating their relaxation, and implementing xemedial actions. 
Moreover, debates on Japanese automotive import barriers often involve 
participants committed to one side or the other. Thus many defend Japan by first 
pointing to its low formal barriers, then questioning the suitability of candidate import 
products, and finally lauding Japan's recent impressive percentage increases in imports. 
Japan's critics first note its high quasi-formal and informal barriers, argue that there are 
numerous appropriate potential import products, and then decry the continuing low 
absolute levels of Japan's imports. Such debates rarely admit of ready and clear 
resolution, and progress to date on increasing North American vehicle and parts exports 
to Japan has been disappointing. Nevertheless, OSAT believes that these issues must be 
addressed and resolved expeditiously, lest automotive trade become more constrained and 
contracting rather than more open and expanding. While the strategic priorities of the 
Traditional North American industry appropriately target reducing the share of the North 
American market held by the Japanese industry, we believe it is also extremely important 
that the North American industry successfully participate in the Japanese market, and 
initially that will be through exports to Japan. 
Before discussing the current situation, a short historical overview is necessary to 
explain why North American automakers and their suppliers have such a limited presence 
in the Japanese market today. The Big Three all established vehicle assembly operations 
in Japan early, and by 1934, GM and Ford had attained a combined market share of over 
90%. In 1936, Japan passed the Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Business Act, placing 
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severe restrictions on local manufacturing activities of foreign f m s ,  putting tariffs of 
70% on imported vehicles, and raising the duties levied on parts. By 1939, all American 
automotive manufacturing operations in Japan ceased, and all manufacturing assets were 
seized in 194 1. 
Following World War 11, North American companies were not permitted to revive 
their manufacturing activity, and, up until 1965, automotive imports were again restricted 
to allow the indigenous industry to develop. The 1970s witnessed the dismantling of 
many formal entry barriers, and North American vehicle imports reached a high of almost 
22,000 units in 1979, before the second oil shock drastically cut into sales. In the late 
1980s, American imports began to climb again, reaching 32,230 in 1991. However, only 
15,546 of these were Traditional Big Three vehicles; the balance was from New Entrant 
facilities. American Big Three sales were about 6% of foreign car sales, which in turn 
comprised 2.9% of the Japanese market. Traditional North American penetration stood at 
a dismal 0.17% of overall automotive sales in the Japanese market in 1990. 
Japanese government and industry officials often attribute the lack of American 
market share variously to insufficient efforts to understand the nature of the Japanese 
market, insufficient investment of time and money necessary to do business in Japan, 
automobiles that are not designed specifically for Japanese consumer tastes and needs, 
vehicles too large for the narrow roads of Japan, failure to make export models with right- 
hand drive, lack of follow-on support by American manufacturers, and general lack of 
quality in American products. The Japanese side does not typically view restrictive 
Japanese practices, nor the past actions of the Japanese government as particularly 
relevant or significant barriers to market entry today. The North American view 
emphasizes the actions of the Japanese government that destroyed their burgeoning 
operations in Japzn, prevented their reestablishment at a time when such efforts were 
feasible undertakings, and the continuing barriers they face today, including the 
processing of import vehicles, the restricted access to established distribution networks, 
and the extremely high costs of entry. 
Numerous aspects of Japanese regulatory policy pose significant obstacles to 
imports. Perhaps the most important lie in Japan's product standards and the processes 
for certifying that imported vehicles meet these standards. Homologation-modifications 
to satisfy these standards-adds time and cost to the importing process, especially for 
small quantities. Yet the investments required to produce vehicles tailored to Japanese 
specifications cannot be justified without confidence that large sales are possible. 
Moreover, many of the standards-and the expenses they generate--contrast markedly 
with the much more flexible regimes faced by Japanese auto makers exporting to North 
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America. Although the US and Japanese governments and their automobile industries 
have been engaged since the early 1980s in bilateral negotiations to harmonize their 
automobile regulatory regimes, these efforts have produced only limited results, and new 
Japanese regulations still appear to have important discriminatory effects. In addition, 
foreign auto makers seeking to sell in Japan are confronted with a national vehicle 
inspection system that severely disadvantages foreign parts makers, and a taxation system 
that continues to discriminate against foreign vehicles. 
Product Specifications 
Like virtually all national governments, the Japanese government establishes 
criteria that products of all types, including autos, must satisfy. The principal automobile 
criteria concern vehicle safety, emissions, and noise. However, unlike many national 
governments, Japan usually requires manufacturers to pre-clear products, submitting 
them for government-sanctioned testing and approval before they are allowed on the 
market, rather than permitting manufacturers to verify their own compliance. In addition, 
the Japanese government frequently requires products, including autos, to conform to 
detailed specifications for product design, rather than the functional standards typical in 
North America and elsewhere. Finally, Japan is reluctant to recognize alternative 
international standards and testing procedures. 
Japan's general practices clearly reflect genuine health and safety concerns, as 
well as distinctive characteristics of Japan's geography, social priorities, and traffic 
environment, such as its limited land area and crowded roads. Nevertheless, in some 
cases, the health and safety benefits of these regulatory practices are difficult to identify, 
and have been, in any case, far less noteworthy than their effects on restricting access to 
the world's second largest national motor vehicle market. More importantly, from a trade 
standpoint, few comparable barriers exist to Japan's access to the North American market. 
North American disputes with Japan over vehicle standards have covered a wide 
range of products, from side reflectors and windshield wipers to braking systems and 
emissions levels. The European Community, for its part, is negotiating with Japan over 
the placement and number of screw holes for license plates. Currently, Japan's Ministry 
of Transport (MOT) and the US government are focusing on numerous substantive 
standards-related issues affecting the export of vehicles to Japan. While there has been 
progress on a number of these issues, that progress has varied from Japan's acceptance of 
international standards and North American testing results to agreement to undertake 
technical discussions. 
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Two especially frustrating issues for the North American industry have been 
referred for technical discussion, rather than resolved. These are engine exhaust 
emissions testing procedures and catalyst overheat warning systems. Current US 
emissions standards are more stringent than Japanese, and the disparity will widen in 
model year 1994, when the emissions provisions of the US Clean Air Act go into effect. 
Japan did not accept US emissions tests on US-made vehicles as substitutes for separate 
tests administered in Japan, unless testing was conducted under observation by a witness 
appointed by the MOT. Nor would Japan accept US test data, even though US testing is 
accepted by most of the rest of industrialized Europe, the industrialized Far East, Brazil, 
and Canada. While the United States requested that Japan accept the US tests and data, 
Japan has agreed to discuss technical aspects of Japanese testing procedures to be 
conducted in official test institutes in the United States. 
The controversy over catalyst overheat warning systems illustrates how the 
distinctive Japanese design-centered approach to product regulation has resulted in a 
safety standard turning into a trade barrier. Japanese regulations require that vehicles 
contain a dedicated system to warn of overheating in catalytic converters for exhausts, 
while North American regulations simply require that auto makers address this problem 
when the vehicle is designed, leaving the method up to the manufacturer. Japan is the 
only country to require, not only this type of system, but a witnessed heat damage test as 
well before the vehicle can be approved. Japan's MOT claims that the overheat warning 
devices frequently detect dangerous conditions in exhausts, and that therefore they can 
neither drop the requirement nor accept foreign manufacturers' assurances about the 
efficacy of their vehicle designs. The United States has insisted that North American 
vehicles' designs have successfully ensured that catalytic converters do not overheat, 
without adding the sensor, controller, and wiring comprising a dedicated system. MOT 
has agreed to enter into technical discussions on this issue. 
The many Japanese vehicle standards mean that foreign manufacturers must 
modify vehicles extensively if they are to be sold in Japan, a process called 
homologation. Homologation for North American vehicles has recently included the 
addition of a catalyst overheat warning system, new head lamps, breakaway mirrors, side 
marker lamps, control identification, chassis stamps, engine stamps, wheelbase flares, an 
emergency signaling device, and Japanese labels. According to the Commerce 
Department, these homologation measures added $2,168 to the sticker price of an average 
Big Three car exported to Japan in 1990, and accounted for over 8%of its price. Another 
US government study found that homologation added $2,900 to the cost of a Chrysler 
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LeBaron coupe sold in Japan, and accounted for nearly one-third of the price differential 
in Japan between the LeBaron and the comparable Honda Accord Coupe. 
A similar comparison is shown in table 5.8, contrasting the retail prices of a Ford 
Taurus LX and Honda Accord in North America and Japan. The higher prices in Japan 
are attributable to homologation, shipping, the need to add unique equipment, and in the 
case of the Taurus, for profit margins accrued to three levels of distributors. 
These numerous issues involving technical standards, testing methodologies, and 
verification of performance continue to present serious and expensive barriers to North 
American access to the Japanese market. While some view progress as substantial, 
because many have been altered or eliminated over the years, many see that same 
progress as painfully slow, since so many remain. 
Table 5.8. Comparison of Retail Prices in North America and Japan128 
Import Approval Procedures 
Japan's principal process for certifying compliance with safety standards is the 
Type Designation System (TDS). This process applies to domestic as well as imported 
vehicles. The TDS imposes no numerical quotas on importers and has the potential of 
dealing efficiently with large volumes of vehicles by permitting the inspection of 
manufacturing facilities to ensure that their procedures conform to Japanese standards 
rather than the inspection of each vehicle. Yet the testing requirements themselves and 
the preparation and processing they require are considered needlessly burdensome by 
North American manufacturers, as is the amount of documentation required. 
In 1986, Japan took measures to expedite this process by introducing the 
Preferential Handling Procedures (PHP) system. This import protocol requires far less 
documentation than the TDS procedures and less extensive testing. Manufacturers are 
allowed to certify with affidavits that their products meet certain safety and noise 
standards-those that have been declared by Japan to be functional equivalents of 
Japan 
North America (in $US) 
Difference 
* 
128 Ford Motors Corporate Strategy Group. 
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Japanese standards-but each car must be inspected individually, unlike the TDS 
procedure. Moreover, a manufacturer could only export 1,000 vehicles of a specific type 
to Japan each year under PHP. Because foreign producers can take advantage of this 
program only if they severely limit export volumes to Japan, PHP acts as a de facto 
import limitation. In contrast, North American ceflication processes permit Japanese 
self-certification to all safety standards and set no limits on the sales of imported vehicles. 
While the MOT now facilitates individual vehicle inspections by sending inspectors to 
the dealer or distributor, it seriously limits the locations and dates and requires advance 
scheduling. The US government has asked Japan to eliminate both TDS and PHP in 
favor of North American procedures. Japan has recently agreed to increase the limits on 
PHP imports to 2,000 vehicles a year, and will permit an extra 1,000 during the time that 
a TDS application is under consideration. However, the costs of PHP are high, and it is 
not economical to use this procedure for beyond 500 to 600 vehicles. 
Taxation 
The structure of Japanese automobile taxes long discriminated against foreign 
firms, principally through a commodity tax rate based on the size of the vehicle and its 
engine. Foreign cars typically fell into higher tax categories. Beginning in April, 1989, 
the Japanese tax system replaced this three-tiered commodity tax with a uniform-rate 
consumption tax-in effect, a value-added tax similar to those levied in the European 
Community. It is unclear whether this change was due to the move of Japanese 
manufacturers into larger cars and engines, a change in environmental concerns, or a 
concern with the old system's effects on imports. 
However, imports are still taxed at a higher effective rate than domestic vehicles 
because the vehic!e tax base for imports includes insurance, freight, and homologation 
costs. In addition, all vehicles are still subject to other taxes based on vehicle weight and 
size, such as the acquisition tax, the tonnage tax, and an engine capacity tax that more 
than doubles for engines displacing more than 2000cc. These effectively leave US- 
manufactured vehicles subject to higher taxes. 
Ironically, a program that was touted as a method to boost imports effectively 
discriminates against non-Japanese manufacturers. Japanese companies are eligible for a 
credit against corporate income taxes equal to 5% of the year-to-year increase in the value 
of their imports, provided such imports rise by at least 10%. Other companies are 
allowed only a tax deferral for a five-year period for achieving the same import levels. 
Thus a car imported by a Japanese vehicle manufacturers can generate a 5% tax credit, 
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even on the Japanese content of the imported vehicle. Cars imported and sold by a non- 
Japanese company would generate much smaller tax deferrals and interest saving. 
Inspections 
The rigorous Japanese vehicle inspection system, known as the shaken system, 
presents a substantial barrier to North American automotive exports to Japan. Cars in 
Japan must be inspected three years after the purchase of a new vehicle, then every two 
years for the next ten years of the vehicle's life, and every year thereafter. These 
inspections can be very expensive propositions for car owners, The owner of a three-year 
old vehicle in excellent condition typically spends more than $1,000 for the minor repairs 
and adjustments invariably identified by repair facilities as necessary for passing 
inspection. The repairs and maintenance required to pass second and third inspections are 
usually even costlier. 
This inspection system is the envy of world automakers, since it effectively forces 
the early replacement and retirement of vehicles. The trade issues it raises stem from the 
typical repair procedures. Repair facilities in Japan principally use original equipment 
replacement parts supplied by the vehicle's manufacturer. Such parts are used for two 
principal reasons. First, aff~liates of Japanese automobile makers have dominated the 
repair system to date. Second, at least until recently, inspectors routinely failed cars that 
included foreign replacement parts. As part of the bilateral US-Japan Market Oriented 
Sector Specific (MOSS) agreement on auto parts concluded in 1987, Japan agreed to 
inform relevant parties that the installation of foreign parts should not in and of itself pose 
any obstacle to clearing inspection. However, most repair stations are linked to a specific 
Japanese auto conzpany, and thus carry only Japanese replacement parts, while inspectors 
harbor lingering suspicions about "nongenuine" parts. The shaken system has been and 
remains a serious direct barrier to the sale of imported parts, and indirectly to the sale of 
imported vehicles. 
Distribution System 
The automotive distribution system, for both vehicles and parts, still presents a 
significant nontariff barrier to foreign companies attempting to sell their products in the 
Japanese market. In theory, the distribution system for vehicles is similar to that of the 
United States. The broad outline of the system was copied from the American 
automobile distribution network, and Japanese literature on the subject stresses this 
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point.129 However, the distribution system is marked by restrictive practices, most 
especially exclusive dealing, making it difficult if not impossible for foreign 
manufacturers to expand their marketing efforts in Japan by "piggy-backing" on the pre- 
existing network, as Japanese manufacturers did in North America. 
Japanese industry officials maintain that while Japanese dealers generally enter 
into sales arrangements with one manufacturer, they are not prohibited from handling the 
products of other manufacturers and are as fully independent as those in North 
~merica.130 The Japanese view the difficulty foreign manufacturers face in gaining 
access to the dealer network as independent business decisions of the dealer, arguing that 
dealers-at least for the larger Japanese manufacturers, such as Toyota, Nissan, and 
Honda--cover all the market niches and thus have no need to carry American products. 
Moreover, to add foreign products would unduly tax the sales staff, service, and parts 
procurement. 
Japanese dealer-manufacturer relationships have both explicit and implicit 
features which allow manufacturers to maintain a high degree of control over their 
dealers' actions. The explicit arrangements fall into three main categories: full 
ownership and control of the dealership; investment in the dealership; and contractual 
arrangements through which third parties agree to sell a manufacturer's products through 
a dealership. Each of these arrangements provides the manufacturer a high degree of 
influence, if not control, over the dealership's business activities. In addition to these 
explicit arrangements, low dealer profitability keeps them dependent on the 
manufacturers for financing and other assistance, providing manufacturers with great 
leverage. Incentives and rebates offered to dealers also keep the dealers dependent, since 
many are tied to the dealer's sales of the manufacturer's product in proportion to the 
dealer's overall sales. Carrying another manufacturer's product would lower such 
rebates. Finally, historical relationships and mutual loyalty are all-important features of 
business dealings in Japan. Throughout Japanese industry, if a company is tied to 
another, then that company does not go elsewhere to expand its business. The net result 
in automotive distribution is that dealers are highly unlikely to introduce competitors' 
products. 
This dealer dependency effectively prevents non-Japanese manufacturers from 
utilizing the existing dealer network to market their products in Japan. Since the dealer 
outlets have accounted for over 95% of sales in recent years, marketing efforts through 
129~apan Automobile Manufacturers Association, Inc, Automotive Distribution in Japan, Washington, 
D.C.,1990. 
l3b id . ,  p. 14. 
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importers and independent dealers appears to be of limited value in securing volume 
sales.131 In spite of Japanese protests to the contrary, the Japanese automobile industry 
is a prime example of a distribution keiretsu that excludes outsiders. The Japanese Fair 
Trade Commission found the automotive sector to be almost completely cartelized, with 
manufacturers exercising a wide degree of control over the actions and fate of their 
dealers. 132 
The question arises as to why the North American Big Three do not simply set up 
their own, separate distribution network. A primary reason is the exorbitant price of land 
in Japan. Since it is such a scarce commodity in Japan, land is not freely traded, and 
therefore, suitable locations for dealers' outlets are often simply not available even if one 
were willing to incur the cost. Various estimates place the cost of one new sales outlet in 
Japan from $10 million to $25 million. Five hundred outlets,-a fraction of requirements 
for effective distribution-would require from $5 billion to $12.5 billion. As discussed 
elsewhere in this report, the capital demands on the North American industry are 
enormous, and it is difficult to make this level of investment in Japan without more 
promising potential results. The Industrial Bank of Japan recently concluded, "The new 
establishment of one's own dealership network has reached its limit, due to the difficulties 
in the after-sales service system and soaring land ~rices."l33 Thus, access to the already 
established dealership outlets of the Japanese producers appears to be a necessity for 
effective penetration of the Japanese market. 
In recent years, in light of the exclusiveness of dealer-manufacturer relations in 
Japan, the Big Three have used a variety of alternative approaches to market their 
products in Japan, including independent importers and affiliations with Japanese 
companies. Ford distributes through Autorama, a joint venture with its affiliate Mazda, 
which provides access to about 300 outlets. GM markets North American vehicles 
through Yanase & Company and Suzuki. These arrangements give GM access to 
approximately 700 sales 0utlets.13~ Chrysler distributes vehicles through J. Osawa & 
Company at about 47 outlets. In addition, Honda and Chrysler have entered an 
arrangement in which Jeeps will be sold in Honda's Import Division sales channel, 
consisting of 110 outlets. To date, Honda has not met the sales targets stipulated in the 
131~merican Embassy, Tokyo, "Japan's Auto Dealer System: Overview and Statistics," Tokyo: US 
Embassy, unclassified cable, May 7, 1991. 
132~nited States International Trade Commission, Phase I: Japan's Distribution System And Options For 
Improving US Access, Washington, 1990, p. 59. 
133 Ibid., p. 9. 
134~nformation on outlets, dealer franchises and sales channels in Japan is drawn £rom a number of 
sources. See, e.g., Automotive Distribution in Japan, p. 8. 
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agreement. There are also 50 Chrysler Japan Sales Limited outlets through which 
Chrysler vehicles are sold in Japan, and 23 outlets for minivans and full size vans through 
Sinwart, a specialty dealer. 
While their efforts to establish dealer networks in Japan have yielded some sales 
results, the number of outlets-about 1,66&that the Big Three has achieved is a mere 
9% of the approximately 17,500 total outlets in Japan. Moreover, the North American 
manufacturers are dependent on the good will and effort of business partners who often 
have an interest in limiting their sales to preserve higher profit margins, control, or to 
promote alternative vehicles. Given the costs of establishing an independent distribution 
network, access to truly independent dealers is a major requirement for North American 
success in the Japanese market. 
In striking contrast to the American manufacturers' inability to become integrated 
into the Japanese distribution network, approximately 30% of the American Big Three's 
dealers in the United States are dual dealers, carrying Japanese-brand products in their 
showrooms alongside their domestic manufacturer's vehicles.135 By 1990, there were a 
total of 64,685 US franchised outlets, 34,716 for American vehicles and 29,969 for 
Japanese and Japanese-made, American nameplate vehicles. 136 Thus Japanese vehicles 
are sold in approximately 46% of the franchised outlets in the United States-a far cry 
from the situation that the American manufacturers face in Japan. 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFI'A) 
A trilateral North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) would impact on 
the competitiveness of the automotive industries of Mexico, Canada, and the United 
States. NAFTA would affect trade among the three countries, as well as between these 
countries and the rest of the world. It would affect relative business costs and 
opportunities, thus impacting potentially on the global distribution of automotive 
manufacturing facilities and services. 
The inclusion of Mexico in a free-trade agreement offers both opportunities and 
uncertainties for the US-Canada automotive industry. The opportunities arising from a 
NAFTA flow from the fact that Mexico would add close to 85 million people and $170 
billion in total economic output. The addition of the Mexican economy would create a 
NAFTA economic zone, which exceeds in size the combined zones of the European 
l35~ccordin~ to a dealer survey by the National Automobile Dealers Association. 
36~ard's  Automotive Yearbook, 1991, pp. 2 19-22 1. 
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Economic Community (EC) and European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA), as shown in 
table 5.9. 
This large economic zone has the potential to produce higher levels of automotive 
employment, production, and sales in North America than would be the case if Mexico 
remains excluded because: 
The US-Canada automotive markets are mature and will experience lower 
annual growth in the future than in the past, whereas the Mexican market has much 
potential for growth 
Removal of tariff and non-tariff baniers would expand trade; and 
Extended scope for rationalization of the automotive industry could produce 
competitive gains in productivity and cost reductions relative to the competition outside 
NAFTA, thus displacing imports and encouraging exports. 
Table 5.9. World Trade Zones 
NAITA EC+EFTA World 
Population (million) 1,620 360 358 5,206 
GDP ($trillion) 3,853 5,864 5,532 19,982 
Exports ($billion) 656 509 1,320 2,902 
The uncertainties that various stakeholders associate with a NAFTA relate 
fundamentally to the perceived risks of winning or losing. In the global economy, the 
knowledge, technology, capital, and skills employed in the automotive industry are 
highly mobile. What will happen to the geographic distribution of these factors of 
production and the resulting investment and employment patterns under a N m A ?  Can 
a trade deal be struck that produces net gains for all three member countries? What 
would be the essential features of such a deal? Within each country, who would lose and 
would adjustment policies be warranted and feasible? These are the kinds of questions 
that underlie the uncertainty surrounding a NAFTA. 
US, Canadian, and Mexican Interests and Objectives 
The three governments come to the negotiating table with some common 
interests, concerns, and objectives, but also some different ones. All three governments 
share an interest in strengthening the North American economic zone. The emergence of 
strong trading blocs in Europe and Asia raise the prospect of tougher trade rules between 
North America and these blocs. An economically united and vigorous North America 
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would be in a stronger position to compete with these trading blocs. Environmental 
concerns could also benefit from being addressed from a trilateral perspective. 
All three governments have common objectives of increased trade, economic 
growth, rising employment, and increasing living standards. However, the three 
countries start from different positions. Mexico has a comparatively low standard of 
living, low wages, poor working conditions, much lower levels of basic public services, a 
wide gap between rich and poor, low savings and investment, and a developing industrial 
base and infrastructure. 
Mexico's trade policies have been protectionist, although this is changing. The 
United States and Canada have historically had a close trading relationship. Both nations 
have high living standards, generally good working conditions, diversified economies, 
developed industrial infrastructure, established public services, and sizable middle-class 
populations. Canada has a much smaller market and has relied on trade with the United 
States for much of its export sales. 
Mexico has an automotive industry of growing maturity and diversity. This 
industry posted its best year ever in 1990 and is poised to prosper. Mexico could become 
a focal point for new auto industry investment to produce vehicles and parts for sale 
within the large NAFTA area as well as for export to non-NAFTA countries. Mexico 
has much to gain from a NAFTA by participating in an integrated North American 
automotive market. 
Automotive Industry Interests and Concerns 
The overarching objectives of a NAFTA for the automotive industry, which the 
US and Canada share, would be: 
The addition of the Mexican market to those of the United States and Canada 
and the substantial market growth potential that this would create 
The unraveling of Mexico's protectionist automotive policies to take advantage 
of the market growth opportunities 
Increasing the competitiveness and degree of integration of the North American 
automotive industry, displacing imports, and stimulating exports 
Avoiding use of Mexico as a platform for non-NAFTA counmes to unfairly 
penetrate the United States and Canadian markets 
Minimizing the disruptive impacts of a NAFTA on existing automotive 
communities in all three countries 
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Non-North American-owned companies, including those with production 
facilities in North America and those without, would share the first two of the above 
objectives. Some of these companies with production facilities in North America may 
share objectives three and four. 
Concerns about a NAFTA that have been expressed by some groups, including 
Canadian and US labor, and which would need to be addressed, include: 
1. The possibility of a shift of production capacity from Canada and the US to 
Mexico; large increases in Mexican automotive exports to the US and Canada resulting in 
job and investment losses for both countries. 
2. Dislocations in Canadian and US automotive industry communities; the 
exploitation of Mexican workers through low wages and poor working conditions. 
3. Relatively low environmental standards in Mexican automotive production. 
On balance, NAFTA offers the US industry growth opportunities over the longer 
term, but also threatens some short-to-medium-term disruptions. Growth opportunities 
for Canada appear smaller, but the risks of disruptions may be greater. 
The trade negotiators have the task of coming up with a free-trade agreement that 
addresses these industry objectives and concerns and paints a "win-win-win" scenario. 
The key issues the negotiators must address on automotive trade include: 
1. The phase out of automotive tariffs between Mexico, the United States, and Canada. 
2. Each country's automotive tariffs with other countries. 
3. Mexico's nontariff barriers to automotive trade. 
4. North American automotive content performance requirements and calculation 
methods. 
5. Automotive investment policies toward NAFTA members and toward other countries. 
6. Dispute settlement mechanisms. 
7. The treatment of used cars. 
8. Product/process standards. 
Some industry stakeholders see a NAFTA as a mechanism for improving 
competitiveness; others feel uncertain and vulnerable. The three countries involved in the 
negotiations have some automotive interests that converge and some that are divergent. 
The negotiators have a range of issues to address and options to select. Mexico may be 
best positioned to benefit from a NAFTA. Canada appears to have the most 
COMPETITIVE SURVIVAL: Rivate Initiatives, Public Policy, and the North American Automotive In&sfry Page 159 
vulnerability. The United States would benefit over the long term, but may face some 
short- term disruption. 
There is strong industry support of the elimination of trilateral tariffs and nontariff 
barriers, subject to acceptable content rules and some production safeguards. This 
assumes that the trade package does not open up the possibility of Mexico being used by 
non-NAFTA countries as a platform for penetrating the North American market. 
Concerns that must be addressed include whether or not producers already located in 
Mexico should be given preferential treatment, and the implications of a NAFTA for 
local employment and working conditions in the three countries. 
Impacts of Cost and Policy Changes 
Research for this report includes simulations of the major potential effects of 
seven possible developments on the North American automotive industry and its 
Japanese c0mpetitors.13~ Policy actions are among the major, if not always the exclusive, 
drivers of these developments. Hence, these results at once portray the importance of the 
policy arena in determining industry performance and suggest the possible effects of 
differing policy options. These simulations are based on a three sector model, and 
describe percentage changes across a range of performance measures compared with a 
1988 base case.138 These measures include, among others, total sales in the United States 
and Canada; changes in sales share by Japanese Import producers in the United States 
and Canada; changes in total factor productivity and unit costs in the United States and 
Canada; and percentage changes in employment in the United States and Canada. The 
sales results refer to dollar value of sales for both vehicles and parts, rather than the more 
familiar-and restictive-unit vehicle sales. 
The only major effect of these scenarios on producer performance in Japan occurs 
if North American producers capture 15% of the Japanese market. Long-term industry 
employment then falls by 8% in Japan, although permanent employment practices might 
prevent this and impose additional handicaps on Japanese producers. Therefore, 
1 3 7 ~ e  also simulated the effects of dropping the Voluntary Restraint Agreement, which has limited 
Japanese exports to North America. Since these restraint levels exceeded actual Japanese unit imports 
since 1986, formulating a reasonable tariff equivalent for modeling purposes was not possible. 
138~elvyn Fuss, Stephen Murphy and Leonard Waverman, "The State of the US, Canadian, and Japanese 
Auto Industries: Impacts of Cost and Policy Changes," January, 1992. The three sectors incorporated into 
the model are 1) an econometric cost model; 2) a set of equations converting costs to prices, and 3) a set of 
consumer demand functions. The basic cost model reproduces output and sales within 1.5% of actual-a 
very tight fit. 
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improved performance of North American producers is not purchased at the price of 
substantial h a m  to the motor vehicle industry in Japan. 
Exchange Rate 
The currency exchange rate is a powerful determinant of comparative costs, and 
shifts in the exchange rate can have tremendous impact on competitiveness, as discussed 
in an earlier section.139 While market factors drive exchange rates, it is clear that 
government policy also has major effects. Countries take numerous actions to achieve or 
defend a particular exchange rate, as recently exemplified by the weakening of the US 
dollar in the mid- 1980s due to the Plaza Accord. The Canadian dollar is closely tied to 
the US dollar, so for convenience, we discuss the yen:US dollar exchange rate. 
The 1988 yeddollar exchange was about 128:1, with the dollar considerably 
weakened compared with its value in the mid-1980s, when the rate neared 240:l. If the 
actual exchange rate fell to 110:1, a 16% appreciation of the yen or a 14% weakening of 
the dollar, our analysis suggests that Japanese sales share would fall by over 12% in 
Canada and the United States over the long tenn. 
However, strategies to develop international competitiveness solely through 
weakening North American currencies have significant negative effects, as imports 
become more expensive, and consumer welfare ultimately suffers as goods produced 
outside North America become more expensive. While this benefits the overall trade 
balance, it is purchased at the price of more expensive traded goods. 
Exchange rates represent one of the critical, but uncontrollable factors in 
international competition. If the North American producers benefited from the weakened 
dollar of the latter part of the 1980s, they were surely damaged by the strengthened dollar 
of the mid-1970s. Exchange rates can shift in either direction, and it is important to 
recognize that a weakened yen represents a serious threat to North American producers, 
one that must be factored into strategic planning. If the yen:dollar exchange rate moved 
to 150:1, weakening the yen by some 15% or strengthening the dollar by 17%, Japanese 
long-term sales share in the US and Canada increases by 14.5%. Unit costs fall 
somewhat in the United States and Canada because of the materials and equipment that 
are purchased in Japan, but the impacts of total factor productivity are small. The 
impacts on employment are more substantial, as US employment falling by nearly 3% 
and Canadian employment by almost that amount. 
139~ee the discussion of total factor productivity on pages 83-86. 
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Labor Costs 
The price of labor reflects numerous private and public decisions, including wage 
rates, benefit coverage, and the funding method and levels of public programs. Thus our 
analysis of health care costs, reported earlier, suggests that the differences in funding 
methods and levels between the United States and Canada result in substantially higher 
costs for manufacturers in the United States, and this is reflected in the price of labor. 
Labor costs can be reduced through private initiatives, such as increased productivity, or 
changes in public policies. 
Under this scenario, a 17% reduction in the price of labor in Canada yields 
improvements in production and employment in Canada, but has little effect on North 
American total market size. Unit costs in Canada fall by 5.6% and employment rises by 
9.4% in the long run. The United States suffers some minor negative effects on its own 
costs and employment because of this reduction in Canadian labor costs. A reduction in 
the price of labor by 17% in the United States increases total sales in North America by 
about 2.5%. Unit costs in the US fall by nearly 6%, while employment increases by 
12.7% in the long run. Canada, on the other hand, experiences some minor performance 
decrements on these measures. These are indeed substantial impacts, with important 
consequences for the economy and for government revenues. 
If labor prices simultaneously fall 17% in Canada and the United States, total 
North American sales increase nearly 3%, while Japanese sales in North America fall 
about the same amount. Unit costs fall, and Canadian long-term employment increases 
8%, and US employment just over 11%. The simultaneous lowering of labor price yields 
a higher North American employment gain, as Japanese share falls more than in either of 
the separate scenarios. However, each nation's employment gain is somewhat lower, 
since neither nation gains at the expense of the other. 
Cost of Capital 
Our earlier analysis suggests that the North American industry indeed faced a cost 
of capital disadvantage in the mid-1980s, and that the current rough parity of capital costs 
in North America and Japan is unlikely to compensate for the continuing disadvantages 
imposed by that earlier deficit. What would happen if the North American industry were 
to develop a cost of capital advantage? We model these results with a 20% decrease in 
the US and Canadian cost of capital. The impacts are more substantial in the long run 
than in the short run because the long run permits capacity adjustments, whereas capital is 
essentially fixed in the short run. This 20% reduction in the price of capital lowers unit 
COMPETITIVE SURVIVAL: Private Initiatives, Public Policy, and the North American Automotive Indusbry Page 162 
costs in the US by 3% and in Canada by nearly 2%. Total sales in both North American 
markets increase fractionally, and there is little effect on long-run employment. 
Tariffs 
Both the United States and Canada impose tariffs on automotive goods, although 
not on each other's imports under the FTA. The weighted US tariff is some 4.5%, 
including the tariff of 2.5% on cars and parts and 25% on light trucks, while the weighted 
Canadian tariff is 9.2%. What would result from raising these tariffs to a common 15%? 
A common rate of 15% involves a substantial difference in actual tariff increases in 
Canada and the United States because of the differing current levels, and this results in 
quite disparate impacts on the Canadian and US markets, Such a common tariff reduces 
Japanese sales in the long run by over 9% in the United States, whereas in Canada the 
reduction in sales is just over 5%. The effects of such a tariff on the total market size are 
negligible, suggesting that consumer loss is not especially high, and each nation gains 
nearly 2% in automotive employment. 
Reduce Japanese Market Share by One-Third 
There are two immediate policy options that could effect a rapid and sharp 
decrease in Japanese import market share in North America. Canada and the United 
States could impose tariffs sufficient to achieve a lowered market share target or simply 
establish a quota. Of course, Japan could itself establish a more stringent quota as well. 
We simulate the effects of a reduction of one-third in Japanese market share, or roughly 
20% of the North American market. Such Japanese share reduction adversely affects the 
size of the two North American markets, reducing the combined markets over 2%. Such 
actions primarily effect the industry's employment level, as both Canada and the United 
State reap employment gains of over 8%. 
The limiting of Japanese share through tariff and quota mechanisms inflicts some 
consumer welfare losses, as it drives up prices. However, the effects of the two 
mechanisms differ in an extremely important way. Quotas restrict supply, permitting the 
Japanese manufacturers to raise prices and capture consumer losses in the form of larger 
profits. These profits can support product development efforts and thus convert to a 
formidable competitive resource when restrictions end, as discussed above.140 Thus the 
North American imposed restrictions in the early 1980s may have contributed to funding 
the explosion in Japanese product development, although it is unclear that they truly were 
140see discussions on pp. 80 and 94. 
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binding. While tariffs also result in higher prices and consumer loss, consumer losses are 
captured by their own government and thus consumers are somewhat compensated. 
Research & Development 
There is a substantial, real, efficiency difference between Japanese and domestic 
North American producers, as discussed above in the section on productivity. Our model 
suggests that a major method of reducing these cost efficiency differences is to increase 
research and development (R&D). Our scenario assumes that the stock of R&D-that is, 
the amount of cumulative knowledge-is increased by 50%, equivalent to a doubling of 
R&D expenditures in North America over four years. Of course, R&D expenditures are a 
complex function of company performance, yielding investment funds, the cost of 
capital, and policy incentives, typically reflected in tax codes. 
The effects of this increased R&D investment are substantial. US unit costs fall 
by 12.7% and Canadian by 6.3% in the long run. These unit cost reductions, reflected in 
lower wholesale and retail prices, increase sales in North America by 5.5% in the longer 
term, while reducing Japanese share by nearly 5%. Long term total factor productivity 
leaps by 14.5% in the United States and nearly 7% in Canada. This basically wipes out 
any productivity differential between the United States and Japan. However, automotive 
employment in both Canada and the United States falls substantially in the short term, 
and some 4% over the long term, because research and development typically results in 
technical improvements that are capital using and labor saving.141 
Japanese Market 
What would the effects on the North American industry be if it were to capture 
15% of the Japanese market? Such a level is not unreasonable, assuming serious and 
rapid steps to open the Japanese market are undertaken, since it is still well below North 
American shares in Europe. We assume that North American share of the Japanese 
market would rely on exports, rather than overseas production. This scenario is 
necessarily speculative because no price change in the model captures such a share gain 
due to the very low base of US and Canadian model sales in Japan. Moreover, the 
barriers to such an accomplishment are high indeed. Nevertheless, this level of market 
penetration has major benefits for the North American industry, raising employment in 
the United States and Canada substantially-by nearly 9% in the long term. Total factor 
141 To be sure, the income and employment generated elsewhere in the economy might well compensate 
for these automotive losses. However, our focus is on the automotive effects of these scenarios. 
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productivity rises in North America, especially in Canada, where scale effects are more 
substantial, and Japanese sales share in North America falls by nearly 1%. 
Japanese Market Combined with Increased R&D 
While the effects of these scenarios differ somewhat across the various 
performance measures, the final two certainly represent an attractive package. Increased 
R&D has very positive effects on total market size and unit costs, although only moderate 
effect on decreasing Japanese share, and it yields long term employment reductions. 
However, capturing 15% of the Japanese market might more than compensate for any 
employment losses associated with R&D investments, and lessen the importance of 
decreasing Japanese share in North America. What would happen if both of these 
scenarios developed? 
Total sales in North America would rise 5.696, while Japanese share would fall by 
just about that amount. Unit costs fall over 7%in Canada, and nearly 13% in the United 
States. The employment gains from capturing market share in Japan do more than offset 
the losses associated with increased R&D investments, as each country gains about 4% in 
automotive employment. The gains in total factor productivity still eliminate any 
productivity differential between Japan and the United States. 
However, the very attractiveness of these scenarios raises an important issue. 
Both efforts are capital intensive, and it is unclear how the North American industry 
could fund these efforts simultaneously, even ignoring the enormous capital requirements 
it faces for product development, discussed above. It surely suggests the need for other 
policy changes to support these investments, so that the capital is available through 
earnings and/or capital markets. 
s-0' 
Table 5.10 summarizes the results of these simulations on four key US and 
Canadian performance dimensions: total sales, Japanese share, unit costs for domestic 
production, and employment levels. The displayed results are for the long run, permitting 
capacity adjustments to occur, and assuming low elasticities. 
Currency shifts have substantial effects, perhaps most notably their effects on the 
range of outcomes the North American industry might experience, both in Japanese 
import share and North American automotive employment. Reducing labor costs in 
either country promises substantial employment gains to the improving country, but 
imposes some loss on the other, while simultaneous labor cost reductions in both 
countries afford substantial gains for both. A reduced cost of capital primarily effects 
COMPETITIVE SURVIVAL: Private Initiatives, Public Policy, and the North American Automotive Industry a Page 165 
unit costs. Establishing a common tariff of 15% reduces Japanese share, but it requires a 
substantially higher tariff or quota to achieve a 33% reduction in Japanese share and to 
yield substantial employment gains. Increasing R&D and capturing 15% of the Japanese 
market each provide some substantial improvements, but it is the combination of the two 
that appear to yield the most even gains across these performance dimensions. 
Table 5.10. Scenario Effects on Key Performance Dimensions: 
Percentage Changes Compared With 1988 
Performance Dimensions 
Scenario: Total Sales Japanese Share Unit Costs Employment 
Can US CanAJS Can US Can US 
Exchange Rate 
1 10 ven:$US -1.0% -1.3% -12.3% 
Labor Cost Falls 
17% in Can 0.6 0.3 - 1.5 -5.8 0.0 9.4 - 1.2 
17% in US 2.3 2.5 - 1.6 0.2 -6.3 -1.2 12.7 
17% in Can &US 2.9 2.8 - 3.0 -5.6 -6.3 8.1 11.3 
Capital Costs 
Fall 20% 0.5 0.4 - 0.7 -3.0 -1.8 0.5 -0.0 
Tariff at 15%* -0.2 -0.6 -5.2; -9.2 -0.3 -0.0 1.7 1.9 
Reduce Japan 33%: 
Tariff or Quota -1.6 -2.5 -33.3 -1.3 -0.2 8.1 8.6 
Increase R&D 5.5 5.5 - 4.9 -6.3 -12.7 -4.5 - 3.7 
Capture 15% of 0.2 0.2 - 0.8 -1.4 - 0.2 8.8 8.9 
Japanese Market 
Capture 15% Japan, 
Increase R&D 5.6 5.6 - 5.5 -7.3 -12.7 3.9 4.0 
*Because of different current tariff levels, the effects of raising current tariffs differ for 
the Canadian and US markets even in the long run. 
The pursuit of a combined strategy to increase R&D investments and win vastly 
larger market share in Japan will require tremendous capital investment, since both 
strategies are very capital intensive. That presents a major challenge to the industry, as 
discussed earlier, and will necessitate policy support. Capturing 15% of the Japanese 
market will require serious efforts on the part of the North American governments to 
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open that market, and on the part of the industry to exploit that opportunity. Perhaps 
above all, these scenarios reinforce the joint importance of public and private initiatives. 
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VI. SUMMARY 
The conceptual model presented in figure 6.1 presents a framework for 
considering the results of our comparative assessment of the North American and 
Japanese automotive industries. This framework consists of a break-even model that has 
guided much of the review and analysis of both industries. Our initial assumption was 
that the traditional North American industry requires higher volumes to cover its basic 
fixed costs, reflecting higher costs due to competitive disadvantages rooted both in 
private-sector and public-sector decisions and actions. Our analyses and results suggest a 
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Figure 6.1. Conceptual Model 
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Fixed and Variable Costs 
We distinguish fixed and variable costs in terms of the relatively short run, since 
in the longer term few costs are truly fixed. Fixed costs are largely insensitive to 
fluctuations in production volumes, while variable cost levels are more immediately 
related to changes in production volumes. Public and private practices can impose each 
of these kinds of costs on a manufacturing company, and it is analytically useful to 
allocate the fixed costs of the North American and Japanese industries into components 
that reflect first, the private initiatives largely under the control of management; and 
second, those costs that are imposed as costs of doing business by the differing 
socioeconomic environments, and thus largely reflecting differences due to policy 
decisions at the various governmental levels. Table 6.1 presents some examples of each 
type of cost. 
Table 6.1. Examples of Costs, by Source and Type 
This table raises two issues. First, it merits comment that some of these costs 
have shifted over the past few years, at least at the level of the manufacturers. In 
particular, labor costs at the manufacturers are now much more fixed, and less variable 
than in the past. Recent agreements have limited layoffs, expanded supplementary 
unemployment benefits, and provided higher levels of both job and income security. In 
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security. In the long run, this can be a major source of competitive strength, as both 
European and Japanese industry have found that job security is an important basis of 
worker cooperation, morale, and willingness to wholeheartedly pursue long term 
productivity improvement. However, in the short run it can be competitively damaging, 
as layoffs no longer permit management a ready avenue of cost reduction as production 
falls, and may result in temporary in-sourcing of work that damages suppliers. 
Second, many of these costs spring from a combination of public and private 
sources, and reasonable people may disagree as to their proper location in the table. 
Thus, health care costs reflect public elements-the method and level of funding-and 
private aspects-the contractual agreement between employers and employees, and 
corporations and insurers. In our view, the workforce levels of education and skill 
required for successful automotive production ensure that the workforce will insist on 
medical coverage, whether through employer or government plans, or through higher 
wages to finance coverage on an individual basis. We, therefore, believe the public 
policy choices in the medical care arena are more important sources of industry costs than 
the particular private agreements that determine its exact form. Similarly, excess 
capacity results partly from a set of private decisions and partly from public actions. 
Thus one may criticize the industry for failure to eliminate capacity in the face of falling 
market share and to vigorously pursue replacement markets abroad, but should not ignore 
the critical role of government in providing relatively open access to North American 
markets while failing to ensure reciprocal openness in foreign markets. 
Our analysis of these factors is incomplete, reflecting limited resources, time, and 
available data. Nevertheless, we have identified a few components of the Traditional 
industry's costs and estimate some cost differentials between the Traditional North 
American industry and its Japanese and/or New Entrant competitors. We thereby lay the 
groundwork for continued consideration of these important issues. 
Private Fixed 
The US in 1988 still faced a 15% disadvantage in efficiency, although the gap 
reduced some eight percent since 1984. Finally, the US faced a four percent labor cost 
disadvantage in 1988, down from 15% in 1984. If the weakening of the dollar 
contributed to these performance gains, it contributed to reduced North American 
investment costs for the Japanese industry, contributing to the traditional industry's 
excess capacity. The costs of excess capacity are high, as illustrated by the conversion of 
a nearly 5% US total cost advantage in 1988 to a 1% disadvantage at lower 1991 capacity 
utilization rates. 
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Private Variable 
The US industry converted a 10% disadvantage in material costs in 1984 to a 19% 
advantage by 1988, a finding supported by price comparisons of parts and components. 
While the gap is product design efficiency is closing, it still represents a substantial North 
American disadvantage. 
Public Fixed 
The traditional North American industry faced a $534 per vehicle health care 
penalty compared to the Japanese industry, and over $600 compared to New Entrants, in 
1990. If volumes increased to 1985 levels, these unit costs would lessen, but the industry 
would still face a premium of about $275 and $350 above Japanese and New Entrant 
competitors. These North American costs of $1086 in 1990 reflect the relatively low 
costs of health care in Canada. The pension cost burden on active workers at the 
traditional North American manufacturers is some 3.5 times the burden at New Entrants, 
and this differential will only grow as the traditional industry reduces capacity and 
employment. Differentials in the cost of capital to the North American and Japanese 
industries has fluctuated over the 1980s, but the Japanese industry maintained a 
significant edge in the mid to late 1980s, when companies made product investments for 
today's market. Thus, the capital costs alone for a new platform project were some $290 
per vehicle higher for the traditional industry in 1986, although only some $8 higher in 
1990. 
Public Variable 
This study did not examine any of the costs in this category, although it is clear 
that decreased infrastructure investments have increased the costs of moving goods in 
North America. 
Of course, we cannot uniquely identify costs with just one of these cells in reality. 
Thus we find the United States facing a four percent labor cost disadvantage against 
Japan in 1988 even if all other costs of production were equal. However, labor costs 
include health care costs, a 'public-fixed' cost in this analysis. We estimate health care 
costs at $797 a vehicle for 1988 US production, and these costs thus account for 26% of 
US labor costs and 4.6% of total costs per vehicle. If US health care costs were reduced 
by approximately SO%, making them comparable to Japanese and Canadian health care 
cost levels, the US "private-fixed" disadvantage of four percent due to labor costs would 
surely reduce, and perhaps even convert to an advantage, at least partially offsetting the 
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efficiency disadvantage. Similarly, the US cost of capital disadvantage of $290 per 
vehicle accounts for nearly two percent of total US 1988 costs. Eliminating these two 
differentials would lower the industry's 1988 costs and breakeven point by some four 
percent, nearly doubling our estimate of the industry's actual 1988 cost advantage over 
Japan. 
s-ry 
It is analytically useful to separate production costs into sources and types. 
However, the systemic nature of the complex operations of producing a vehicle prevent 
such clean separation in reality. The public policy environment sets important constraints 
upon and provides important assets for private initiatives, and performance dimensions 
that often appear to lie entirely within the private sector frequently are shaped by public 
policy choices. The realities of automotive production reinforce the importance of both 
public and private initiatives in addressing North American competitive deficits. 
Our policy simulations suggest that the most important available strategies for 
improving the overall competitiveness and performance of the North American industry 
are a combination of increased R&D expenditure by the industry and the capture of a 
relatively modest 15% of the Japanese vehicle (or parts) market. To be sure, these 
strategies require both public and private initiatives. However, public policy actions to 
encourage investment in the face of economic and industry problems, and to secure 
access to Japan's market probably take priority at the current time. 
In our judgment, the larger gap between the traditional North American and 
Japanese industries exists in the policy arena rather than, as many have assumed, in the 
private arena. Moreover, whatever the comparison between private and policy arenas 
today, the gap has closed more in the private arena since 1980 than in the policy arena, 
where the gap appears to be growing. 
Finally, whatever the role of private initiatives in producing the higher breakeven 
point of the North American industry, the decisions that resulted in this reflect rational 
management to a larger extent, and culpable management failure to a lesser extent than 
many in North America have assumed. The private sector decisions of the North 
American automotive industry that are subject to criticism often reflect the sharply altered 
automotive environment of the 1970s, and the normal difficulties of change rather than 
stubborn and ostrich-like management and labor. The Japanese industry has a lower 
breakeven volume, but that is sustained by growth in a shielded market, permitting price- 
competitive and profit-driven (e.g. investment) strategies, and that reflects, in part, public 
policy choices, as well as excellent strategic and tactical management. 
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Conclusion: Able to Compete--But Will They Survive? 
The Traditional North American Automotive Industry has shown that it can 
compete, and it has demonstrated substantial improvement during the past few years in 
production efficiency, vehicle quality, consumer satisfaction, and along additional 
competitive dimensions. Indeed, early results indicate that the Big Three may regain 
market share in 1992, in contrast to their market share erosion of the past decade. 
However, the fundamental question persists as to whether the industry can survive 
the next few years and be viable in the future. Policy-imposed disadvantages, serious 
concerns as to capital availability, and Japan's power and competitive resources all 
constitute severe threats to the Traditional industry's long term viability. 
In order to survive, the North American Big Three must continue to focus on a 
relentless pursuit of excellence in order to catch up with and surpass their stalwart 
competitors. There is no longer room for complacency or error in the increasingly 
competitive and hostile global automotive industry. At the same time, the North 
American governments must recognize the critical economic and social importance of the 
Traditional Automotive Industry , and work to create a policy environment that will 
enable the Traditional industry to effectively compete against foreign producers that 
enjoy formidable support from their own governments. 
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APPENDIX A. RECOMMENDATIONS FROM 
VARIOUS REPORTS ON COMPETITIVENESS 
The recommendations proposed earlier in this report have been somewhat narrowly 
focused to address issues of particular concern to the North American automotive 
industry. Various other competitive studies and reports in recent years have put forth a 
host of recommendations aimed at improving the overall competitive status of the US 
economy. Some of these are directed at the automotive industry, while the majority are 
more general in scope. A number of these proposals are highlighted below. First we 
present a compendium of public policy recommendations, followed by a list of suggested 
private initiatives. The sources of these recommendations are listed at the end of the 
appendix. 
Public Policy Recommendations 
Training and Education 
Expand the Head Start Program. 
Reaffm support of "America 2000" strategy for educational excellence and choice. 
Provide income tax deduction for interest expense from student loans, and allow 
penalty-free withdrawal from IRA'S for educational expenses 
Reorganize current job training and employment services into "Job Training 2000", a 
more effective and market-driven system coordinated through Private Industry 
Councils 
Provide comprehensive worker adjustment assistance with training, job search 
assistance, and temporary income support tailored to the needs of the individual 
Increase the emphasis on engineering education to increase the number of engineering 
graduates from American universities 
Structure work-study programs like those used in Germany and other European 
countries 
Create financial incentives for business-based and other non-traditional training 
programs; provide tax credits for businesses offering training in generic skills, and 
impose a sales tax on those who don't participate 
Use the military's training establishment and existing private vocational schools to train 
poorly educated civilians 
Promote apprenticeship programs on a nation-wide level, similar to those now in place 
in Europe and Oregon, Wisconsin, and Georgia 
Change accounting practices to promote investment in education and training; expense 
their costs instead of capitalizing them 
Relax anti-trust laws to encourage industry-wide education consortia 
Incorporate training into greatly expanded government technology diffusion programs 
Incorporate more and better educational criteria into the Labor Department's LIFT 
Award and the Commerce Department's Baldridge award 
Promote community colleges as technical interfaces with smaller companies 
Institute a payroll-based training levy 
Institute a crash program to upgrade the skills of today's labor force; create an Education 
Corps that works in tandem with industry to improve the capabilities of our citizens 
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Assure adequate training and support for managerial as well as technical skills (e.g., an 
industrial/comrnercial managerial/technological extension service like the existing 
Agricultural Extension Service) 
Foster an environment where learning is viewed as a lifelong, continuous, process via 
the availability of ongoing educational programs; provide additional incentives for 
investment in education - for acquisition of new job skills 
Health Care 
Achieve world-class health care for all Americans at a cost that is comparable to the 
other major industrial countries; a variety of containment strategies could be used 
(including expenditure caps) both to reduce unnecessary use of medical services and to 
improve efficiency of the health care payment system 
Require the use of regional reimbursement schedules by hospitals and physicians, and 
impose national spending targets and improved quality measurement systems 
Endorse a comprehensive systematic reform plan, which addresses access, cost, and 
quality; incremental, piecemeal changes will not address the systematic problem 
Institute health care legal reform: controlling the costs of health care, litigation, and 
liability expenses of all kinds and shifting the burden to society at large means a 
national health care system and new rules limiting both the incidence of and the 
awards attached to legal suits - including medical malpractice suits 
Address health care costs both in terms of cost containment and burden sharing. 
Develop competitive health care delivery systems that maintain high health-care 
standards, at world-class cost levels, with funding that maintains competitiveness of 
the industrial and service base 
Adopt measures to expand insurance coverage to the presently uninsured residents and 
thus reduce cost shifting to existing health plans 
Cost of Capital 
Raise both the national saving and investment rates substantially by the end of this 
decade 
Consider substitution of consumption-based taxes for all or some of our present income- 
based taxes 
Consider exempting all interest and dividend earnings from taxation 
Consider tax changes that discourage consumption, such as a VAT, a national sales tax, 
limitation of home-mortgage tax preference, or other sector-specific actions 
Introduce a sliding-scale capital gains tax that would start with very high rates for short- 
term gains and decline to zero for gains of ten years or more 
Raise the limits on maximum contributions to IRS's and other tax-deferred or exempt 
retirement savings plans, and allow limited withdrawals over the course of the plan 
Drop the quarterly report requirement as a symbolic act, and substitute semi-annual 
reports 
Eliminate tax exemptions for pension funds and other sources of financing for LBO's 
and hostile takeovers, and do away with tax deductibility of the interest on funds 
borrowed for such ends 
Change the fiduciary responsibilities of board members so that they are legally charged 
with taking adequate care of employees and communities, as well as of shareholders 
Establish guidelines that tie executive compensation to long-term performance 
Create tax incentives for a heavily bonus-based compensation system in which bonuses 
are based on the performance of the entire company 
Promote widespread use of ESOP's 
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Reform the banking system by allowing nationwide banking and by allowing banks to 
own a certain minimum level of shares in corporations; also, permit the creation of 
European-style universal banks in the US 
Relax the anti-trust laws to permit more corporate cross-shareholding and also to 
redefine the relevant markets for anti-trust purposes as international rather than 
domestic ones 
Remove limits on concentrated holdings, and lower tax disincentives for concentrated 
private ownership stakes 
Adjust tax incentives toward long-term, productive assets, and pass through tax 
incentives to pension holders 
Allow inside information to concentrated owners under rules that bar trading on it, and 
expand disclosure to encompass intangible and positional assets 
Provide greater access to management for concentrated owners, loosen restrictions on 
shareholder communications, loosen restrictions on institutional board membership, 
and encourage representation by significant shareholders, customers, and suppliers 
Allow lenders to provide both debt and equity capital 
Get companies to think long-term so they can make the strategic investments in 
equipment, training, and research needed to compete with the Japanese and Germans 
Determine what are internationally competitive tax practices and recognize the short- 
terdlong-term budget trade-offs in becoming competitive, e.g., accelerated 
depreciation for new equipment, tax credits for R&D, and incentives to hold 
investments longer to relieve some of the pressure to focus on short-term gains 
Make capital available for industrial development on terms that favor sustained 
investment in R&D and in improving manufacturing quality and efficiency 
Adopt tax policy to accentuate investment vs. consumption (such as liberalized rules for 
IRA contributions and withdrawals) 
Revise the Alternative Minimum Tax to reduce its cyclical effects 
Substitute a VAT for some or all of the present corporate income tax 
Balance the federal budget in the long term by: 
- Cutting defense spending by $100-150 Billion. (soliciting payment by host 
countries for US forces stationed there is one possible avenue) 
- Taxing social security and requiring a means test for entitlements 
- Reducing automatic COLA increases for federal and military retirees one percent 
below the CPI, and extending the retirement age for new entrants into the military; 
establishing a rule that federal retirees cannot be paid more in pensions than the 
salaries of those in active service 
- Reducing interest payments on the federal debt by shifting federal financing to 
shorter term, lower-interest bonds 
Remove the tax deduction for mortgage interest on second homes 
Eliminate home equity loans and impose stricter criteria for credit card issuance 
Partially replace the income tax with a value-added tax, with appropriate rebates for the 
Poor 
Infrastructure 
Develop a 2lst-century infrastructure, which entails smart highways, optical fiber 
networks, digital libraries, mag-lev trains, interactive television, high-speed digital 
communications, and national-level standard setting 
Place increasing reliance on user fees to fund transgrtation programs (82% vs. 73% in 
FY 1992) 
Implement the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act, a comprehensive 
package that authorized $15 1 Billion. over 6 years 
Create a capital budget for the Federal government 
Spur the Baby Bells to upgrade the communications infrastructure: 
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Establish national standards for advanced communications - Give relief from some of the regulations that curb their ability to deliver services 
over optical fiber links they might install 
- Double the rate of depreciation on existing lines that are replaced with fiber optics 
and digital switches 
- Pennit an experiment involving expansion of services to 10% of current customers 
to promote new service development 
- Require that the access fee paid to local carriers on long-distance calls be used for 
upgrading networks to fiber optics and advanced switches 
- Establish government-business working groups to facilitate greater commercial use 
of the technologies developed in the National Research and Education Network and 
the National Science Foundation Network 
Appoint a federal infrastructure czar with the authority to coordinate all executive 
branch infrastructure projects 
Create a mechanism, i.e., a National Infrastructure Bank, to finance certain types of 
infkastructure projects, especially those on the state and local levels 
Provide a unified national R&D policy for both civilian and military agencies, as part of 
an overall policy emphasis on commercialization 
Complete deregulation of the air transportation system; build more airports and expand 
present gate utilization 
Assure an adequate port system and encourage US shipping availability at competitive 
costs 
Fiscal, Monetary, and Trade Policy 
Conclude the Uruguay Round; continue bilateral negotiations; aggressively exercise 
existing US trade laws, control policies, and export finance programs 
Pursue continued resolution of the Third World debt crisis and encourage greater 
coordination of economic and monetary policies to promote economic growth 
Simplify the cross-border tax policies to make the US more competitive, and coordinate 
regulatory policies with other industrial countries 
Increase funding of the Export-Import Bank (from $567 Mil, to $682 Mil.) 
Ensure existing US international trade laws remain truly effective under GATT 
Allow companies aggrieved by unfair foreign trading practices a private right of action 
in federal court to redress these grievances - especially for illegal dumping and 
subsidies 
Eliminate by 1995 the deficit in our global trade in goods and services and hence halt 
the need to borrow abroad with consequent further buildup in the nation's foreign debt 
Work to enhance the US position as an exporter of products based on high levels of skill 
and high value added, i.e., manufactures that can support high wages 
Consider agreement among the G-7 to maintain the dollar at a competitive level, 
building on the "reference ranges" that were agreed in 1987. 
Consider agreements with the EC and Japan to coordinate macroeconomic and 
monetary policies to sustain world growth and thus a hospitable environment for 
continuing trade expansion 
Consider promoting US trade results through the various international negotiations now 
underway, including the G A T ,  NAITA, and Enterprise for the Americas Initiative 
Expand the Export-Import Bank to match the magnitude and effectiveness of other 
countries' export programs 
Eliminate or sharply reduce many of the excessive national security controls, foreign 
policy controls, sanctions, short supply controls, etc. that now curtail foreign sales by 
US firms 
Reduce staff turnover in the relevant government agencies to improve America's ability 
to negotiate beneficial trade agreements 
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Consider halving of the trade deficit, by doubling Export-Import Bank lending authority 
and encouraging the Bank actively to seek out new borrowers, doubling the US 
government export promotion effort, aggressively monitoring dumping and other trade 
law violations, negotiating with the Japanese industq a concrete plan to raise to 80% 
the US labor and materials content of Japanese autos and electronics produced in the 
US, and preventing any short term strengthening of the dollar 
Adopt a new international economic policy that focuses on: 
- Structure, acknowledging that it does matter what the US produces and that the US 
needs to maintain leadership in industries such as aircraft and electronics 
- Reciprocity, which should be the fundamental basis of trade policy, balancing 
opportunities in some agreed manner 
- Types of trade, recognizing the essential differences between natural resources, 
common goods, government goods (like defense products), and high-value-added 
industrial goods. Use different approaches for each type of trade 
- GATT, which should be remodeled in the form of a true world trade organization 
- Trade blocs, like EC '92 and NAFTA and emerging structures in the Pacific region, 
may continue to spur the removal of trade and investment barriers. 
Declare an explicit policy of responding aggressively to targeting policies by foreign 
industries 
Pass an economic stimulus package 
- Consider measures such as a tax credit to consumers for auto purchases 
- Finance it to the maximum extent possible through spending cuts in order to hold 
down the deficit and maintain stable interest rates 
- Act as quickly as possible to give the economy the needed "shot in the arm" 
- Market it carefully to the public to increase consumer confidence 
- Present GATT "anti-dumping" proposals are unacceptable as unenforceable 
- NAFTA must include strong rule of origin requirements (preferred goal: 75%) 
- NAFTA must protect present industries in Mexico with gradual phase-out 
provisions 
- Require dislocation planfprovisions and evaluate gains from Mexican market versus 
loss of jobs in NAFTA negotiations 
- Utilize business/industry representatives on NAFTA negotiation teams 
Convince President and Administration to adopt Mr. Poling's January 9 statement to 
JAMA as policy in handling US-Japan trade to achieve ultimate balance 
Identify and promote the GAC as spokesperson for the US auto industry in trade matters 
Pursue joint Council trade positions/recommendations and communicate and publish 
collectively and personally to Congressional members and government agencies; 
develop a publicity campaign for public consumption, utilize company newsletters to 
raise employee awareness, and encourage employee letter campaigns to Congressional 
representatives 
Reorient US policy to emphasize domestic measures to maintain competitiveness rather 
than negotiations to remove barriers 
Fund export promotion on a par with competitor countries; make export promotion a 
priority for the whole diplomatic staff, not just commercial officers abroad; use 
competitive policies on export financing assistance 
Condition US foreign aid on purchase of US capital goods, construction services, etc. 
Limit trade actions to cases where an important US industry is facing substantial harm 
from foreign market barriers that domestic measures cannot alleviate 
- Increase USTR staffing; create more high-level positions 
- Reduce turnover of government officials and representation of foreign interests by 
former key government officials 
Reject unilateral free trade; embrace and pursue free trade where there is a strong 
commitment to and enforcement of free trade for the nations involved 
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Base criteria for which foreign companies can participate in government technology and 
other programs on reciprocity (i.e., how US f m s  are treated in the other country) and 
performance (i.e., long-term benefits to the US economy) 
The US Trade Representative should spend less time forcing open the Japanese markets 
for rice and more time boosting electronics exports 
Coordinate defense R&D more closely with commercial objectives 
Initiate government- to-government negotiations targeted at the automotive trade 
imbalance: 
- Eliminate the remaining formal and informal barriers to North American vehicle 
access to the Japanese market, and encourage purchases of such vehicles to levels 
that will dissipate the cultural bias in Japan to buy Japanese 
- Rapidly increase the level of business with proven North American suppliers by 
changing the level of expectations of existing Japanese keiretsu suppliers in North 
American and Japan as regards to growth and business share 
- Within the working levels of the Japanese vehicle manufacturers, increase the 
desire to purchase components and engineering services from traditional North 
American suppliers 
- Expand the aftermarket channels for autoparts on Japanese vehicles beyond the 
existing Japanese-controlled dealership network in both North America and Japan 
- If these steps are not taken or progress is not sufficient, negotiate an agreement 
similar to the agreement that exists between Japan and the EC that establishes 
transitional quotas and targets on automotive imports during the remainder of the 
1990's 
Regulations 
Increase the gasoline tax up to $1 per gallon over 5 years, with appropriate rebates for 
the poor or severely impacted 
Favor efforts that foster continued evolutionary improvement in fuel economy 
technology, but oppose congressionally mandated extreme CAFE increases; increase 
lobbying efforts and develop a joint Council/grassroots program 
Commit to protect the environment for all future generations 
Seek to lead in the setting of regulatory goals for environmental attainment with 
flexibility in how to meet them 
Encourage the application of sound scientific methodology to the timely solution of 
environmental issues 
Work in full partnership with the public and government in environmental consensus 
building 
Work to anticipate the need for environmental legislation or regulation, thereby 
achieving stable longer-term policy 
Enhance environmental performance by setting standards and milestones, regular 
measurement of programs and reporting, sharing of solutions, and involve employees 
in process 
Adopt product liability reform as a priority for 1992; recognize that product liability 
reform is the fmt  step towards the goal of achieving broader reform of the tort system 
to gain better balance between the risks and rewards for both parties in lawsuits 
Develop anecdotes to support the need for product liability reform, including: costs 
borne by the current system; examples of unfair and unbalanced awards or settlements; 
and examples of depressing effect on product innovation 
Undertake an overall assessment of the regulatory system that currently exists in North 
America, the economic impact the system has on North American industry, how both 
the system and its impact compare with North America's global trading partners, and 
the need to effect changes. 
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Social Welfare 
Consider an extension and widening of unemployment benefits and increased funding 
for other safety net programs 
Seek continued progress in social welfare programs, at an efficient and affordable pace, 
including civil rights progress, problems of poverty, Medicare, crime, and drugs. 
Increase business involvement with key urban study centers that shape long-term policy 
alternatives for government; enhance industrial funding, exchange programs, and 
dialogue 
Core Technologies 
Make permanent the Research and Experimentation Tax Credit and extend for 18 
months the rules governing allocation of foreign and domestic R&D expenditures 
Achieve a growth rate in manufacturing productivity in the 1990's that equals or 
exceeds Japan's and continues to exceed that of other industrial countries 
Shift the focus of Federal technology policy from scientific breakthroughs to 
commercial follow-through 
Consider new mechanism for government and industry to work together to develop 
generic pre-competitive technologies 
Re deploy technological resources freed by the end of the Cold War to support the 
restoration of American competitiveness; redirect at least part of the National 
Laboratory system toward commercial ventures 
Develop new programs and institutions aimed at technology diffusion and application, 
such as a manufacturing extension program on the model of our agricultural extension 
service 
Establish a full-fledged National Technology Extension Service, modeled after the 
highly successful Agricultural Extension Service, to encourage small- and medium- 
sized businesses to introduce new technologies into their operations by offering low- 
cost leasing or accelerated depreciation options 
Undertake new efforts to glean commercial spin-offs from the national labs; make part 
of their funding contingent on their formation of cooperative R&D projects with 
private industry 
Develop targeted tax policies to spur industrial and technological development, using 
both credits and accelerated depreciation schedules for development of technologies 
identified as critical to optimum US economic performance; such policies must be 
highly nuanced 
Use government purchasing power to stimulate technology development, by providing 
accessible markets for US products incorporating new technologies (within the rules 
permitted by GAIT) 
Revise the anti-trust laws to promote collaborative research efforts and allow these to 
continue through generic development stages of technology development 
Provide advance certification for certain joint projects as not infringing anti-trust laws 
(e.g., safe harbor market shares) 
Enlarge information and exhortation to US manufacturers on how to make things better 
Make permanent the IRS rule that allows &I% of a taxpayer's US incurred research and 
experimentation expenses to be directly allocated to US source income 
Assist small and rnid-sized suppliers to improve their product development abilities and 
incorporate more advanced technologies into their processes with a manufacturing 
equivalent to the agricultural extension service 
Develop a system for diffusing technologies to small and medium-sized companies - Industrial extension services to diffuse new technologies 
- Fund a program to lease modem production equipment at subsidized rates 
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- Facilitate the commercialization of technology from the national labs to US firms 
by reducing red tape and funding transfer programs 
Provide speedier enforcement of intellectual property laws 
Use risk-sharing R&D partnerships for development of new technologies of commercial 
interest on a coherent, strategic basis 
Government-Industry-Labor Cooperation 
Adopt synergistic labor-management relations as an important source of productivity 
Revise US labor law with a view to creating more flexible work rules in exchange for 
greater job security; provide incentives for cooperation and remove incentives for 
adversarial relationships 
Replace the nation's present captive defense industry with a procurement system 
dominated by a world-class civilian manufacturing base; eliminate unique laws, 
regulations and business practices that currently require specialized defense 
operations, and encourage commonalty of production 
Increase Washington-based lobbying visits, supplemented with grassroots 
communications 
Identify champions in the Executive Branch as friends of industry 
Support government/industry partnership as personified in recent Asian mission of the 
president 
The Federal government should focus on varied "experiments" to tap the full capability 
of government and industry through joint, cooperative efforts - that work together 
towards common objectives and tap the strengths of each partner 
* Work to simplify and make flexible the modes of cooperation between the government 
and private sector 
Cost-sharing is recommended, but it should not be so burdensome or rigid as to thwart 
the formation of partnerships, and work-in-kind should be counted as a cost share 
Form government-industry partnerships for technology development and low-cost, 
quality production 
Adopt a new system of labor law that promotes cooperation rather than conflict 
Conclusions-Immediate Public Policy Actions 
Designate an agency, perhaps a substantially strengthened Department of Commerce or 
the International Trade Commission with its functions greatly expanded, that would 
raise the nation's awareness of the competitiveness problem and initiate action 
Implement the provisions of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act that 
require preparation of Competitiveness Impact Statements for all new government 
programs; the Administration should prominently include a Competitiveness Impact 
Statement with each recommendation or report on legislation that it submits to 
Congress. The Congress should insist that such Statements be submitted, review them 
carefully, and take them fully into account in making its decisions on all relevant 
legislation 
Constitute a Federal Economic Structure Council to analyze current US policies and 
their impact on economic performance and identify desirable lines along which any 
necessary restructuring should take place 
Provide Executive Branch mechanisms to coordinate and administer economic structure 
and technology policies 
Use a major portion of the peace dividend to reduce the cost of capital (through reduced 
deficits, investment tax credits, revision of the alternative minimum tax, or other 
changes identified later) 
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Review the entire regulatory approach, to assure consistency with world 
competitiveness, cost-effectiveness, and coherency 
Include more private-sector executives in the next Administration to enhance 
cooperation among government and industry; consider an executive "exchange 
Program" between government and industry 
Form a bi-partisan committee with key representatives from the Executive and 
Legislative branches to establish a competitiveness blueprint for North American 
manufacturing, to develop key strategies and ensure their implementation 
Private Initiatives 
Quality and Reliability 
Increased manufacturing focus on total quality systems and productivity 
Increased investment to upgrade manufacturing processes and capabilities 
Improve quality and reliability 
- Streamline the supply chain 
- Increase supplier quality assurance capability and provide expanded training. 
Ford's quality improved 72% for cars and 76% for trucks from 1980, and now is as 
good as some of the high-volume Japanese manufacturers, and approaching the best 
Productivity and Cost Reduction 
Identification and deployment of world class practices required to continuously improve 
productivity and quality 
Improve productivity and reduce costs 
Streamline overhead structure and reduce levels of management. The 1991 James 
Harbour report on assembly plant productivity placed 3 US Ford car assembly plants as 
having the highest productivity in the US, better than any of the Japanese transplants, 
and approaching the productivity of the best Japanese plants. The same report placed 3 
US Ford truck plants with the highest productivity in the US. Ford had 7 of the top 10 
most productive truck plants 
Human Resource Effectiveness and Union Relations 
Employee education and training efforts focused on upgrading basic skills and 
enhancing operational capabilities. 
Continued efforts toward increasing employee involvement, empowerment and 
responsibility. 
Improve human resource effectiveness and union relations 
- Expand employee involvement, empowerment, and team structures to achieve 
business goals. Ford is an acknowledged leader in executing these strategies in all 
its plants and offices. 
- Emphasize employee development and skills training to increase employee 
competence and commitment. Ford allocates over 2% of payroll for these 
activities, more than double its expenditures in prior decades. Ford has been 
recognized as best-in-class for its employee development initiatives and for 
working to improve public education in its communities. 
- Develop cooperative relations between labor and management to improve business 
performance and enhance the well-being of employees. Ford and the UAW are 
highly regarded for the quality of the relationship they have developed, resulting in 
best-in-class joint programs. 
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Leading Edge Products 
Use of R&D to improve product design and manufacturing technologies. 
Integration and concurrent performance of R&D, product design and manufacturing 
processes to achieve greater efficiency and reduce both cycle times and time-to-market. 
Other Private Sector Actions 
Increased emphasis on overseas market opportunities and exports 
The entire value chain - from assembler through component supplies - increasingly 
must be viewed as a competitive unit 
Increased trust and mutualism must occur along each segment of the supply chain 
Relationships must become less adversarial and move toward increased cooperation, 
mutual dependence and partnering 
Fundamental changes are required in moving toward longer-term supply contracts and 
earlier supplier involvement in development and design delegation 
To support change, enhanced mechanisms for communication, information flow and 
cooperation between North American vehicle manufacturers and the supply base must 
occur 
Industry opportunities for cooperative endeavors in research, development and 
manufacturing should be identified, sponsored and initiated by industry associations 
and groups. 
Industry associations and groups also should form partnerships with academic 
institutions to enhance technology development and provide basic education and 
employee training 
Industry organizations also can enhance industry competitiveness through improved 
collection and dissemination of key automotive benchmark data dealing with R&D, 
trade patterns, manufacturing, production and quality levels, financial measures, 
investment and related matters 
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